Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute ResolutionCambridge University Press, 23.2.1996 - 272 sivua Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures. |
Sisältö
Proportionality for n 2 | 6 |
12 Divideandchoose and applications | 8 |
13 Filterandchoose and applications | 12 |
14 The role of information | 16 |
15 Austins movingknife procedure and applications | 22 |
Proportionality for n 2 the divisible case | 30 |
22 The SteinhausKuhn lonedivider procedure | 31 |
23 The BanachKnaster lastdiminisher procedure | 35 |
67 A fourperson movingknife procedure | 126 |
Envyfree procedures for arbitrary n | 129 |
72 Two approximate procedures | 130 |
73 J An infinite procedure | 133 |
74 A finite procedure | 138 |
75 Applying the trimming procedure to indivisible goods | 143 |
76 Efficiency entitlements and chores | 148 |
Appendix | 156 |
24 The DubinsSpanier movingknife procedure | 36 |
25 Applications of lastdiminisher and its movingknife version | 38 |
26 The Fink lonechooser procedure | 40 |
27 Woodalls and Austins extensions of Finks procedure | 41 |
28 Efficiency entitlements and chores | 44 |
Proportionality for n 2 the indivisible case | 51 |
32 Knasters procedure of sealed bids | 52 |
33 Lucas method of markers | 57 |
34 Efficiency and entitlements | 62 |
Envyfreeness and equitability for n 2 | 65 |
42 Bargaining and fair division | 66 |
43 The AdjustedWinner AW procedure | 68 |
44 The ProportionalAllocation PA procedure | 75 |
45 The combined procedure | 78 |
46 Three or more players | 80 |
47 Conclusions | 83 |
Appendix | 85 |
Applications of the pointallocation procedures | 95 |
53 A hypothetical divorce settlement | 98 |
54 A real divorce settlement | 102 |
55 AW versus Knasters procedure | 108 |
56 Conclusions | 113 |
Envyfree procedures for n 3 and n 4 | 115 |
62 The SelfridgeConway discrete procedure | 116 |
63 The Stromquist movingknife procedure | 120 |
64 The LevmoreCook movingknife procedure | 122 |
65 The Webb movingknife procedure | 124 |
66 Two other movingknife procedures for n 3 | 125 |
Dividethedollar | 158 |
a reasonable payoff scheme | 160 |
adding a second stage | 163 |
combining DD1 and DD2 | 168 |
85 The solutions with entitlements | 170 |
86 Conclusions | 173 |
Appendix | 174 |
Fair division by auctions | 178 |
92 Twostage auctions | 181 |
the privatevalue case | 183 |
the winners curse | 188 |
the commonvalue case | 191 |
96 Conclusions | 198 |
Appendix | 201 |
Fair division by elections | 204 |
102 The Hare system of single transferable vote STV | 206 |
103 The Borda count | 209 |
104 Cumulative voting | 212 |
105 Additionalmember systems | 213 |
106 Controlled roundings | 216 |
the search may be futile | 219 |
108 Constrained approval voting CAV | 225 |
109 Conclusions | 228 |
Conclusions | 231 |
Glossary | 237 |
| 248 | |
| 264 | |
Muita painoksia - Näytä kaikki
Fair Division: From Cake-cutting to Dispute Resolution Steven J. Brams,Alan D. Taylor Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 1996 |
Yleiset termit ja lausekkeet
Additional-member algorithm Alice announced valuation applicable approval voting assignments assume Austin's procedure bid in stage Bob and Carol Bob cuts Bob thinks Bob's Borda count Brams call cut candidates Carol and Ted Carol thinks chapter choice chooser chores common value considers controlled roundings Cumulative voting divide the cake divide-and-choose division Dutch auction efficient egalitarian outcome election English auction ensure entitlements envy envy-free allocation envy-free procedure equal equitability estimate exactly example fair fair-division procedure four players G₁ give guarantee highest bidder illustrate indivisible initial irrevocable advantage issues Knaster's procedure knife least lone-divider moving-knife procedure n-person Nash equilibrium Panama Canal treaty parties percent player receives player thinks point-allocation points preferences problem seats second-highest bid single transferable vote solution stage I bids Steinhaus strictly better TEFs Theorem three pieces three players tied for largest trimming procedure two-stage auctions usurp Vickrey auction voters winner winner's curse wins yields
Suositut otteet
Sivu 4 - Obs. malice; (2) painful or resentful awareness of the advantage enjoyed by another joined with a desire to possess the same advantage.