Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social LearningCambridge University Press, 2004 - 402 sivua Penguins jumping off a cliff, economic forecasters and financial advisors speculating against a currency, and farmers using traditional methods in India are all practising social learning. Such learning from the behavior of others may and does lead to herds, crashes, and booms. These issues have become, over the last ten years, an exciting field of research in theoretical and applied economics, finance, and in other social sciences. This book provides both an informal introduction and in-depth insights into the subject. Each chapter is devoted to a separate issue: individuals learn from the observations of actions, the outcomes of these actions, and from what others say. They may delay or make an immediate decision; they may compete against others or gain from cooperation; they make decisions about investment, crop choices, and financial investments. The book highlights the similarities and the differences between the various cases. |
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IX | 21 |
X | 23 |
XII | 24 |
XIII | 26 |
XIV | 27 |
XV | 30 |
XVII | 31 |
XVIII | 33 |
XX | 35 |
XXI | 38 |
XXIII | 39 |
XXIV | 42 |
XXV | 43 |
XXVII | 45 |
XXIX | 46 |
XXX | 48 |
XXXI | 49 |
XXXII | 51 |
XXXIII | 52 |
XXXIV | 53 |
XXXV | 54 |
XXXVI | 55 |
XXXVIII | 58 |
XXXIX | 62 |
XL | 63 |
XLII | 67 |
XLIII | 68 |
XLIV | 69 |
XLV | 71 |
XLVII | 74 |
XLVIII | 75 |
XLIX | 76 |
L | 77 |
LII | 78 |
LIII | 81 |
LIV | 84 |
LV | 86 |
LVI | 87 |
LVII | 90 |
LVIII | 91 |
LIX | 95 |
LX | 97 |
LXI | 99 |
LXII | 100 |
LXIII | 103 |
LXIV | 104 |
LXV | 105 |
LXVI | 107 |
LXVII | 108 |
LXVIII | 110 |
LXIX | 112 |
LXX | 113 |
LXXI | 115 |
LXXII | 118 |
LXXIII | 123 |
LXXIV | 124 |
LXXV | 127 |
LXXVI | 128 |
LXXVII | 129 |
LXXVIII | 130 |
LXXIX | 132 |
LXXX | 133 |
LXXXI | 134 |
LXXXII | 136 |
LXXXIII | 137 |
LXXXIV | 141 |
LXXXV | 145 |
LXXXVI | 149 |
LXXXVII | 151 |
LXXXVIII | 152 |
LXXXIX | 153 |
XC | 158 |
XCI | 161 |
XCII | 163 |
XCIII | 165 |
XCIV | 167 |
XCV | 170 |
XCVI | 174 |
XCVII | 175 |
XCIX | 176 |
CIX | 193 |
CX | 196 |
CXII | 200 |
CXIII | 205 |
CXV | 207 |
CXVI | 209 |
CXVII | 210 |
CXVIII | 211 |
CXIX | 213 |
CXX | 214 |
CXXI | 215 |
CXXII | 218 |
CXXIII | 222 |
CXXV | 224 |
CXXVI | 225 |
CXXVII | 227 |
CXXVIII | 228 |
CXXX | 231 |
CXXXI | 232 |
CXXXII | 233 |
CXXXIII | 235 |
CXXXIV | 237 |
CXXXV | 239 |
CXXXVI | 241 |
CXXXVII | 244 |
CXXXIX | 246 |
CXL | 248 |
CXLI | 249 |
CXLII | 250 |
CXLIII | 253 |
CXLIV | 257 |
CXLV | 261 |
CXLVI | 264 |
CXLVIII | 268 |
CXLIX | 272 |
CL | 274 |
CLI | 276 |
CLII | 282 |
CLV | 285 |
CLVI | 287 |
CLVII | 288 |
CLVIII | 291 |
CLX | 295 |
CLXI | 302 |
CLXIII | 306 |
CLXIV | 307 |
CLXV | 312 |
CLXVI | 315 |
CLXVII | 317 |
CLXVIII | 319 |
CLXIX | 322 |
CLXX | 324 |
CLXXI | 328 |
CLXXII | 330 |
CLXXIII | 333 |
CLXXIV | 336 |
CLXXV | 338 |
CLXXVI | 339 |
CLXXVII | 341 |
CLXXVIII | 342 |
CLXXIX | 343 |
CLXXX | 344 |
CLXXXI | 346 |
CLXXXII | 350 |
CLXXXIII | 354 |
CLXXXIV | 355 |
CLXXXV | 358 |
CLXXXVI | 359 |
CLXXXVII | 361 |
CLXXXVIII | 365 |
CLXXXIX | 369 |
CXCI | 370 |
CXCII | 373 |
CXCIV | 374 |
CXCV | 378 |
| 385 | |
| 395 | |
| 399 | |
Muita painoksia - Näytä kaikki
Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning Christophe P. Chamley Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 2003 |
Yleiset termit ja lausekkeet
action agent chooses agent with belief agents invest agents know agents observe aggregate activity arbitrage asset Assume assumption asymptotically Bayes's rule Bayesian BHW model cascade chapter condition continuum convergence cost defined delay demand density depends distribution of beliefs equal equation equilibrium strategy ex ante exchange rate EXERCISE exogenous expected value expert Figure finite fixed exchange rate Gaussian herd increases informational cascade informed agents interval investment in period large number Lemma marketmaker martingale mass of agents multiple equilibria Nash equilibrium noise traders normal distribution number of agents opportunity cost optimal p₁ parameters perfect information players private beliefs private information private signal probability of investment Proposition public belief random variable regime Section sequence social learning speculative attack SREE strategic complementarities symmetric equilibrium trade updated vanishingly small variance x₁ zero θ₁ θο μ₁ ρε σ²
Suositut otteet
Sivu i - ... the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Review of Economics and Statistics.

