The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

Lester W. Grau
DIANE Publishing, 1996 - 223 sivua
When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival.

Mitä ihmiset sanovat - Kirjoita arvostelu

Käyttäjän arvio  - seattlemaddy -

I bought this for my son when he was in the Marine Corp. one of his commanders recommended it. Lue koko arvostelu

Muita painoksia - Näytä kaikki

Yleiset termit ja lausekkeet

Suositut otteet

Sivu 124 - Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star and the Order for Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR (Third Class), and many medals.
Sivu 66 - This Report shows that Zabotin successfully fulfilled many of the tasks assigned to him. His superiors in Moscow were obviously satisfied with his work in Canada, for in August, 1945, he was awarded two Orders or Decorations, the Order of the RED BANNER, and the Order of the RED STAR, which, as Gouzenko said, "are given for good organization work". The Chief of General Intelligence telegraphed Zabotin to congratulate him on these awards and added: "I wish you further success in your honourable work".
Sivu xix - Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan, London: Brassey's 1991, p. 10; and Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent [Limited contingent], Moscow: Progress, 1994, p. 172. 2 Manuscript of Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, Tragediya I doblest...
Sivu 5 - There were three types of dry rations. The first contained a can of meat, some crackers or toast, some jam and a tea bag. The second contained two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat and a can of vegetables or fruit (ed.).
Sivu xiv - Soviets who served during the 10-year war. Far more telling were the 469,685 other casualties, fully 73 percent of the overall force, who were wounded or incapacitated by serious illness. Some 415,932 troops fell victim to disease, of which 115,308 suffered from infectious hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoid fever. Beyond the sheer magnitude of these numbers is what the figures say about Soviet military hygiene and the conditions surrounding troop life. These numbers are unheard of in modern armies...
Sivu xiv - ... a microcosm for the internal weakness of the society as a whole. According to one study: The messages of doubt were military, political, ethnic, and social. In the end they were corrosive and destructive. One needs only review the recently released casualty figures to underscore the persuasiveness of the problem. Soviet dead and missing in Afghanistan amounted to almost 15,000 troops, a modest percent of the 642,000 Soviets who served during the 10-year war.
Sivu 42 - Afghan government and were responsible for detecting and eradicating domestic political opposition, subverting the mujahideen, penetrating opposition groups abroad and providing military intelligence to the armed forces through its military wing. The KHAD was patterned after the KGB and GRU and apparently reported to the KGB (ed.).
Sivu 40 - BTR or bronetransporter is an eight-wheeled armored personnel carrier that can carry up to an 11-man squad. It mounts 14.5mm and 7.62mm machine guns and can carry antitank weapons as well. The BTR and BMP were the most-common infantry carriers of the Soviet Forces (ed.).
Sivu 140 - BMD or boevaya mashìna desanta is an air-dropable, armored personnel carrier that carries up to nine men (usually a maximum of seven). It has the same turret as the BMP, so the BMD-1 has the 73mm cannon of the BMP-1, while the BMD-2 has the 30mm chain gun of the BMP-2.
Sivu xviii - Union reportedly killed 1.3 million people and forced five and a half million Afghans (a third of the prewar population) to leave the country as refugees. Another two million Afghans were forced to migrate within the country.

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