Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical LifeCambridge University Press, 20.1.2011 Andrew Sayer undertakes a fundamental critique of social science's difficulties in acknowledging that people's relation to the world is one of concern. As sentient beings, capable of flourishing and suffering, and particularly vulnerable to how others treat us, our view of the world is substantially evaluative. Yet modernist ways of thinking encourage the common but extraordinary belief that values are beyond reason, and merely subjective or matters of convention, with little or nothing to do with the kind of beings people are, the quality of their social relations, their material circumstances or well-being. The author shows how social theory and philosophy need to change to reflect the complexity of everyday ethical concerns and the importance people attach to dignity. He argues for a robustly critical social science that explains and evaluates social life from the standpoint of human flourishing. |
Sisältö
| 1 | |
2 Values within reason | 23 |
values and practical reason | 59 |
4 Beings for whom things matter | 98 |
5 Understanding the ethical dimension of life | 143 |
6 Dignity | 189 |
7 Critical social science and its rationales | 216 |
8 Implications for social science | 246 |
Comments on philosophical theories of ethics | 253 |
| 264 | |
| 279 | |
Muita painoksia - Näytä kaikki
Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life Andrew Sayer Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 2011 |
Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life Andrew Sayer Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 2011 |
Yleiset termit ja lausekkeet
able abstract acknowledge actions actors argue argument Aristotle assess autonomy become behaviour Bourdieu capabilities approach capacity Chapter character claims Collier commitments common concern context critical theory critique cultural depends develop dignity discourse discourse ethics dispositions dominant dualisms emotions emotivism emotivist ethic of care ethical ethnocentrism eudaimonia evaluative everyday example experience fallible feel feminism flourishing and suffering Habermas harm hence human nature ideas ill-being imagine implies important individuals inequalities influence instrumental rationality interaction involves kind lack live logic MacIntyre Martha Nussbaum matters means merely modern moral sentiments naturalistic fallacy normative ethics norms Nussbaum objects one’s ourselves particular people’s person philosophers phronesis political practical judgement practical reason problem reductionism reflection reflexivity relationship respect responses Sayer self-interest sense shame situation social science social scientists society someone sometimes subjective tend theory things tion treat understanding valuations values virtues vulnerability Weber well-being