the lawyer do this? Yes; he may do it with true fidelity to his client, with a proper fidelity to the law which he has sworn to uphold, and to his own conscience, unless the method which he suggests to his client (which is itself legal) will, in his judgment, create an instrumentality hurtful to the state of which he is a citizen, or to the development of his country in the paths of freedom, liberty, and progress.

The duty which the lawyer owes his client is undoubtedly great. It is said by some that he must forget self and regard only his client. From that view I must dissent. I do not believe, under any proper system of ethics, that a lawyer can be held as surrendering, when he accepts a retainer, his personal notions of propriety or freedom of personal action. To do so would be to surrender the right of self-use and personal responsibility to the paramount right of another. In the illustration given, the client who desires to accomplish under one form what the law will not permit under another has no right to demand your services in accomplishing the desired object if you do not believe that the operation of trusts in this country is for the good of the country; while to the lawyer who holds that the trusts are advantageous to the country, no such objection can attach, and there are not a few who hold, and are prepared to demonstrate, that the capitalization of capital and the consolidation of administration under one organization is a most desirable thing for the country, commercially, economically, and socially.

While, therefore, I maintain that no man is justified, as a lawyer, in advising his client to evade the law that may be obstructing him, if the end to be accomplished, in his opinion, is against the public good, I feel that it is perfectly consistent in another lawyer to give the

advice which would accomplish the same ends for the client, if he believes the object a good one, because it must never be forgotten that such a lawyer is not advising his client to break the law. He is merely taking advantage of the weakness of the law to accomplish for his client what the law does not forbid and which he himself approves.

A principle which must be faithfully guarded in the practice of the law is that of never appearing in a case in which you may be embarrassed in the prosecution of your client's cause by your relationship to the adverse party by ties of blood or business or social life. Your client is entitled to your best efforts always. Can he have such if the ties of blood between you and the adverse party are close and tender? If your business relations with him have been such as to preclude you from an attack which your client's cause may demand? Or if socially you have been so related to him as to make it difficult, if not impossible, to show up your adversary in his true. relations to the case. This principle rests upon that exclusive right which the client has to your whole service, and if for any reason this may be paralyzed or weakened by your relationship to the adverse party, it is only meet and proper for you to decline the retainer.

I once knew a young man who was a "briefless barrister," struggling for the necessities of life in his profession, who was called upon to defend two men for murder. They were charged with the murder of, and had killed, a gentleman and his wife who were his friends, and at whose house he had oftentimes enjoyed the kindliest hospitality. A refreshing retainer of $2,500 was the seductive temptation to the offer. He refused the retainer, because the case as developed by those who desired his services showed that it would be necessary to make an

attack upon the character of one of the parties killed. To my mind, he was right in so refusing, because, if he were a true friend, he would naturally doubt whether the attack on his friend was justifiable, or, at least, the feelings of friendship for the dead would minimize and lessen the vigor of the attack which his client's cause might demand for its successful defense.

A lawyer is often asked whether it is consistent with good morals for him to enter the "plea of the statute of limitations" in a case where he knows his client owes a debt and attempts to avoid it by the interposition of this plea. This question involves, in a measure, the same considerations which we have considered heretofore. The lawyer finds the law already made for him, with no power to change it to meet a special case, and, as an officer of the law, he is expected and required to live up to it and to enforce it. The lawmaker undoubtedly finds, as a primary principle of human nature, that man will surely demand what is his own in due season. If it is his, or if he has a right to it, he will certainly demand it, and that, too, in as short a period as possible. Some from motives of generosity, some because of ample means, or it may be from engrossment in other matters, may make their demands at different periods; and the lawmaker, with this principle of human nature before him, writes a law that if the demand is not made within a prescribed period, which period is supposed to cover the time in which such demands should naturally be made, that the interposition of the "plea of the statute of limitations" shall prevent the enforcement of the claim. That limitation becomes a part of the contract when entered into. This is known to debtor and creditor alike. The creditor, as a part of his contract, knows that he can only enforce it

within a fixed period; the debtor knows that he may be free from the liability unless it is enforced within that period.

And the limitation is fixed for another reason that the contract out of which the demand springs can often be proven only by the living. If no limitation were put upon demands, the creditor might wait until the demise of all those who were cognizant of the contract, and then attempt to take advantage of the position of the supposed debtor by enforcing the contract which he is unable to disprove. This is strikingly illustrated in the requirements in many jurisdictions where executors are required by law to plead the statute of limitations in all cases in which their decedent's estates are involved, and the failure to do so makes the executor personally liable. The law in this case, therefore, is made with no idea that it will, or can, cover all cases that may arise; but, taking human nature as we find it, together with the motives that actuate debtor and creditor alike, the best solution of the rights of each is found in the limitation upon the right of demand by the one and the release from payment to the other.

That some debtor may unjustly avail himself of the law to rob his creditor, even with the knowledge of the lawyer who interposes the plea, may be true; but on what ground can the lawyer, whose duty it is to uphold the law, refuse to apply it for his client? This is but another instance of the inadequacy of the law to meet every demand upon it. Indeed, in the consideration of the "plea of the statute of limitations," and the duty of the lawyer to plead it for his client, it must not be forgotten that it is in effect as if it had been written in the original contract that "this contract can be enforced within the fixed period of the statute and not afterwards," and if that be the real effect of the statute, on

what ground can the creditor complain if the defendant avails himself of the contract as made? The statutory limit is, in effect, the year of jubilee for the debtor, when emancipation from his obligation comes under the law of the land, and with the consent of the creditor who entered into the contract with full knowledge of the law. The same view is maintained as to the pleas of infancy and usury.

Many lawyers in the practice before the courts, thinking to add strength to their cause, frequently express, with semidramatic power, their personal belief in the justice of their cause or the character of some witness. Such a habit is to be condemned. It is a misconception of the duty of a lawyer to suppose that any fact in his case can, or ought to, be bolstered up by the bulwark of his personal belief. Whether he believes his case just or not is a fact which the court has no right to take cognizance of, nor he to affirm. Its justice must rest upon other considerationsnotably, the law and the evidence as applied to the law in his case. His duty is to present every phase of the law that can bear upon any point in his case. The judge is to determine its legality, and the jury is to determine its credibility. He must by diligence array the facts, collect the law, and apply the one to the other, without regard to his personal opinion, leaving the facts as stated and the law as indicated, as applying to them, to determine the justice of his cause. He usurps the province of the court if he seeks to throw his own opinion as to the justice of his cause into the case, and makes of himself a witness in the cause -a position he would be unwilling to assume if asked to go on the stand in person.

On the other hand, this practice is open to another objection-when once begun it is difficult to curtail, and the lawyer will find, in the continual draft upon his own opinion as to the justice of his cause in each succeeding case, that the court and jury will soon begin to realize that his opinions of innocence on the one hand, or of the justice of his client's cause on the other, are the hysterical ebullitions of misjudged advocacy; while his failure to assert either, in any case, whenever the practice is begun, will be accepted as a tacit admission of the injustice of his cause or the guilt of his client.

The relations of the counsel to each other in the practice of law is one of the most important to be considered under this subject. "Uberima fides" must be the true relationship of counsel to each other in the discharge of their duties. Sharp practice that puts your antagonist at a disadvantage is neither becoming nor commendable, according to the true spirit which should actuate members of the profession. If your fight cannot be won in the open, let it fail. But success, won at the expense of open and honorable conduct, is far worse. than defeat.

The chivalry of the profession has ever been one of its chief glories. The crossing of lances in the open field should never be marred by a thrust below the belt. The entrance of those to the profession who would break down. the esprit that has ever controlled its leaders is greatly to be deplored, and they must soon be relegated to a position of innocuous retirement, if we would preserve to the world our priceless asset of courtly and decorous demeanor amid the heated contests of the forum.

Letter V

DID not expect to receive very many letters from you at this critical period of your history, without finding in some of them an allusion to your future location.

I have known all along that you did not feel quite satisfied at the prospect of coming in with me. You feel that Wilmotville is a somewhat restricted field for your activities, and, I suppose, with the proverbial ardor of youth, you long for distant scenes-for "fresh fields and That is laudable. pastures new." I think I diagnose your case correctly when I say that you feel the life of a lawyer in a small mid-Western town to be pretty humdrum; that it has nothing to offer you either in the way of money or political honors.

you are a little older, when a few of the rose dreams have vanished, when you have become a little more portly around the girth, and have ceased to fly up the steps of the courthouse in two vigorous leaps.

Frankly, I would not exchange my particular lot in this life with any man. I have my own well-ordered office and my own well-ordered business. Such an office to me is a haven of rest; not the rest of slothfulness, but the quiet peace of the regular day with its regular duties. There is a charm more subtle than I can express to you even in the inanimate furnishings of the office; in the neat rows of well-selected law books, with the uniform buff and red bindings on the outside of them and a measure of truth on the inside; in the well-worn desk at which your grandfather fifty years ago wrote his memorable speech in defense of Plinlimmon, unjustly accused of the murder of Mrs. Simmons; in the chairs polished with the arms of generations of clients as they recounted a hundred stories of wrong and injustice; even in the carpet, long faded into a grey and tasselled dotage, trodden by men who have achieved undying fame in a score of different lines of effort.

In my position a man becomes in

course of time a little court of justice in himself. Many and many a dispute have I settled without the trouble or expense of going to court. Most of the old settlers, as you know, refer their disputes to me, and my opinion is accepted by them as unquestioningly as if it were a mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States. This is well, and as it should be. The true lawyer is a pacifier, not a provoker. His efforts are more than commercial, higher and nobler than merely mercenary. On his integrity and good sense depend the well-being, not only of individuals in their petty differences, but also of the community as a whole, which prospers when time is saved by a peaceable settlement of disputes, and money goes into the land, instead of into the county treasury for costs, or into the pockets of ravenous lawyers for fees.

So I find in this life, my boy, a higher satisfaction than that which comes from feverishly watching a bank roll grow. My pleasures are simple, and the sight of a widow coming into my office in tears, and departing with smiles and renewed hope, warms my heart in a way that the tender of a seat on the Supreme Bench could hardly accomplish.

I never aspired to preside over a law corporation, with half a dozen stenographers, a dozen clerks, and four or five partners. I don't really feel quite comfortable on entering one of those ornate city offices, where a pert youngster demands your business, and then informs you that you may see one of the partners in anywhere from four hours to fourteen years. I suppose they are making money; but I am sure such men would be as depressed at the sudden cessation of litigation as the high-priced ear-and-nose specialist would be if every one should be created with healthy ears

and noses. If I felt like making a barrel of money, I assure you that the law business would be the last means I would choose for that purpose.

One of the big Chicago law corporations got after a poor woman down in my jurisdiction a few years ago. The property involved, a small farm-with all their brass plates and fixings, some of these fellows are glad to get very small fish in their nets-was situated in this county, and the case was tried here. I defended. The question involved a matter of tax titles, and I knew that my opponents were depending on technicalities and their awe-inspiring reputation to dislodge the woman.

Automobiles were coming into use then pretty generally, and one fine day one of those pretty toys, all red paint and gloss, wheezed and popped and crackled to a standstill under my office window, and presently a pompous, rather florid-complexioned man of about my age entered the office, breathing rather heavily from the effort of climbing the stairs. Between two fat, bejewelled fingers he held a thick smug-looking cigar, with one of those eye-destroying bands around it. He offered me the mate of that cigar, and being something of a smoker myself, and always ready to accept any expression of the good will of my fellow men, I took it; and after supper that night I enjoyed it mightily, as I reflected between the puffs on the events of the day.

My visitor eyed my little office with a great air of complacency, and decided that the whole effect was "very quaint -very quaint, indeed." In fact, I suppose he considered it an interesting survival of the "old school," whatever that was. He explained that he would have sent one of the boys down to try the little case (by that I suppose he meant one