VI. 1776. Sept. 15. guards. Silliman's brigade threw itself in despair CHAP. into the redoubt of Bunker hill, where Knox, at the head of the artillery, thought only of a gallant defence; but Burr, who was one of Putnam's aids, rode up to show them that a retreat was practicable, and guided them by way of the old Monument lane to the west side of the island, where they marched along the winding road now superseded by the Eighth avenue, and regained the Bloomingdale road near the present Sixtieth street. The respite which saved Putnam's division was due to Mary Lindley, the wife of Robert Murray. When the British army drew near her house on Incleberg, as Murray hill was then called, Howe and his officers, ordering a halt, accepted her invitation to a lunch; and by the excellence of her viands and old Madeira wine, and by the good-humor with which she parried Tryon's jests at her sympathy with the rebels, she whiled away two hours or more of their time, till every American regiment had escaped. Washington was the last to retire, riding from Bloomingdale but a few moments before it was occupied by the British infantry. The Americans left behind a few heavy cannon, and much of their baggage and stores; fifteen of them were killed; one hundred and fiftynine were missing, chiefly men who had wilfully loitered behind. The British gained the island as far as the eighth mile-stone, with but two Hessians killed and about twenty British and Hessians wounded. At night, their bivouac extended from the East river near Hellgate to the Hudson at Bloomingdale. On Harlem heights the American VI. CHAP. fugitives, weary from having passed fifteen hours under arms, disheartened by the loss of their tents 1776. and blankets, and wet by a cold driving rain that Sept. closed the sultry day, lay on their arms with only the sky above them. 15. NOTE. The account I have given of Washington's conduct in his attempt to rally the fugitives at Kip's bay agrees substantially with that of Marshall, (Marshall's Washington, i. 101, ed. 1843,) and with the matured judgment of Sparks, (Life of Washington, 199). Washington was justly vexed at the cowardice of the men whom he had stationed at Kip's bay; he reported it in unsparing terms to congress, and censured it in general orders. All agree that he attempted, but in vain, to rally the men; no one disputes that, with the good judgment of perfect self-possession, he gave immediately the wisest orders for the safety of the army, nor that his conduct on the occasion struck the army with such awe that he could count on its courage by the dawn of another day. The makers of gossip have gradually embroidered upon the incident of his serious and well-founded displeasure a variety of inconsistent details. Of strictly contemporary accounts, that is, of accounts written within a few days of the events, I find three of importance: Washington to Congress, September 16, 1776, in his Official Letters, i. 246, and in Sparks, iv. 94; Greene to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island, September 17, 1776, in Force, fifth series, ii. 370; and Cæsar Rodney at Philadelphia to Messrs. Read and Mackean, September 18, 1776. The account of Rodney is a report carefully prepared from various sources which he does not specify. I give an extract from it: "From all I can collect, this was the situation of affairs on Sunday morning, when the ships before mentioned began a very heavy firing at Turtle bay, to scour the country previous to their landing the troops, but hurt nobody, that I can hear of. When the firing ceased, their troops began to land, and ours to run as if the devil was in them. In spite of all the general could do, they never fired one gun. General Washington, having discovered the enemy's intention to land at that place, ordered a reënforcement, and set out there himself. However, before he got to the place, he met our people running in every direction. He endeavored by persuasion and threats to get them back, but all to no purpose; in short, they ran till they left the general to shift for himself." This letter shows clearly the opinion prevailing among men of sense in Philadelphia at the time. Greene's words are: "Fellows's and Parsons's whole brigade ran away from about fifty VI. 1776. Sept. 15. men, and left his excellency on the ground within eighty yards of the CHAP. enemy, so vexed at the infamous conduct of the troops that he sought death rather than life." That Washington sought to shame or to inspirit his men by setting them an example of desperate courage may be true; certainly a general who chides for cowardice can do it best when he has just given evidence of his own disregard of danger. The embellishments of the narrative, which have been gradually wrought out, till they have become self-contradictory and ludicrous, may be traced to the camp. A bitter and jealous rivalry, which the adjutant-general had assisted to foment, had grown up between the New England troops and those south of New England. Northern men very naturally found excuses for their brethren, and may have thought that Washington censured them too severely; but while I have had in my hands very many contemporary letters written by New Englanders on the events of this campaign, I have never found in any one of them the least reflection on Washington for his conduct in the field during any part of this day, unless the words of Greene are to be so interpreted. The imputations began with officers south of New England, and were dictated by a zeal to illumine and bring out in bold relief the dastardly behavior of the eastern runaways. The first effort in that direction may be seen in an official letter from Smallwood, the highest Maryland officer, to the convention of his state: " Sixty light infantry, upon the first fire, put to flight two brigades of the Connecticut troops, — wretches who, however strange it may appear, from the brigadiergeneral down to the private sentinel, were caned and whipped by the Generals Washington, Putnam, and Mifflin, but even this indignity had no weight; they could not be brought to stand one shot." Colonel Smallwood to Maryland Convention, October 12, 1776, in Force, fifth series, ii. 1013. This statement, so full of blunders and impossibilities, shows the camp to be not always "a correct source” of information. Gordon comes next; under the date of December 20, 1776, he writes: "His [Washington's] attempts to stop them [the troops] were fruitless, though he drew his sword and threatened to run them through, cocked and snapped his pistols." Gordon, ii. 327. Now a man on horseback, "within eighty yards" of an advancing enemy, could not, at one and the same time, have managed his horse and drawn his sword and cocked his two oldfashioned flint-lock horse-pistols. Gordon was capable of prejudice, and was no critic; when he cites a document, I hold it certain that he cites it truly, for I have found it so in every case where I have had occasion to verify his citations; when he tells a story, I hold it certain that some one had told it before; but I have found that his repeating it gives it no sure claim to credence. His work, which, notwithstanding all its faults, is invaluable, is by no means free from tales that, on examination, are VI. 1776. Sept. 15. CHAP. found untrustworthy. Succeeding writers sometimes find it hard if they cannot add a little to the statements of previous narrators. Ramsay has indulged himself in an exposition of the train of thought which was passing through Washington's mind at the time of the fright and consequent confusion. Ramsay's Revolution, i. 306, 307. Heath, publishing "Memoirs" in 1798, improves upon Gordon, and writes from hearsay: "Here it was, as fame hath said, that General Washington threw his hat on the ground." Heath's Memoirs, 60. Graydon repeats the hearsay, but without vouching for it, "that the general lost all patience, throwing his hat upon the ground in a transport of rage and indignation." Graydon in Littell's edition, 174. Now Washington was on horseback; did he get off his horse to pick up his hat in the face of Cornwallis and Clinton? Did he ride about in sight of the British and Hessians and of his own army for the rest of the day bareheaded, or in a begrimed hat and plume? I am almost ashamed of exposing so foolish a story, which rests on no authority. To sum up the whole: Trustworthy documents prove that the party at Kip's bay retreated in a cowardly manner; that Washington was angry at them for their cowardice, as he ought to have been; that he was the last to consent to turn away from the enemy; that he then with promptness and unimpeached good judgment did everything which remained to be done; that on the next day he had a more perfect command of the army, and more assurance of their courage, than for several weeks before. CHAPTER VII. THE EMBARRASSMENTS OF AMERICA. SEPTEMBER 15-30, 1776. VII. 1776. Sept. 15. THE cowardice of the troops at Kip's bay was CHAP. reported to congress by Washington with unsparing severity; and was rebuked in a general order, menacing instant death as the punishment of cowardice on the field. Meantime he used every method to revive the courage of his army. On the night of their reaching Harlem heights, he sent orders to Silas Talbot, who had accepted the perilous command of a fire-brig, to make an attempt on the ships of war that lay in the Hudson, near the present One hundred and twenty-fourth street. At two o'clock in the dark and cloudy morning 16. of the sixteenth, the officer left his hiding-place, three or four miles above Fort Lee, ran down the river under a fair wind, and, grappling the "Renommé," set his brig on fire. He was burned almost to blindness, yet escaped with his crew; the "Renommé" freed itself without injury; but, with |