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CHAP. enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to attempt to hold a post, from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am, therefore, inclined to think that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but, as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders, as to evacuating Mount Washington, as you may judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last. So far as can be collected from the various sources of intelligence, the enemy must design a penetration into Jersey, and to fall down upon your post. You will, therefore, immediately have all the stores removed, which you do not deem necessary for your defence."

Having thus disposed of the question of Fort Washington by revoking the order to defend it to the last, and providing, as he believed, for its evacuation, and having ordered "immediate" preparations for evacuating Fort Lee, he turned his 9. mind to other duties. On the ninth, he began sending with Putnam to the Jerseys five thousand troops, of which he was himself to take the com10. mand. On the tenth, Lee, who, with about seven thousand five hundred continental troops and militia, was to remain behind till all doubt respecting Howe's movements should be over, was warned, in written orders, to guard against surprises, and to transport all his baggage and stores to the northward of Croton river, with this final instruction: "If the enemy should remove the greater part of their force to the west side of Hudson's

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river, I have no doubt of your following, with CHAP. all possible despatch." Then, having finished his work with a forecast that neglected nothing, Wash- 1776. ington rode from White Plains an hour before noon, and reached Peekskill at sunset.

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On the morning of the eleventh, attended by Heath, Stirling, the two Clintons, Mifflin, and others, he went in boats up the magnificent defile of the Highlands, past Forts Independence and Clinton and the unfinished Fort Montgomery, as far as the island on which Fort Constitution commanded the sudden bend in the river. A glance of the eye revealed the importance of the opposite west point, which it was now determined to fortify according to the wish of the New York provincial convention. Very early on the twelfth, Washington 12. rode with Heath to reconnoitre the gorge of the Highlands; then giving him, under written instructions, the command of the posts on both sides of the river, with three thousand troops of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York to secure them, he crossed at ten o'clock, and rode through Smith's "clove" to Hackensack. His arrangements, as the events proved, were the very best that his circumstances permitted, and he might reasonably hope to check the progress of Howe in New Jersey at the river. But unhappily he was not seconded by his generals, who, from the character of the army, and the uncertain extent of the power of the commander-in-chief, acted as if they were his peers.

No sooner did Lee find himself in a separate command than he resolved neither to join nor to reënforce his superior; and Greene framed his

CHAP. measures on a system directly contrary to Wash

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XI. ington's manifested intentions. He fell to ques Nov. tioning the propriety of the directions which he 9-13. received; insisted that Fort Washington should be

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kept, even with the certainty of its investment; gave assurance that the garrison was in no great conceivable danger, and could easily be brought off at any time; and cited Magaw's opinion that the fort could stand a siege till December. Instead, therefore, of evacuating it, he took upon himself to send over reënforcements, chiefly of Pennsylvanians; left unrevoked the order to defend it to the last extremity; and, in a direct report to congress, encouraged that body to believe that the attempt of Howe to possess himself of it would fail.

Before the end of the thirteenth, Washington arrived at Fort Lee, and, to his great grief, found what Greene had done. "The importance of the Hudson river, and the sanguine wishes of all to prevent the enemy from possessing it," had induced congress to intervene by a special order, which left Washington no authority to evacuate Fort Washington, except in a case of necessity; his full council of war had approved the action of congress; Greene, his best and most trusted officer, and the commander of the post, insisted that the evacuation was not only uncalled for, but would be attended by disastrous consequences; and, under this advice, Washington hesitated, by an absolute order, to conflict with congress, whose judgment he might strive to enlighten, whose command he was bound to obey. His next hours at Hacken

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sack were crowded with duties; besides ordinary CHAP. matters of detail, he had to prepare from dissolving regiments the means of protecting New Jersey, Nov. and to advise congress of the pressing wants of the army.

On the night following the fourteenth, the vigilance of Greene so far slumbered, that thirty flatboats of the British passed his post undiscovered, and hid themselves in Spyt den Duyvel creek. Having finished batteries on Fordham heights, Howe, in the afternoon of the fifteenth, summoned Magaw to surrender Fort Washington, on pain of the garrison's being put to the sword. The gallant officer, remonstrating against this inhuman menace, made answer, that he should defend his post to the last extremity, and sent a copy of his reply to Greene, who, about sunset, forwarded it to Washington, and himself soon after repaired to the island. On receiving the message, Washington rode to Fort Lee, and was crossing the river in a row-boat late at night, when he met Putnam and Greene, and spoke with them in the stream. Greene, who was persuaded that he had sent over "men enough to defend themselves against the whole British army," reported that the troops were in high spirits, and would do well. On this report Washington turned back with them to Fort Lee, for it was then too late to withdraw the garrison.

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The grounds which Magaw was charged to de- 16. fend reached from the hills above Tubby-hook to a zigzag line a little south of the present Trinity cemetery, a distance north and south of two and a

CHAP. half miles, a circuit of six or seven. The defence XI. of the northernmost point of the heights was com1776. mitted to Rawlings and a Maryland rifle regiment,

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in which Otho Holland Williams was the second in command; Magaw retained at Fort Washington a small reserve; the lines at the south were intrusted to Pennsylvanians under Lambert Cadwalader of Philadelphia, who had no heart for the day's work, and justly enough thought and too openly avowed that a successful defence was impossible; on the Harlem side, Baxter, with one regiment, occupied the redoubt on Laurel hill; the interval of two miles between him and Cadwalader was left to casual supplies of troops.

A cannonade from the heights of Fordham was kept up on the sixteenth till about noon. Of four separate attacks, the most difficult and the most dangerous was made by Knyphausen with nearly four thousand five hundred men. The brigade on the right nearest the Hudson was led by Rall; the other, with Knyphausen, marched nearer the road towards the gorge, officers, like the men, on foot. The high and steep and thickly wooded land was defended by felled trees and three or four cannon. The assailants must climb over rocks; they drew themselves up by grasping at trees and bushes; some slipped on the dry autumn leaves and fell; others dropped before the rifle. Excited by the obstinacy of the contest, Rall cried out: "Forwards, my grenadiers, every man of you;" his drums beat; his trumpeters blew the notes of command; and all who escaped the fire from behind rocks and trees shouted "Hurrah!"

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