XIX. 1777. CHAP. that state. He had shown himself great at Bunker Hill, Trenton, and Princeton; but on the idea that he was self-willed, he was passed over. Chafing at the unworthy neglect, he retired to his freehold and his plough, where his patriotism, like the fire of the smithy when sprinkled with water, glowed more fiercely than ever. Congress, without consulting Washington' on the appointment of his chief of staff, "earnestly solicited Gates to reassume the office of adjutant-general with his present rank and pay," "in confidence that he would retrieve the state of the army, and place it on a respectable footing." The thought crossed his mind to secure in the bargain a provision for his own life, with an annuity on that of his wife or son; and as the price of his consent he actually demanded"something more than words." Washington offered to welcome him back as the only means of giving form and regularity to the new recruits; but nothing came of the offer, for the New England members, especially Samuel Adams, were resolved on raising him to the command of the northern department. The neglect of Washington by congress increased in the camp the discontent which naturally rises among officers in the clashing of their desires. Beside the jealousies which grew out of the wish for promotion, subordinate generals importuned him for separate commands, and those who were detached were apt to murmur at his suggestions, or 1 "I never even hinted it." Washington to Gates, 10 March, 1777, in Washington's Writings, iv. 355. 2 MS. draught of a letter of Gates to the President of Congress, in the New York Historical Society's library. Gates to Congress, 28 February, 1777. MS. XIX. 1777. demand of him a supply of all their wants, never CHAP. considering the limit of his resources, and never contented with their fair share of materials and men. "Let me know who were your informers," wrote Heath on receiving a merited admonition. Sullivan fretted at an imaginary slight, and demanded an explanation. "Five hundred men is all that his excellency allows me," wrote Putnam to congress from Princeton. Mifflin, whose ambition was divided between a career of arms and of civil life, showed signs of groundless complaining. Washington was surrounded by officers willing to fill the ears of members of congress with clamor against his management, or opinions in counteraction of his advice. The service had suffered from the high advancement of worthless foreign adventurers, some of whom had obtained engagements from Deane at Paris. An eager desire to secure able veteran officers had assisted to blind the judgment of congress; henceforward it required of claimants a good knowledge of the English language and strong credentials. One emigrant from northern Europe stood conspicuous for modesty and sound judgment, the Pole, Kosciuszko. He left his native country from a disappointment in love; and devoting himself to freedom and humanity, in the autumn of 1776, he entered the American army as an officer of engineers. This year the public service carried him to Ticonderoga. Before the end of March, Greene was sent to Philadelphia to explain the pressing wants of the army. By his suggestion, the instructions of the XIX. CHAP. commander-in-chief were modified: henceforward, he, as well as the chief officer in every department, 1777. was permitted, not required, to consult the general officers under him; and it was made his duty, regardless of the majority of voices, "finally to direct every measure according to his own judg ment." The helplessness of congress appeared more and more; with the fate of the country dependent on the campaign, their authority did not reach beyond a series of recommendations "to the execu tive powers and legislatures of each of the United States;" and in case voluntary enlistment should prove insufficient, they "advised each state to cause indiscriminate drafts to be made from their respective militia." One attempt and only one was made to exert a temporary control over a state. The legislature of Pennsylvania had adjourned; the inadequateness of the executive authority menaced danger, "not only to the safety of the said commonwealth, but to the general welfare of the United States:" congress, therefore, directed its president and council, with its army and navy boards, to "exercise every authority to promote the safety of the state," till the legislature could be convened; and they promised their own coöperation. To the command of the forts in the Highlands on the Hudson George Clinton was appointed with the concurrence of New York, of congress, and of Washington. In the northern department the utmost confusion grew out of the rivalry between Schuyler and Gates. The former loved his country more than his own rank or fortune; the thoughts of the latter centred in himself. The XIX. 1777. emergency required a general of high ability, and CHAP. to such a one Schuyler would have gladly given way; but he was unwilling to be supplanted by an intriguing subordinate. Gates, who was hovering round congress, and boasted of his repulse of Carleton, refused to serve at Ticonderoga as a subordinate. On the fifteenth of March, congress censured an objurgatory letter from Schuyler; and ten days later, without consulting the commander-in-chief, they directed Gates "to repair immediately to Ticonderoga, and take command of the army there." Elated with his advancement to an independent command, which in importance was second only to that of the grand army, he quickly forgot that he had a superior; and he took upon himself, by sturdy and confident importunity with congress, to make a disposition of all the troops in the service of the United States, and to direct the movements of the forces under Washington, as well as of his own.1 Yet his appointment, though achieved through the New England delegates, did not bring out the troops from their states; and congress found no resource but to resolve, on the twenty-ninth of April, “that General Washington be directed to write to the Eastern states, from whom the troops to be employed at Ticonderoga were expected, and to request them, in the name of congress, to pursue every means for completing and forwarding the 1 Gates to Lovell, 29 April, 1777. MS. "Don't let the voice of party divert congress from posting their army," &c. &c. "The plan I placed in your hands for stationing the army upon the opening of the campaign, do not be diverted from adopting it, unless it be to strength- XIX. CHAP. regiments; it being the opinion of congress that delay will be attended with the loss of that important post." 1777. Washington, after proper inquiry, had from the first compared Fort Independence, opposite Ticonderoga, on the east side of Lake Champlain, to a mill built on a beautiful site to which water could not be brought; "the enemy might pass that post and get into Lake George, without receiving the least annoyance;" but congress, never distrustful of itself and this time led by the opinions of Schuyler, voted permission to Gates to evacuate "Ticonderoga, on the west of Lake Champlain, and apply his whole force to securing Fort Independence and the water-defences of Lake George." Seizing the opportunity of gaining an advantage in the opinion of congress over Schuyler, he answered: "I see no reason for abandoning any part of the post;" "I am not the least apprehensive there will be occasion to surrender one acre we possess." "1 Schuyler had been very much censured for remaining at Albany; Gates, notwithstanding his explicit orders, waited two months in that city for ordnance and stores, and announced to Washington: "I am resolved not to leave Albany, before I see the bulk of them before me."2 Gates, who had great confidence in his own "prophetic skill," and wished to shape every movement in aid of his command, wrote to Hancock: "I foresee the worst of consequences from too great a proportion of the main army being drawn into 1 Gates to Congress, 9 May, to Lovell, 12 May, 1777. MSS. 2 Gates to Washington, 24 May, 1777. MS. |