August 31. CHAP. Whom she values more than a rich province; and III. nourishes the germ of this quarrel, in order to 1776. direct its development as may suit her ambition and convenience. England has in America a numerous army and fleet, equipped for prompt action; if the Americans baffle her efforts, will not the chiefs of the ministry seek compensation at the expense of France or Spain? Her conduct makes it plain even to demonstration, that we can count little upon her sincerity and rectitude; still it is not for me to draw the conclusion, that with a power of so doubtful fidelity war is preferable to a precarious peace, which can be no more than a truce of uncertain duration. The object of these reflections is, not to anticipate the resolution which can come only from the high wisdom of the supreme authority, but only to present the motives which may give it light. "The advantages of a war with England in the present conjuncture prevail so eminently over its inconveniences, that there is no room for a comparison. What better moment could France seize, to efface the shame of the odious surprise of 1755, and all the ensuing disasters, than this, when England, engaged in a civil war a thousand leagues off, has scattered the forces necessary for her internal defence? Her sailors are in America, not in ships of war only, but in more than four hundred transports. Now that the United States have declared their independence, there is chance of conciliation unless supernatural events should force them to bend under the yoke, or the English to recognise their independence. While III. 1776. August the war continues between the insurgents and the CHAP. English, the American sailors and soldiers, who in the last war contributed to make those enormous conquests of which France felt so keenly the humiliation, will be employed against the English, and indirectly for France. "The war will form between France and North America a connection which will not grow up and vanish with the need of the moment. No interest can divide the two nations. Commerce will form between them a very durable, if not an eternal, chain; vivifying industry, it will bring into our harbors the commodities which America formerly poured into those of England, with a double benefit, for the augmentation of our national labor lessens that of a rival. "Whether war against England would involve a war on the continent deserves to be discussed. The only three powers whom England could take into her pay are Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The last of these will not come to attack France and Spain with her armies; should she send ships of war, it would only make a noise in the newspapers; if she should attempt a diversion by a war on Sweden, France must at any rate have war with England, for England would never suffer a French fleet to prescribe laws in the Baltic. The alliance between France and Austria, and the unlimited love of the empress queen for peace, guarantee her neutrality. The mutual distrust of the courts of Vienna and Berlin will keep them both from mixing in a war between the house of Bourbon and England. The republic of Holland, having, 31. III. August 31. CHAP. beyond all other powers, reason to complain of the tyranny of the English in all parts of the globe, 1776. cannot fear their humiliation, and would regard the war on the part of France as one of conservation rather than of conquest. As it is the dearest desire of the king, in conformity to his principles, to establish the glory of his reign on justice and peace, it is certain that if his majesty, seizing a unique occasion which the ages will perhaps never reproduce, should succeed in striking England a blow sufficient to lower her pride and to confine her pretensions within just limits, he will for many years be master of peace, and without displaying his power, except to make order and peace everywhere reign, he will have the precious glory of becoming the benefactor, not of his people only, but of all the nations. "The fidelity and the oath of a zealous minister oblige him to explain frankly the advantages and the inconveniences of whatever policy circumstances may recommend; this is the object of the present memoir; this duty fulfilled, nothing remains but to await in respectful silence the command which may please the wisdom of the king. "Should his majesty, on the other hand, prefer a doubtful and ill-assured peace to a war which necessity and reason can justify, the defence of our possessions will exact almost as great an expenditure as war, without any of the alleviations and resources which war authorizes. Even could we be passive spectators of the revolution in North America, can we look unmoved at that which is preparing in Hindostan, and which will be as fatal III. 1776. to us as that in America to England? The revo- CHAP. lution in Hindostan, once begun, will console England for her losses, by increasing her means and August her riches tenfold. This we are still able to pre- 31. vent." The words of Vergennes were sharp and penetrating; now that Turgot and Malesherbes were removed, he had no antagonist in the cabinet; his comprehensive policy embraced all parts of the globe; his analysis of Europe was exact and just; his deference to the king of two-and-twenty removed every appearance of presumption; but the young prince whose decision was invoked was too weak to lead in affairs of magnitude; his sluggish disposition deadened every impulse by inertness; his devotion to the principle of monarchical power made him shrink from revolution; his intuitions, dim as they were, repelled all sympathy with insurgent republicans; his severe probity struggled against aggression on England; with the utmost firmness of will of which his feeble nature was capable, he was resolved that the peace of France should not be broken in his day. But deciding firmly against war, he shunned the labor of further discussion; and indolently allowed his ministers to aid the Americans, according to the precedents set by England in Corsica. Meantime, Beaumarchais, with the connivance of Sept. Vergennes, used delicate flattery to awaken in the cold breast of the temporizing Maurepas a passion for glory. The profligate Count d'Artois, younger brother of the king, and the prodigal Duke de Chartres, better known as the Duke of Orleans, III. Sept. CHAP. innovators in manners, throwing aside the stiff etiquette and rich dress of former days for the 1776. English fashion of plain attire, daring riders and charioteers, eager patrons of the race-course, which was still a novelty in France, gave their voices for war with all the pride and levity of youth. The Count de Broglie was an early partisan of the Americans. A large part of the nobility of France panted for an opportunity to tame the haughtiness of England, which, as they said to one another, after having crowned itself with laurels, and grown rich by conquests, and mastered all the seas, and insulted every nation, now turned its insatiable pride against its own colonies. First among these was the Marquis de Lafayette, then just nineteen, master of two hundred thousand livres a year, and happy in a wife who had the spirit to approve his enthusiasm. He whispered his purpose of joining the Americans to two young friends, the Count de Ségur and the Viscount de Noailles, who wished, though in vain, to be his companions. At first the Count de Broglie opposed his project, saying: "I have seen your uncle die in the wars of Italy; I was present when your father fell at the battle of Minden; and I will not be accessory to the ruin of the only remaining branch of the family." But when it appeared that the young man's heart was enrolled, and that he took thought of nothing but how to join the flag of his choice, the count respected his unalterable resolution. Beside disinterested and chivalrous volunteers, a crowd of selfish adventurers, officers who had been dropped from the French service under the reforms of Saint |