CHAP. August. CHAPTER IV. BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. AUGUST, 1776. Ir was the fixed purpose of Washington "to obey implicitly the orders of congress with a scrupulous 1776. exactness;" and he rejected "every idea of interfering with the authority of the state of New York." In obedience to their united wishes, he attempted the defence of New York island. The works for its protection, including the fortifications in Brooklyn, were planned by Lee in concert with a New York committee and a committee from congress. Jay thought it proper to lay Long Island waste, burn New York, and retire to the impreg nable Highlands; but as it was the maxim of congress not to give up a foot of territory that could possibly be held, Washington promised "his utmost exertions under every disadvantage;" "the appeal," he said, "may not terminate so happily as I could wish, yet any advantage the enemy may gain, I trust will cost them dear." To protect New York IV. 1776. city he was compelled to hold Kingsbridge, Govern- CHAP. or's island, Paulus-hook, and the heights of Brooklyn. For all these posts, divided by water, and August. some of them fifteen miles apart, he had in the first week of August but ten thousand five hundred and fourteen men fit for duty. Of these, many were often obliged to sleep without cover, exposed to the dews. There was a want of good physicians, medicines, and hospitals; more than three thousand lay sick; their number was increasing; they were were to be seen seeking shelter in every barn or stable or shed, and sometimes nestling in thickets and beside fences. Of the effective men, less than six thousand had had any experience; and none had seen more than one year's service. Some were wholly without arms; not one regiment of infantry was properly equipped. The regiment of artillery, five hundred and eightyeight in number, including officers, had no skilled gunners or engineers. Knox, its colonel, had been a Boston bookseller. Most of the cannon in the field-works were of iron, old and honey-combed, broken and defective. The constant arrival and departure of militia made good discipline impossible. The government of New Jersey called out one half of its militia, to be relieved at the end of one month by the other half; but the call was little heeded. "We shall never do well until we get a regular army; and this will never be until men are enlisted for a longer duration; and that will never be until we are more generous in our encouragement. Time alone will persuade us to this measure; and in the mean while we shall very indis 1776. August. CHAP. creetly waste a much greater expense than would IV. be necessary for this purpose, in temporary calls upon the militia, besides risking the loss of many lives and much reputation." So wrote John Adams, the head of the board of war, a man of executive ability, but sometimes misled by his own energy. He rejected the thought of retiring from Long Island, demanded of others zeal and hardihood like his own, inclined to judge an army capable of victory when orders for the supply of men had gone forth, and never duly estimated the resisting force of indifference and inexpertness. While he cultivated confidential relations with Lee and Gates, he never extended the same cordial frankness to Washington, never comprehended his superior capacity for war, and never weighed his difficulties with generous considerateness. Moreover, congress was always ready to assume the conduct of the campaign, and to issue impracticable resolutions. To Gates it intrusted a limited power of filling up vacancies as they occurred in his army; but it refused to grant the same authority to the commander-in-chief, saying: "Future generals may make a bad use of it." The natural modesty of Washington, and his sense of his imperfectness in the science and practice of war, led him to listen with thoughtful attention to the suggestions of others; while his comprehensive vigilance, unwearied close attention, and consummate reflective powers were fast bringing out the qualities of a great commander. Among the major-generals around him, there was not one on whom he could fully rely. As yet the military judgment of Greene was crude. IV. 1776. The brigadiers were untrained, and CHAP. some of them without aptitude for service. Poor as had been his council at Cambridge, that in New August. York was worse. The general officers, whose advice his instructions bound him to ask, knew not enough of war to rightly estimate danger; and the timid, and the time-serving who had their eyes on congress, put on the cheap mask of courage by spirited votes. us." On the fifth of August, at the darkest moment, Trumbull wrote from Connecticut: "Notwithstanding our enemies are numerous, yet knowing our cause righteous, and trusting Heaven will support us, I do not greatly dread what they can do against On the seventh, Washington answered: "To trust altogether in the justice of our cause, without our own utmost exertions, would be tempting Providence;" and he laid bare the weakness of his army. On receiving this letter, Trumbull convened his council of safety. Five regiments from the counties of Connecticut nearest New York had already been sent forward; he called out nine regiments more, and exhorted those not enrolled in any trainband to volunteer: "Be roused and alarmed to stand forth in our just and glorious cause. Join yourselves to some one or other of the companies of the militia now ordered to New York, or form yourselves into distinct companies, and choose captains forthwith. March on this shall be your warrant. warrant. Play the man for God and for the cities of our God: may the Lord of hosts, the God of the armies of Israel, be your leader." At these words, the farmers, though their IV. August. CHAP. harvest was but half gathered, their meadows half cut, their chance of return in season to sow their 1776. grain before winter uncertain, rose instantly in arms, forming nine regiments each of three hundred and fifty men, and, self-equipped, marched to New York, just in time to meet the advance of the British. True, their arms were ill-suited for the day of battle, their habits of life too stiff for military discipline, their term of service too short for becoming soldiers, so that they were rather a rally of the people than a division of an army; but they brought to their country's defence the best will and all that they could offer, and their spirit evinced the existence of a nation. In like manner, in New York, where two thirds of the men of wealth kept aloof from the struggle, or sided with the enemy, the country people turned out of their harvest-fields with surprising alacrity, leaving their grain to perish for want of the sickle. The body thus suddenly levied in New York, the nine regiments from Connecticut, the Maryland regiment and companies, the regiment of Delawares, and two more battalions of Pennsylvania riflemen, raised the number of men fit for duty under Washington's command to about seventeen thousand; but most of them were fresh from rustic labor, ill-armed or not armed at all, and, from ignorance of life in camp, prone to disease. In spirited orders that were issued from day to day, the general mixed counsel with animating words. He bade them "remember that liberty, property, life, and honor were all at stake;" that they were fighting for everything that can be |