* *

ant, husband and wife, the nature and punishment of a variety of crimes and offences, as murder, theft, adultery, incest, polygamy, &c., the grounds of divorce, &c, &c., still receive illustrations from this copious source; and this high authority is often appealed to by legal writers, either as decisive or argumentative of their doctrines." * * "We have been thus particular on the subject of the utility of the Bible to the lawyer, from a deep conviction that its ethics, history and law cannot fail of being eminently serviceable to him; from our observation that young lawyers frequently read any other book but this; and, lastly, from the fact that nearly all the distinguished lawyers with whom we have been personally, or through the means of books, or otherwise acquainted, have not only professed a high veneration for Biblical learning, but were themselves considerably versed in it. Lord Coke had, no doubt, made the Scriptures his study, long before Archbishop Whitgift sent him a copy of the New Testament, with a request that he, who had so thoroughly mastered the common law, should study the law of God; be this as it may, his writings abound with arguments and illustrations taken from that source. The names, also, of Bacon, Hale, Holt, Jones, Erskine, Yates, Grotius, D'Aguessau and very many others, who have testified their respect for this knowledge, by frequent reference to the sacred volume; added to the like tribute, so often paid to it by poets and orators, were a sufficient warrant, if one were needed, for the urgent manner in which I press this subject on the student's attention."

Similar recommendations of the study of the Holy Scriptures are given in every respectable treatise on the study of the law. The uniformity and urgency of these commendations at least show that legal writers have never discovered in the sacred writings any thing to discourage, or embarrass, or hinder the young legal student in the pursuit of his profession at least they show that lawyers of eminent learning and experience believe that the practitioner will be better equipped for the successful discharge of his duties as a lawyer, if he has stored his mind in youth with the truths of the Divine Word, mastered its teachings, and familiarized himself with its principles. Nor will it be objected, we are sure, that these writers are wanting in perspicacity. In claiming for the legal profession the power to understand their true interests, we are but claiming what every one will, without argument, acknowledge.

There is, moreover, no external circumstance attending the study of the law, in itself considered, preventing the prosecution of Biblical and religious truth.

The professional student may be helped in his legal studies by the prosecution of religious studies; he will hardly be hindered by them. A too great devotion to

strictly professional treatises has in some instances, doubtless, contributed to divert the attention of the legal scholar from the claims of the Holy Scriptures; but this may be objected as well to every other engrossing science; whether geology, mineralogy, astronomy, chemistry or botany, or leaving the departments of natural science, whether one's studies incline to metaphysics, strictly so-called, or to the belles lettres. Many of these, we know, have sometimes fully occupied the time and attention of those whose chief business it should have been to study and to preach the Gospel. If we would then do away with the study of the law, because in some instances its prosecution has hindered growth in spiritual knowledge, consistency requires that we should destroy as well the sciences and arts, and indeed every occupation or study of life not strictly and technically religious. The critical objector to the practice of the law would hardly insist on carrying out his principles to consistent conclusions, if he should thereby peril or destroy his own pursuit. He would find the claims of Divine philosophy not altogether so exacting and so exclusive as he had been accustomed to believe: to nourish and sustain the "little ones at home" he would speedily know to be of as lasting obligation, if not of as high a character, as the mere acquaintance with Divine teaching, without its practice.

So far, also, as the study of the law is a mental exercise, calling for the use of the highest powers of the mind, for severe analysis, for the accurate investigation and elimination of principles, and their practical application to human relations and duties, so far will it prove of advantage in enabling one to know religious truth, and to understand how to apply it. No one will question that the lawyer is advantaged in a mental and moral point of view by his frequent application of moral principles to human conduct. This is an important item, and ought not to be neglected in making our estimate of the peculiar facilities of the bar. But we call attention to the fact here, simply to show the superior vantage ground of the lawyer as a hearer of religious truth.

Every minister of the Gospel has experienced the diffi

culty of securing attention to the doctrines he proclaims. The people lack consideration. It is very hard work to think; to think on new topics when totally new, to continue to think on old topics, when very old. We would account it strange, were we not so familiar with the fact, that the minister encounters both these difficulties in nearly every congregation he addresses. Some of his auditors have never seriously thought upon the topic he discusses; to them his teachings are misty and confused, the impressions they receive dim and imperfect. Others have thought upon the truths so often, have heard them handled and applied so often, that they have become old and trite. The lawyer the true lawyer will not generally be found in either class. He has learned by continual and repeated practice, to grasp a novel subject in all its relations, and he follows with delight the preacher into new fields of thought: and is gratified by the amplest range and largest discourse. On the other hand, the lawyer will know how to value the old; and will not unfrequently, while a hearer, contribute from his own stores of thought, or by some practical and recent experience in illustration of its truth, invest the teachings of the pulpit with freshness and power. When attendants on the ministry, we may claim for the bar that they are attentive and appreciative hearers. The statement, too, may startle the reader; yet it is nevertheless true, that as large a proportion of legal men are diligent in their attendance on the preaching of the Gospel, as of any other profession or pursuit.

While what we have stated is conceded to be true; and the probability of Christian sentiment at the bar, if there were no hindrances in the way, is also conceded; it is objected that the facts tell on the contrary side of the question; that legal men are not often professedly religious; that the large majority of them acknowledge no allegiance to Divine truth, neither obey it themselves nor encourage its obedience in others; that among them Infidelity numbers its advocates, and that a practical and a theoretic disregard of the claims of Christianity is the rule, and not the exception; and indeed, it is further objected that this dis

regard of Christian obligation is not a mere accident of the profession, but one of its essentials, the due discharge of legal duties requiring a sacrifice of Christian principle. If the latter branch of this charge be true, attempts to defend the practice of the law would be vain, and the necessary and consistent conclusion would be that pure morals and a regard to the public welfare would demand the suppression of the legal profession. But is it true?

In proof of its truth, the objector cites the familiar example of an advocate's defence of a criminal known to be guilty. He says that such a defence is always immoral, and utterly incompatible with Christian character.

We shall test the soundness of this declaration: but before passing condemnation upon the bar, let us see what are their teachings upon the point. To begin with the work of Mr. Brown:

"The best system of forensic ethics or moral philosophy, as applied to the legal duties of men, is of Divine authority: 'Do unto others as you would be done by ;' that is, as you justly deserve to be done by; 'Love your neighbors (or your clients) as yourself;' which means, do the same justice to them that in their condition you would be rightly entitled to expect you are not to do more for them than you would rightly expect; nor to love them better than yourself—not to sacrifice your conscience or your heavenly hope to them."

Again:

"We repeat it, a lawyer is bound to refuse a case that he believes to be dishonest, or to retire from it, the moment he discovers it to be so. And he is also bound to avoid litigation, unless it is necessary, and when necessary or unavoidable, always to adopt the least offensive means for bringing it to a satisfactory result. The law is the handmaid of justice, and in its administration should never be attended with undue severity or malevolence."

Again:

"A lawyer has a right to take all the advantage his learning and talents afford him, in order to sustain a good cause or defeat a corrupt one; but he has no right to substitute his talents or learning for the honesty of a case, and thereby render iniquity triumphant. When he has doubts as to the correctness of his position, he may fairly incline in favor of the party he represents, and sustain his views by every authority and fact that the law or evidence may supply, leaving it of course to the court and jury to ratify or reject them. He is not to decide the case, nor is he morally answerable for the correctness of its decision: but he is answerable for the correctness of the motives by which he is influenced."

Judge Sharswood's testimony is to the like effect, and, indeed, every legal writer of eminence and learning has taught the same doctrines.

In making these citations from legal authorities on the ethics of the bar, we shall not be accused of introducing testimony which ought not to be regarded. Had these works been written as defences of the bar, we might suspect the sincerity of the testimony; but they were written for no such purpose; they were designed for those who had already determined upon, or were actively engaged in the pursuit of the profession; and they show the animus of the profession in its claims to sincerity and just dealing, as much as the ordinary conversation and tone of remark of a private individual would disclose more aptly than in any other way, his personal character.

Bnt while legal writers teach thus decidedly and emphatically the duty of the lawyer, not willingly to undertake the espousal of an unjust cause-one that he knows to be unjust, and with the view to forward or protect injustice— much diversity of opinion exists among them, as to the obligation a lawyer is under to a client whose cause he may lawfully espouse. Some, but very few, maintain with Lord Brougham in his famous defence of Queen Caroline, that "an advocate, by the sacred duty he owes his client, knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world -his client and none others,"-that "to save his client by all expedient means; to protect that client at all hazards. and costs to all others, and amongst others to himself, is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties;" and that "he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction which he may bring upon any other." We know of none, however, who would adopt the further sentiment of this distinguished lord, when he adds that "separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them if need be to the winds, the advocate must go on reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion for his client's protection." Others, however, and the larger and more considerate part, adopt the sentiments of Hale: "I