concert or control. But next, if war can be avoided, there is no comparison between the benefit thus gained and the advantage of keeping the Government together.

However, this I think cannot be denied me--that the Cabinet should be called together to consult on the critical state of affairs. I shall be ready to discuss them soberly and calmly, and to listen to any views however opposed to mine. But to have every proposal at once rejected is more than I believe anyone in my situation ever bore, and I will not set the example. . . . - Yours ever,

J. RUSSELL.

The resolution which Lord John thus formed was probably much strengthened by two fresh letters which he received. from Lord Spencer. In the first of them, written on the 20th of September, Lord Spencer said

I think that there is nothing that Syria can be estimated at, which ought to have induced us to make a treaty with Russia, Austria, and Prussia to which France is not a party; because Syria is not worth a continental war in which we should be engaged against France. . . . There are, as I have said, difficulties and dangers, from the apprehension of which the agreement in opinion of you and Melbourne does not at all relieve my mind, because there are things done which cannot be undone. But, for your future conduct, you and he perfectly agreeing must be very satisfactory, because Palmerston must give way to you: and, should he not, though I for one should be extremely sorry to see him quit your Administration, his doing so would have no effect whatever either on Parliament or on the country. I hope, therefore, that you will be stout and make him do everything possible to remedy the mischief which has already been done, by conciliating France as much as possible, and by showing that our great object is to keep on cordial terms with her.

Three days later, he wrote again :—

Now as to your resigning, it does not appear to me that you can be driven to this. . . . There is no doubt that it would be the bounden duty of any man to resign if he found the Cabinet of which he was a member going to involve the country in a war which could be avoided. But I think I know the opinion of nearly all the members of your Cabinet well enough to be quite sure that they will be quite as desirous to avoid war as you and I are. Palmerston undoubtedly may have so involved himself that it may be difficult for

him to alter the course which he wishes to follow without discredit. But I should not think this likely, and I hope it is not so. But, even if it is, Palmerston, as I said in my last letter, stands, if not quite, nearly alone; and, though the decision of the Cabinet against him might make him feel it necessary to resign, even that would have no effect whatever upon the stability of the Administration.

It was a far journey from Lord Spencer to Mr. Hume. But, on September 26, Mr. Hume made a strong appeal to Lord John to use his influence in the Cabinet to stay the hand of the destroyer, and to prevent the war which seems inevitable if the British Cabinet do not agree to the modified. treaty which, we are informed, will be submitted to-morrow for your consideration.'

In the meanwhile the march of events necessitated a slight modification in Lord John's policy. M. Thiers had sent a special mission, of which M. Walewski was the chief member, to Alexandria; and M. Walewski had succeeded in inducing Mehemet to moderate his demands; and to confine them to the hereditary government of Egypt for himself and family, together with the government of Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo during his own life and his son's. On September 18 M. Thiers informed Mr. Bulwer, the Secretary of Legation. at Paris, of this arrangement, adding that M. Walewski had carried it to Constantinople with the view of obtaining the Turks' assent to it.

Woburn Abbey: September 26, 1840.

My dear Melbourne,-. . . The whole aspect of affairs is changed by the language of Thiers on the 18th. We have now to deal, not with the Pasha, but with the Pasha and France. . . . I have told Palmerston I think we ought in conference to tell our allies we are ready to accept Walewski's conditions, provided they (the allies) agree, and the Syrian insurgents have security against vengeance.

If you and Palmerston are against this I had much better retire. The course will be simple enough. If Palmerston succeeds without war, he has the triumph justly due to him. If war is impending, I shall be in a position to oppose, and I think to prevent it. The Whig party, I think, would be with me in such a case.— Yours, J. RUSSELL.

Thus, almost to the eve of the meeting of the Cabinet,

everything pointed to the immediate abandonment of the high-handed policy on which Lord Palmerston had resolved. Yet the result was very different, and, without the explanation which Lord John's private correspondence affords, is almost unintelligible.

Two circumstances combined to paralyse Lord John's action.

In the first place, news arrived in London that Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at the Porte, had taken upon himself to advise the Sultan to reject the terms which M. Walewski was offering; and Lord Melbourne thought that their rejection altered the situation. Such was not Lord John's opinion:

Wilton Crescent: September 27, 1840.

My dear Melbourne,-I am very sorry not to agree with you; but I confess I am unable to yield to your arguments.

If Lord Ponsonby has taken upon himself to advise the Sultan to reject the proposition of Mehemet Ali without reference to the allies, Lord P. is highly criminal, and ought to be disavowed.

I cannot see there is anything humiliating in declaring our readiness to accept terms which are much more favourable to the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire than the original treaty. . . .

I feel satisfied that, by pursuing my present course, I shall prevent war with France; and that, if I do not take it, I shall have to defend in the House of Commons the policy I think most injurious to England and destructive to the peace of the world.-Yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

In the next place, a still stronger pressure was to be placed on Lord John than the disinclination of the Prime Minister to thwart the Foreign Secretary. Lord John had hardly written his letter when he received the following note from Lord Melbourne:

Windsor] C[astle]: September 26, 1840.

For God's sake do not bring on a crisis; the Queen could not really go through that now, and it might make her seriously ill if she were to be kept in a state of agitation and excitement if a crisis were to come on. . . . She wishes you think all [sic] of this and the consequences it might cause not only to me [? her], but to

all Europe, as it would show our weakness in a way that would be seriously injurious to the country.1

Lord John at once replied

September 27, 1840.

I am very sorry for the painful situation of the Queen. Lord Spencer, who urges me to be firm, says that if we go to war we shall be at once overthrown in the House of Commons, and the only way of maintaining the Ministry is to maintain peace. I wish you would see the matter in this light.

I will call upon you in South Street at two o'clock to-day. — Yours, J. RUSSELL.

The interview accordingly took place, and on the following day, the very day on which the Cabinet met, Lord Melbourne gave Lord John a message from the Queen desiring him to see her before taking any extreme measure. John replied—

Lord

September 28, 1840.

My dear Melbourne,-I shall be very glad to avail myself of the Queen's wish to see me before taking any extreme measure, or giving any pledge.

It is my anxious desire that matters should be gravely and temperately considered, and that peace should not be thrown away as a child throws away a toy which it has had too long.-Yours truly, J. RUSSELL.

Thus, when the Cabinet met on the afternoon of the 28th, the whole conditions were changed. It had been summoned to consider an ultimatum of Lord John's; it met to find that the ultimatum, at the Queen's wish, was suspended. It practically was compelled to adopt the conclusion--which seems so impotent and inexplicable when it is related by Mr. Greville, who, well informed in other respects, was ignorant of the

It is right to say that this unsigned memorandum is in Lord John's handwriting; and that his brother-in-law, Mr. George Elliot, in sorting, years afterwards, Lord John's papers, docketed it as a memorandum of Lord John's. It occurred to me at once that it was a copy made by a busy man from some not very legible handwriting, and that the style was Lord Melbourne's and not Lord John's. My conclusion is, I think, placed beyond doubt by my discovering in another bundle of papers the memorandum which follows in the text and is evidently a reply to it. The Princess Royal was born in the following

November.

VOL. I.

A A

above correspondence-to adjourn for three days. Before it met again, Lord John had agreed to withdraw his resignation and to consider favourably a middle course suggested by Lord Melbourne.

Wilton Crescent: September 29, 1840.

My dear Melbourne,-I entirely subscribe to the Queen's opinion as I understand it, and have taken the liberty of making an extract of that part of her letter. . . . If I understand your suggestion, I think it a good one. I know not that I can do more than attentively consider your proposal, and I wish you would put it in writing for the Cabinet.

Like Canning, I am disposed to say, 'If we are told we must have war sooner or later, I say later.' But I am not for making any humiliating concession to France.

I do not suppose you wish me to go to Windsor to-morrow. I think it better you should go alone.-Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.1

The compromise which Lord Melbourne suggested, and which the Cabinet adopted at its adjourned meeting on the Ist of October, was that Lord Palmerston should summon the representatives of the four powers and invite them to make an overture to France. But the adoption of this compromise unfortunately led to fresh misunderstanding. The very day. after the Cabinet met, on October 2, the 'Chronicle,' which was believed to be under Lord Palmerston's influence, published so violent an article that Lord John, as he wrote to Lord Melbourne, concluded that it was 'Palmerston's object to drive me out of office.' It soon, moreover, became plain that the adoption of the compromise was made the pretext for fresh delay, and delay in Lord John's judgment increased the chance of war. He was accordingly driven to a fresh remonstrance :

Downing Street: October 8, 1840.

My dear Lord Melbourne,-I have been willing to act on your advice and not do anything which might appear precipitate. But, having reviewed the events and decisions of the past week, I am now obliged to announce to you my serious determination.

1 Lord Melbourne's private secretary docketed this letter, 'September 29, 1840 Lord John Russell submits to the Queen's pleasure and retracts his resignation.'