In reference to the first we would say, in general terms, a distinct and prominent place should be given to the conscience, for the same reason which leads to the adoption of the other two divisions, viz., the distinctive character of the phenomena to be classified. -- The reason for any division whatever is not that the mind is divided into sections and departments, as if the intellect, the sensibilities, and the conscience, were so many individual members of the soul, as the hands and feet are members of the body. We are not writing to reaffirm the unity of the soul, which, so far as we know, no one ever denies. But while it is a unit, it is a unit capable of acting and being acted upon in various ways, and by various and very diverse agencies. It is with these actions and feelings of the soul that we have to deal in all our researches in mental science. Inquiries into the substance of the soul itself are futile. As we know God only through the manifestations of Himself, which He condescends to give, so in like manner, we can understand mind only through the phenomena it exhibits when acting itself, or being acted upon. In one respect, mind is like electricity. In its passive state we can tell nothing about it, nor even discern its presence. It is only when excited that we are aware of its existence. But the phenomena of mind are found in very great variety; naturally we generalize, and for convenience sake we classify. Certain of them, while differing in many respects, are yet found to have something in common which indicate an active state of the mind. These we associate together, and represent them by a common name, the Understanding. Others, again, have a different characteristic in common, which indicate a passive state of the soul. These, in like manner, are viewed in connection, and referred to what we call the Sensibilities. Now, for the same reason, and in accordance with the same principle, we would form a third class, and consider them under a well understood designation, the Conscience. For the moral phenomena of the mind have in them something different from the purely intellectual and from the purely emotional; being neither the one nor the other exclusively, but to a certain extent combining them both, and combining them in such a way as to render the individual character of each at once perceptible. It will be said that what is here asked for is already given; that by almost every writer on moral science, conscience is treated in this very manner, receiving distinct notice in a separate "section." True; but this very reply contains an affirmation in another shape of the complaint now brought forward. A "section" does not give to conscience that importance in a system of mental science which it ought to receive. The reason of this we believe to be that some of our earlier writers on this subject, who have surveyed this mammoth cave, and given names to particular galleries, have been men to whom the study of the nature of conscience has been rather distasteful. The other departments have presented more agreeable fields of investigation, and on them they have therefore chiefly expended their strength, leaving whatever pertains to the conscience to take care of itself. We could instance writers who, we think, speak of conscience solely because they cannot well avoid it while writing on mental philosophy. This seems obvious from the fact that their writings on this subject do not exhibit the same concatenation of reasoning that marks their other investigations. What they have thrown together seems to be the detached and isolated fragments concerning conscience which they have accidentally stumbled upon while mining for other things. It is quite evident they have sunk no special shafts into the depths of man's moral nature, as they have done in his intellectual nature. If a writer chooses to confine his inquiries mainly to the understanding, or to the sensibilities, or both, it is of course perfectly proper for him to do so. He will have an ample field before him, even with such limitations. But then his work should be called by a name corresponding to this restricted examination. If a man should write a book, entitled a General Survey of the Eastern Continent, and should fill the bulk of it with an account of Europe and Africa, and should include Asia in a short section towards the close, or under the caption "Africa," he would be open to sharp criticism. It would do very well to call the book "A Survey of Europe and Africa, with occasional remarks about Asia." More than this would be assumption. In like manner, we think nothing can properly be styled a complete survey of mental science which does not include and assign a most prominent place to the moral phenomena of the mind. It will be said, perhaps, that the consideration of these moral phenomena does not pertain to a work on mental science, but has a place by itself. We can say that writers in mental philosophy, by neglecting this part, have caused it to be understood that it does not pertain to mental science, but this does not cause it to be so in reality. Recurring to our definition, we say, Mental Philosophy is the science which treats of the phenomena of mind. But what do we mean by the phenomena of mind? We mean the manifestations it gives of itself when either acting itself or being acted upon by something else. Is now the mind solely influenced by natural objects and not by moral considerations? Does it perceive natural relations only? Does it not also perceive moral relations? And is there not a great variety of phenomena contingent upon the latter as well as upon the former? And is not the mental process which takes place when the mind perceives a moral relation, and reasons thence to the obligation arising from it, as worthy a subject of consideration as that which takes place when it sees two material objects and infers their relation, sizes or distances from each other? When there is something so similar in the process, why is it that one should be embraced within the province of the mental philosopher, and the other should be considered as lying so far without? We think there is a want of discrimination. The application of the principle of obligation to the circumstances of every-day life furnish a distinct field for the moral philosopher; but the manner in which the mind, unaided by revelation, comes to a knowledge of these obligations, while it may, with propriety, be considered by the moral philosopher, demands the strictest attention of the writer on mental science. If, while enumerating the different kinds of knowledge which the mind obtains from the outer world, and the manner in which that knowledge is received, he should speak particularly of the senses of hearing and feeling, and pass lightly over that of seeing, he would, we think, be only repeating what he does when he devotes a large space to the actings of mind in reference to matter, and a small space to its actings in reference to spirit. Into every matter connected with the former he enters largely. He expatiates upon the manner in which the mind. comes to a correct apprehension of the relation of distance and nearness, of height and depth, of length and breadth, as they exist in matter and space, but when he comes to the discovery of moral relation, or relations existing between spirit and spirit, his views become exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory. Even Christian writers have followed the paths marked out by those who have neglected this higher department of the phenomena of mind. One of the complaints urged against a recent work by Dr. Hickok is, that "too little is made of conscience." In reference to what the conscience should be regarded as including, there has been, even among contemporaneous writers, a very wide difference of opinion. Dr. Wardlaw, in his "Christian Ethics," regards the conscience as purely a determining faculty; the faculty that determines the right or wrong of our conduct. An operation of conscience "is an act of judgment, and an act of judgment exclusively." Dr. Payne repudiates this view, and declares that conscience denotes "the susceptibility to the emotion of approval and disapproval." Conscience, according to his opinion, was designed to be a "moral spring,” and not a "moral guide." We have the "moral guide" in the faculty of judgment, and as an element of the mental constitution we need no other; but we require an impulsive principle—something to secure the doing of that which judgment tells us we ought to do. In subsequent writings, Dr. Wardlaw being pressed by his critics, and more particularly, as Dr. Payne supposes, by the criticisms of Sir James McIntosh, that his system "contained no method of explaining the most conspicuous if not the most essential part of moral approbation and disapprobation," changed his view, and made conscience to consist in the exercise of judgment combined with the susceptibility to certain emotions. To this change of sentiment he does not seem fully to have adhered, for we find him afterwards using expressions more in accordance with his first definition.* Notwithstanding the array of names against it, we confess our partiality to the view which includes in "the conscience" a determining power and an emotional susceptibility. If this be not in favor with English writers on mental science, it is certainly the teaching of the most approved writers among ourselves. There is surely good reason for esteeming highly an arrangement marked out by such authority as Dr. Wayland. Dr. Payne's reasons for regarding the operation of conscience as limited to the emotions are two: The first is philosophical, the second is philological. The first is, as stated above, that "we have the faculty of judging as an element of the mental constitution; we need no other. Therefore it is unphilosophical to look for another; to seek an additional cause when a sufficient one has already been found. The principle every one will admit; but we do not see the correctness of the application in this particular case. We humbly beg to express our opinion that Dr. Payne, reasoning against the existence of a distinct faculty for perceiving moral relations, overthrows (upsets) his reasoning in favor of the existence of a distinct susceptibility for experiencing moral emotions. We think the distinction he draws when he refers different perceptions to one element of the intellectual constitution, and different emotions to two elements of the emotional constitution, is not a distinction in reality, but arises from the process of generalization being carried one step farther in the case of the intellect than it is in the case of the sensibilities; and thus "the legs of the lame" become "unequal." In the first case, we will suppose two distinct subjects of consideration are presented to the mind's eye: two entirely distinct perceptions arise in consequence. If Dr. Payne stopped his process of generalization in reference to perceptions as soon as he does in reference to emotion, he would now proceed no further, and would say, the mind has and must have two distinct powers of perception,-one to perceive natural distinctions, and the * See Note, Payne's Elements of Mental and Moral Science, third edition, page 442. |