mental expedient, required only. because without it the subjects of God's government would be likely to mistake his character, and lose the high confidence they ought to have in his justice and in the moral firmness of his government.

We include, also, more than the persuasive theory claims, unless that theory makes the persuasive value of the atonement to consist in part, at least, in an exhibition of God's righteousness, which his own sense of right prompted. Indeed, as it has been already seen, we cannot think there can be any genuine love toward moral beings in which ardent attachment to righteousness does not exist. Love to moral beings seems necessarily to spring out of righteousness alone, or to be conditioned upon it.

We reach, therefore, this conclusion, in regard to the relation of Christ's death to the law of God. The law, with its sanctions, expresses God's love of righteousness, and his desire that his moral creatures should have love for the same-that they should bear the image of his character. The penalty, death, guards the law, and when inflicted on the disobedient, it exhibits God's righteousness in an active way, by showing his hatred of sin; and is all the expression which the sense of right in God requires.

But, then, it is obvious that to those who sin there is no possibility of deliverance on the ground of mere law. There is neither space for repentance nor ground for remission of sins, even if repentance were exercised.

But God most ardently desires the salvation of sinners. He, then, who is one in being and nature with the Father, the Law-giver-whose every act expresses the Father's feeling and will-leaves the condition of God, comes in the condition and likeness of men, and gives up his life on the cross. His death, which consummates and makes effectual his work, accomplishes what the law and its penalty could not do, since it is not only the act of God, in expressing his righteousness equally with the penalty inflicted on the guilty, but it is the act of God in expressing his righteousness in a new and peculiar way, viz., by a sacrifice on his own part. It arrests the penalty and gives probation to the race, and complete pardon

and adoption to the believers in Christ, by being itself the token and pledge of God's righteousness, and giving the assurance to all that the claims of righteousness shall not be overlooked or set aside in any particular. God, as it were, gives himself in pledge, in a more impressive manner than by the declaration of his word, since he signifies the sincerity of his pledge by a sacrifice on his own part. By this sacrifice is shown, at the same time, how much God desires that men should enjoy a probation, and in it should return to righteousness. It shows, as the law had not shown, and in a degree in which the infliction of the penalty could not show, God's strong love for the well-being of men, and is thus a remarkable exhibition of his benevolence.

It makes, also, pardon to the penitent consist with righteousness, since it is an expression of righteousness equal to that of the punishment of their sins; equal as expressing God's sense of sin as a matter of right, and as exhibiting it and through it, his righteousness to all his moral subjects.

Thus the law with its sanctions, and the death of Christ, run parallel with each other in expressing and manifesting both righteousness and benevolence. But the latter, by doing it in the gracious sacrifice of him who is in personal union with the Lawgiver himself, transcends the law in the expression both of righteousness and benevolence, and in doing what, in kind, the law could not do, viz., furnishing a ground of probation and of pardon, and giving complete redemption to those who believe in the crucified Saviour.

J. A. C.

ARTICLE VIII.-SHORTER BOOK NOTICES.

I.

HAVEN'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY.*-This is an abler work than Dr. Haven's previous treatise on the kindred subject of Intellectual Philosophy. There is more of earnest grappling with difficult problems, and, more of pith, condensation, and vigor in the style. Like its predecessor, this work is orderly in arrangement, and comprehensive in its range of discussion. It gives evidence also of careful reflection, extended reading, and a sincere interest in the subject. While seeing in it many things to commend, and upon which we would gladly dwell, we set them aside, deeming it more important to call the attention of our readers to one or two points which we cannot but think to be fundamental defects. After passing in review various theories of the nature of virtue, and rejecting in terms of special distinctness the idea that "the nature and character" of God" are the ground of right;" he proceeds to say, that right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things. He adopts the idea that this nature of things is in some unexplained way the constitutive origin and foundation of right, in such a sense that by it, God himself is limited and controlled; conforming his acts to it as something existing independent of his being, character, will, or intelligence. Neither, says Dr. Haven, do these distinctions "originate in the divine character," nor has God any "power over them," but is himself subject to the law of right." It will be seen at once that if this law of right does not originate in the divine character or will, this "nature of things" must be external and objective, relatively to the Almighty. A question now arises, and it seems to be a legitimate one, regarding the character, being, or origin of this " nature of things," in which moral distinctions are said to be "inherent," and upon which they depend. We are unable to conceive of moral distinctions as " inherent" in anything but a moral being-a being with a character, and a will, and intelligence. To say that moral distinctions originate apart from such a being, is as absurd as to speak of thought as originating independent of a thinker. Consequently this "nature of things," if it contain in itself and originate moral distinctions, conformity to which constitutes virtue in man, and holiness in God, must itself be a being, self-conscious, wise, and holy beyond our highest power of conception. Such a "nature of things" must be God. If on the other hand the "nature of things" be explained as the sum of all existing beings, forces, laws, and relations, we are reminded that these are either contained in God's essence, or are convertible with the all things which he himself has originated, created, or established. In either case we are compelled to recognize God as that being in whom, and by whom, all things and beings--their natures, laws, or modalities of existence-consist. The "nature of things," if it be anything more than a meaningless abstraction, must denote the constitutive elements and necessary laws of each and all actual existences. These are either created or uncreated. The "na

* Moral Philosophy; including Theoretical and Practical Ethics. By Joseph Haven, D. D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary, &c., &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859.

ture of things," relatively to the uncreated or self-existent, is the nature of God. In relation to created existences, the "nature of things" is the laws and modes of being which God has established for his creation whether moral or material. To speak of a "nature of things" outside of God and what he has created, is flat nonsense.

But we are met with the objection of Dr. Haven, and it is the common one, that if the ground of moral distinctions be the will of God, "we have only to suppose God to change, or to have been other than he is, and our duties and obligations change at once." Dr. Haven must be aware that to a Christian theist such a supposition is, ex hypothesi, impossible. Immutable holiness is the very essence of Jehovah. Any other conception is atheism. He must also remember that those who affirm God to be the ground of moral distinctions, rest their belief in the immutability of these distinctions on the immutability of God. They profess themselves unable to find a foundation less likely to change. Besides, this objection, if it be worthy the name of an objection, bears with equal force against the theory adopted by our author. It seems to us quite as easy to suppose the " ture of things" to change, as to suppose a change in the character of God, the creator, and governor and upholder of all things. The objection, as any one can see, is more damaging to Dr. Haven's own theory than to the one against which he brings it forward.

na

This phrase," nature of things," is one of those convenient and elastic forms of expression with which acute men often deceive themselves. We have lying at our side a work by a distinguished natural philosopher, which assumes, in all its reasonings, a physical" nature of things," which exists necessarily, and in some way so independent of the Creator, that it determines and controls all his actions, so that no modification of this nature is, strictly speaking, conceivable by man, or possible to God. Taking his stand on this doctrine, he binds the Almighty in the chains of fate, and, making Ilim identical with the sum of material forces of the universe, pronounces the Christian miracles absurd and impossible. If a moral “nature of things" can be established apart from the divine essence, which conditions and limits His moral liberty, we see no greater theoretical objection to a physical nature of things, which, in like manner, conditions and limits, His power over the physical universe. The consequences of the latter may be more immediately dangerous than those of the other, but the philosophical method by which it is established is not more erroneous, or more prejudicial to a sound theism. Both theories alike tend to supersede and set aside the divine freedom, independence, and originality of being and thought. Dr. Haven's discussion of the theory of virtue is of the more interest, as he is about entering upon the functions of a teacher of theology in a situation in which he will represent and mould the opinions of our Congregational brethren in the Northwestern States. We are thus furnished with a glimpse of the foundations of the system which, if true to logical processes, he will be likely to teach.

In the portion of the work treating of Civil Polity, we regret to see the partnership or social contract theory brought so prominently forward as the ground of civil government. He does not even postulate a "nature of things" as the ground of the binding obligation of civil law, but is willing to rest it in a compact, similar to that which binds together a financial corporation, or a lodge of Odd-Fellows. We believe the social contract theory both inadequate and pernicious, especially so in a country like ours, where the social forces tend so strongly toward disintegration. This theory answers well enough as a loose representation of certain political relations, but we regret to see it, with the evil consequences which it involves, set forth in a philosophical manual designed to form and settle

the principles of young men in a course of liberal education. The authority of the state to tax, restrain, imprison, or put to death, does not originate from a convention like that which empowers a merchant to sign the name of the firm to which he belongs. Civil society is not a voluntary association which a man may enter or leave at his pleasure. If the social contract be anything more than a convenient legal fiction, it involves the duty of putting in practice the idea thrown out by Jefferson-re-enactment of all fundamental laws once or twice in every generation. In a work so able and scholarly, we regret the necessity for exercising the ungracious office of a fault-finder, but the author of this work is too well read in the history of opinion, to complain when his views are made the subject of friendly animadversion. He has entered on the battle-ground of ages, where insignificance is absolutely the only protection against collision with the holders of adverse opinions.

WHAT IS REVELATION, BY F. D. MAURICE.*-This is a reply to Mr. Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought." It consists of two parts, the first containing seven sermons delivered to a London congregation, and the second of eleven letters addressed "to a Student of Theology." The first discharges only a few small arrows, such as could easily be hurled from the pulpit in popular discourse; the heavy weapons are brought into play in the letters.

Mr. Maurice says, in his preface: "I have the comfort of reflecting that my words can do no possible harm to Mr. Mansel." The book justifies the reflection; Mr. Maurice is unquestionably entitled to all the comfort it can afford. He says, also, that "some may be willing to accept my opposition as an additional proof that Mr. Mansel's blows have been effectual." We belong to that number. The temper and "vehemence" of the letters force us to that conclusion. The readers of Mr. Mansel will be surprised to hear him charged with "always coloring and caricaturing his representations of his opponents."

Mr. Maurice, once a disciple of Coleridge, long ago adopted the distinction between the understanding and the reason, and has taught the competency of reason to sit in judgment on the truths of Christianity, and to construct a religious philosophy. Mr. Mansel's Bampton Lectures are levelled against those modern schools of skepticism which, deifying reason, would subject all revelation to its criticism, and out of the dicta of reason, construct an "absolute religion." But Mr. Mansel's task led him to sweep the field of all the various schools of Rationalism; that of Mr. Maurice seems to have been involved in the ruin. Hinc illa lachrymæ.

Now Mr. Maurice, in his reply, deals not with the fundamental principles of Mr. Mansel's method, but with an unwarranted extension and application of it. Mr. Mansel asserts and proves the impossibility of knowing God as absolute or as infinite, which the skeptics assume as the basis of their reasoning; whereupon Mr. Maurice proceeds, in his refutation, to confound our Christian experience, or knowledge of the facts of revelation with the skeptic's assumed knowledge of the absolute and the infinite, charging on Mr. Mansel the denial of all knowledge of God whatever. Precisely the same process and confusion are repeated in his defence of the office of reason in the province of Religion. The book of Mr. Maurice is in no sense

* What is Revelation? A series of Sermons on the Epiphany; to which are added, Letters to a Student of Theology, on the Bampton Lectures of Mr. Mansel. By the Rev. Frederic D. Maurice, M. A. London: Macmillan & Co. 1859.