Reform Bill of 1860. the bill on two other grounds: first, that the 40s. freeholders, being the most liberal element in the county constituencies, ought not to be disfranchised; and secondly, that their admission to the borough franchise would encourage the manufacture of faggot votes, like the old burgage-tenure, which had been the means of extending the influence of patrons. He objected to the continuance of the 107. household suffrage in boroughs, on the ground that considerable classes of people, worthy to be entrusted with votes, had sprung up since that franchise had been established. After seven nights' debate, the amendment was carried by a majority of thirty-nine. Upon the issue raised by this decision, the government determined to dissolve Parliament, and appeal to the people.2 On the assembling of a new Parliament, ministers having failed to secure a majority at the elections, were at once driven from office by an amendment to the address, declaring that they had not the confidence of the House of Commons.3 And now the question of reform was resumed, once more, by Lord John Russell, on behalf of Lord Palmerston's administration. On the 1st March, 1860, he introduced a bill, in accordance with the spirit of the amendment by which he had destroyed the measure of the previous year: but differing materially from the bills of 1852 and 1854. Like the scheme of Lord Derby's government, it spared all the smaller boroughs. None were to be disfranchised; but it deprived twenty-five boroughs, with a population under seven thousand, of one of their members. This disfranchisement fell far short of that proposed in 1854; 1 Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., cliii. 389-1157. 2 Ibid., 1301. 3 Ibid., cliv. 98-297. and it was avowed that if any more places had been condemned, their representatives, combining with the Conservative opposition, would have succeeded in defeating the bill. If such was now the difficulty of contending with these personal and local interests, what must have been the difficulties of Mr. Pitt in 1784, and of Lord Grey in 1832? One minister vainly attempted to buy off his opponents: the other overcame them by strong popular support. The first ex- · pedient was now wholly out of the question: the latter source of strength was wanting. Fifteen of the vacant seats were distributed amongst the counties; and ten given to the larger cities, and some new boroughs. The 501. occupation franchise in counties, was reduced to a 10l. bonâ fide holding. The 107. borough franchise was lowered to 6l., avowedly for the purpose of comprehending many of the working classes. It was calculated that the new franchise would add two hundred thousand electors to the cities and boroughs. None of the varied franchises, which had formed part of the bills of 1854 and 1859, were again proposed. Sneered at as " fancy franchises," and distrusted as the means of creating fictitious votes, they were now abandoned; and the more rude, but tangible tests of good citizenship inflexibly maintained.' and indif This bill was defeated, neither by adverse majorities, Bill lost nor by changes in the government; but by delays, and by delays the pressure of other important measures. It was not ference. until the 3rd of May,-after six adjourned debates,that it was read a second time, without a division. Discussions were renewed on going into committee; and at length, on the 11th of June, the bill was withdrawn.2 1 Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., clvi. 2050. 2 Ibid., clix. 226. Obstacles to parliamentary reform. Bills to amend the representation in Scotland and Ireland, which had been hopelessly awaiting discussion, had already been abandoned.1 Such obstacles as these, however harassing and inconvenient, would have been easily overcome, if the government had been cordially supported by their own party in the House of Commons, and by popular acclamations. But within the walls of the House, parliamentary reform was received with coldness,-if not with ill-disguised repugnance, even by its professed supporters; and throughout the country, there prevailed the most profound indifference. The cause which had once aroused enthusiasm, now languished from general neglect. The press was silent or discouraging: petitions were not forthcoming: public meetings were not assembled the people were unmoved. Whence this indifference? Why so marked a change of popular feeling, in less than thirty years? The settlement of 1832 had secured the great object of representation,good government. Wise and beneficent measures had been passed: enlightened public opinion had been satisfied. The representation was theoretically incomplete: but Parliament had been brought into harmony with the interests and sympathies of the people. It had nearly approached Mr. Burke's standard, according to whom, "The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons, consists in its being the express image of the feelings of a nation."2 The best results of reform had been realised: the country was prosperous and contented. It has ever been the genius of the English people to love freedom: they are roused by injustice: they resent a public or private wrong; but they are 1 Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., clix. 143. 2 Burke's Works, ii. 288 (Present Discontents). rarely moved by theoretical grievances. Living under a settled form of government, they have cared little for model constitutions; and united in the bonds of a highly civilised society, they have never favoured democracy. Again, since 1832, political power has been vested mainly in the middle classes; and the employers of labour, being masters of the representation, are unwilling to share their power with the working classes, by whom they are outnumbered. Hence the inertness of existing constituencies. They enjoy exclusive political privileges; and desire to maintain them. While these One other cause must not be omitted. moderate measures of reform were being proposed by successive governments, other schemes had been discussed elsewhere,-designed to extend largely the influence of numbers,-and conceived and advocated in the spirit of democracy. Such proposals increased the indisposition of moderate reformers, and of the classes already enfranchised, to forward an extension of the suffrage. At the same time, the advocates of more comprehensive schemes of reform,-while they coldly accepted measures falling far short of their own,—were not unwilling that they should be postponed to some period more promising for the adoption of their advanced principles. And thus, with the tacit acquiescence of all parties, the question of parliamentary reform was again suffered to sleep. Contests of the Commons on questions of CHAP. VII. RELATIONS OF PARLIAMENT TO THE CROWN, THE LAW, AND THE PEOPLE. CONFLICT OF PRIVILEGE AND LAW.- INCREASED POWER, AND MODERATION OF THE COMMONS. CONTROL OF PARLIAMENT OVER · IMPEACHMENTS:- CONTROL OF THE COMMONS SKETCH OF PARLIAMENTARY OVER TAXES AND EXPENDITURE. We have traced, in the last chapter, the changes which have been successively introduced into the constitution of the House of Commons,-the efforts made to reduce the influence of the crown, the ministers, and the aristocracy over its members,-to restrain corruption, and encourage an honest and independent discharge of its duties to the public. We have now to regard Parliament,—and mainly the House of Commons,-under another aspect: to observe how it has wielded the great powers entrusted to it,-in what manner it has respected the prerogatives of the crown, the authority of the law, and other jurisdictions, and how far it has acknowledged its own responsibilities to the people. Throughout its history, the House of Commons has had struggles with the crown, the House of Lords, the courts of law, the press, and the people. At one time resisting en privilege. straining its own powers, at another croachments upon its just authority: successful in |