and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. Government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that in which the determination precedes the discussion,-in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide? Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, -that of the whole; where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole." 1 Since that time, however, the relations between representatives and their constituents have become more intimate; and the constitutional theory of pledges has been somewhat modified. According to the true principles of representation, the constituents elect a man in whose character and general political views they have confidence; and their representative enters the Legislature a free agent, to assist in its deliberations, and to form his own independent judgment upon all public measures. If the contrary were universally the rule, representatives would become delegates; and government, by the entire body of the people, would be substituted for representative institutions." But the political 1 Burke's Works, iii. 18-20. 2 There is force, but at the same time exaggeration, in the opinions of an able reviewer upon this subject. "For a long time past we have, unconsciously, been burning the candle of the constitution at both ends; our electors have been usurping the functions of the House of Commons, while the House of Commons has been monopolising those of the Parliament."-Ed. Rev., Oct. 1852, No. 196, p. 469. Again, p. 470: "In place of se lecting men, constituencies pronounce upon measures; in place of choosing representatives to discuss questions and decide on proposals in one of three co-ordinate and co-equal bodies, the aggregate of which decree what shall be enacted or done, electors consider and decree what shall be done themselves. It is a reaction towards the old Athenian plan of direct government by the people, practised before the principle of representation was discovered." conditions of our own time have brought occasional pledges more into harmony with the spirit of the constitution. The political education of the people, — the publicity of all parliamentary proceedings, and the free discussions of the press, have combined to force upon constituencies, the estimation of measures as well as of men. Hence candidates have sought to recommend themselves by the advocacy of popular measures; and constituents have expected explicit declarations of the political faith of candidates. And how can it be contended that upon such measures as catholic emancipation, parliamentary reform, and the repeal of the corn laws, constituencies were not entitled to know the opinions of their members? Unless the electors are to be deprived of their voice in legislation, such occasions as these were surely fit for their peculiar vigilance. At a dissolution, the crown has often appealed directly to the sense of the people, on the policy of great public measures; and how could they respond to that appeal without satisfying themselves regarding the opinions and intentions of the candidates? Their response was found in the majority returned to the new Parliament, directly or indirectly pledged to support their decision.1 But while the right of electors to be assured of the political opinions of candidates has been generally admitted, the first principles of representative government are ever to be kept in view. A member, once elected, is free to act upon his own convictions and conscience. As a man of honour, he will violate no engagement which he may have thought it becoming to accept : but if he has a due respect for his own character, and for the dignity of his office, he will not yield him 1 Speeches from the throne, 24th March, 1784; 27th April, 1807; 22nd April, 1831; 21st March, 1857. self to the petty meddling and dictation of busy knots of his constituents, who may assume to sway his judg ment. tinued. Such being the multiplied relations of Parliament to Servants' privilege the people, let us inquire how, since its early excesses disconin the reign of George III., it has deferred to the law, and respected other jurisdictions besides its own. The period signalised by the ill-advised attempts of the House of Commons to enlarge its powers, and assert too tenaciously its own privileges,-was yet marked by the abandonment of some of its ancient customs and immunities. From the earliest times, the members of both Houses had enjoyed the privilege of freedom from arrest in all civil suits; and this immunity,-useful and necessary as regarded themselves, had also extended to their servants. The abuses of this privilege had long been notorious; and repeated attempts had already been made to discontinue it. For that purpose bills were several times passed by the Lords, but miscarried in the Commons.1 At length, in 1770, a bill was agreed to by the Commons2, and sent up to the House of Lords. There it encountered unexpected opposition from several peers: but was carried by the powerful advocacy of Lord Mansfield. Nor was this the only privilege restrained by this useful act. Members and their servants had formerly enjoyed immunity from the distress of their goods, and from all civil suits, during the periods of privilege. Such monstrous privileges had been flagitiously abused; and few passages in 1 Lord Mansfield's speech, May, 9th, 1770; Parl. Hist., xvi. 974. 2 Walpole says: "The bill passed easily through the Commons, many of the members who were inclined to oppose it, trusting it would be rejected in the other House."- 3 10 Geo. III. c. 50. Prisoners kneeling at the bar. Privilege parliamentary history are more discreditable than the frivolous pretexts under which protections were claimed by members of both Houses, and their servants. These abuses had already been partially restrained by several statutes but it was reserved for this act, to leave the course of justice entirely free, and to afford no protection to members, but that of their persons from arrest. This same period witnessed the renunciation of an offensive custom, by which prisoners appeared before either House to receive judgment, kneeling at the bar. Submission so abject, while it degraded the prisoner, exhibited privilege as odious, rather than awful, in the eyes of a free people. In the late reign, the proud spirit of Mr. Murray had revolted against this indignity; and his contumacy had been punished by close confinement in Newgate. But in 1772, when privilege was most unpopular, the Commons formally renounced this opprobrious usage, by standing order. The Lords, less candid in their proceedings, silently discontinued the practice, in cases of privilege: but, by fictitious entries in their journal, still affected to maintain it.a Parliament, having relinquished every invidious privi 1 12 & 13 Will. III. c. 3; 2 & 3 Anne, c. 18; 11 Geo. II. c. 24. 2 Parl. Hist., xiv. 894; Walpole's Mem. of Geo. II., i. 15. In 1647, David Jenkins, a Royalist Welsh judge, had refused to kneel before the Commons; and Sir John Maynard, Sir John Gayre, and others, before the Lords. Com. Journ., v. 469; Parl. Hist., iii. 844, 880. 3 March 16th, 1772; Com. Journ., xxvi. 48. In 1787, Mr. Warren Hastings, on being admitted to bail, on his impeachment, was obliged to kneel at the bar; and again, at the opening of his trial, in the following year, he appeared kneeling until desired by the Chancellor to rise. Of this ceremony he thus wrote: "I can with truth affirm that I have borne with indifference all the base treatment I have had dealt to me all except the ignominious ceremonial of kneeling before the House."— Trial of Hastings: Lord Stanhope's Life of Pitt. i. 356. The same humiliating ceremony was repeated eight years afterwards, when he was called to the bar to hear his acquittal announced by the Chancellor.-Ibid., ii. 319. Courts. lege, has not been without embarrassments in exercising and the the powers necessary for maintaining its own authority and independence, and which,—if rightly used, are no restraint upon public liberty. Each House has exercised a large jurisdiction, in declaring and enforcing its own privileges. It administers the law of Parliament: the courts administer the law of the land; and where subjects have considered themselves aggrieved by one jurisdiction, they have appealed to the other.1 In such cases the appeal has been to inferior courts, — to courts whose judgments may again be reviewed by the High Court of Parliament. The courts, without assuming the right to limit the privileges of Parliament, -have yet firmly maintained their own unfettered jurisdiction, to try all causes legally brought before them; and to adjudge them according to the law, whether their judgment may conflict with privilege, as declared elsewhere, or not. A court of equity or common law can stay actions, by injunction or prohibition: but neither House is able to interdict a suit, by any legal process. Hence embarrassing contests have arisen between Parliament and the courts. Sir Francis The right of both Houses to imprison for contempt, Case of had been so often recognised by the courts, on writs of Burdett. habeas corpus, that it appeared scarcely open to further question. Yet, in 1810, Sir Francis Burdett denied the authority of the Commons, in his place in Parliament. He enforced his denial in a letter to his constituents; and having himself been adjudged guilty of contempt, he determined to defy and resist their power. By direction of the House, the Speaker issued his warrant 1 All the principles and authorities upon this matter are collected in Chap. VI. of the author's Trea tise on the Law and Usage of Par- |