66 "to pass a Bill, for the purpose of leaving to the King "the power of disposing of that fortress for the advantage of his subjects. You cannot imagine the ferment "which the proposal produced. The public was roused "with indignation, on the simple suspicion that, at the "close of a successful war, so unjustly begun by Cardinal "Alberoni, we should cede that fortress. One circum"stance greatly contributed to excite the general indigna"tion, namely, a report insinuated by the Opposition, "that the King had entered into a formal engagement to "restore Gibraltar, which was deemed a sufficient ground "to attack the Ministry. Many libels have been pub"lished to alarm the nation, and excite them rather to "continue the war, than to cede a fortress of such im"portance. We were accordingly compelled to yield to "the torrent, and to adopt the wise resolution of withdrawing the motion; because if it had been pressed, it "would have produced a contrary effect to what is designed, and would perhaps have ended in a Bill, which might for ever have tied up the King's hands. Such "being the real state of this business, you will endeavour "to explain to the Court of Madrid, that if the King of "Spain should ever wish at some future day to treat concerning the cession of Gibraltar, the only method of "succeeding would be to drop the subject at present. We 66 are much concerned that France should have interfered on this occasion; the extreme eagerness which she tes"tified was of great detriment. Some letters and me"morials on that subject seemed even to threaten a rupThe alarm was indeed so strong, that people began to suspect France was meditating a change of "system, and made Gibraltar a pretext to adopt other "measures; and this was the cause of my coming to "Paris."* 66 66 66 ❝ture. 66 Stanhope's journey proved successful: the Regent was convinced by his statements, and promised not to join Spain in urging its claims prematurely. But it was not so easy for Schaub to prevail with the Spaniards. Their impatience grew so uncontrollable, that though the question was referred to the Congress to be held at *To Mr. Schaub, March 28. 1720. Cambray, Stanhope made another effort to conclude it in the autumn of 1720. He wrote from Hanover to lay before the Lords Justices the expediency of exchanging Gibraltar on the footing of some adequate equivalent.* The Lords Justices agreed to this plan; and the cession of Gibraltar seemed determined if the consent of Parliament could be obtained. But the project was again marred by the perverseness of the King of Spain, who refused to give Florida, and wished to gain Gibraltar without any equivalent whatever. At this period of the transaction ensued the deaths of Stanhope and Craggs, and the consequent changes in the English administration. Townshend, however, into whose hands the affair now chiefly came, followed in this respect the footsteps of his predecessor. Like him he desired the cession of the fortress, like him he dreaded the resistance of the Parliament. Scarcely had he taken the Seals, when he received an application from the Court of Madrid, stating, in confidence, their difficulty with their own subjects, the peace being deemed in Spain highly dishonourable unless it included Gibraltar. They therefore requested, as an ostensible vindication of the treaty, a letter from King George, containing a promise of restoring the fortress some time hereafter. By advice of the two Secretaries, Townshend and Carteret, such a letter was written by the King on the 29th of April, assuring His Catholic Majesty" of my readiness to satisfy you with regard to the re"stitution of Gibraltar, upon the footing of an equivalent, promising you to make use of the first favour"able opportunity to regulate this article with consent "of my Parliament." But when William Stanhope delivered this letter to the King and Queen of Spain at Aranjuez, they made so many cavils and objections to the word EQUIVALENT, which, they said, would render the letter useless †, that, at their solicitation, George the First consented to write another letter on the 1st of 66 66 * Earl Stanhope to Secretary Craggs, October 1. 1720. See Appendix. William Stanhope to Lord Carteret, May 29. 1721, N.S. Hardwicke Papers. June, omitting the clause in question.* It was the conviction of the Ministers that the letter, even thus mutilated, left the affair entirely to the discretion of Parliament, who might refuse the cession altogether, or demand any equivalent they pleased. Philip, however, considered, or affected to consider, the promise as unconditional; and it was always thus represented in his negotiations. Nevertheless there seems reason to believe, that if the English Parliament could have been brought to approve the cession upon the footing of an equivalent, Philip would soon have consented to yield the latter. In January, 1722, William Stanhope writes from Madrid:-"It is very unfortunate "that our hands are tied as to Gibraltar, so as not to "take advantage of this immoderate desire the King of Spain has to obtain it; for were it otherwise, notwith"standing the pretended promise of it, I am fully per"suaded we might yet sell it for double its worth in "advantages to our commerce."† 66 At Cambray, numerous petty obstacles delayed the opening, and blighted the hopes, of the Congress. At Madrid the negotiations for Gibraltar continued to drag on with the usual slow pace of Spaniards, who, as they say themselves, are born doing business, pass their life in doing business, and die without having done any!‡ Yet Philip did not relinquish his pursuit. To gain this darling object was one of his motives for rushing so eagerly into the Vienna alliance, and he then peremptorily told William Stanhope, that the immediate restitution of Gibraltar was the only means to prevent a war. Stanhope answered, that at all events it could not be done without Parliament, which was not then sitting. "No!" exclaimed the Queen, who was present: Why then let "the King, your master, return from Germany and call a Parliament expressly for that purpose. The matter once fairly proposed would not meet with one negative * See this Letter in the original French; Commons' Journals, vol. xxi. p. 285. 66 66 To Sir Luke Schaub. Coxe's House of Bourbon, vol. iii, p. 22. "Nacimos arreglando, vivemos arreglando, y por fin moriremos "sin haber arreglado nada." See Mr. Slidell's Spain Revisited, vol. ii. p. 330. "in either House. Let this short argument be once "made use of; either give up Gibraltar, or your trade "to the Indies and Spain, and the matter, I will answer "for it, would not admit of a moment's debate!"* Unhappily, however, the two Houses, not having the benefit of hearing this Royal reasoning, were not convinced by it; and Philip, finding his threats as unsuccessful as his entreaties had been before, at length laid siege to the fortress, as I have already mentioned, in 1727. The siege failed, and he signed the preliminaries at the Pardo; but still, in discussing a definitive treaty, continued to claim the former promise, and to urge the expected cession. The views of the English Cabinet at this period were still the same-anxious to pacify the Spaniards, but afraid to lose their popularity at home. In 1728 we find a letter from Mr. Poyntz to his patron, Lord Townshend, observing that "after we carry the point of Gibraltar "the Spaniards will leave no stone unturned to hurt our commerce and to distress us into compliance;" and that "the Catholic King and all true Spaniards are animated 66 against us by this single consideration." Townshend, in answer, declares, "What you propose in relation to "Gibraltar is, certainly, very reasonable, and is exactly "conformable to the opinion which you know I have 66 66 always entertained concerning that place. But you "cannot but be sensible of the violent and almost super"stitious zeal which has of late prevailed among all parties in this kingdom, against any scheme for the "restitution of Gibraltar, upon any conditions what66 soever; and I am afraid that the bare mention of a proposal which carried the most distant appearance of laying England under an obligation of ever parting "with that place would be sufficient to put the whole "nation in a flame."† 66 Townshend had, indeed, good reason for his fear of Parliamentary or popular resistance. From the Spanish complaints the Opposition had obtained a clue to the *William Stanhope to Lord Townshend, August 6. 1725. Coxe's Walpole. † Mr. Poyntz to Lord Townshend, June 9. 1728. Lord Townshend to Mr. Poyntz, June 14. 1728. letter of George the First, in 1721; and they now raised an outcry on two grounds; first, that there should be any idea of ceding the fortress at all— and, secondly, because, as they alleged, the Ministry had disgraced the King and nation by breaking a solemn promise, however wrongly made, from whence they inferred that the war was unjust on the part of England, and that Philip was merely claiming his due. A motion to produce King George's letter was brought forward by Mr. Sandys, in February, 1727, warmly supported by Wyndham and Pulteney. Walpole replied that such a promise had, indeed, been made in a former administration, but that he could assure the House it was only a conditional promise, and void by the refusal of Spain to comply with the terms required; and that as to producing the King's letter, he held that the private letters of Princes were almost as sacred as their very persons. The motion was rejected by a large majority. 66 In 1729, however, the onset was renewed in the other House. No resistance was then made by the Ministers to produce the Royal letter, probably because it had already been published abroad. This document being laid upon the table, the Opposition, in order to thwart the Government and perplex the negotiations as much as possible, moved, "That effectual care be taken in any treaty that the King of Spain do renounce all claim to "Gibraltar and Minorca, in plain and strong terms." But a large minority decided for a counter-resolution: "That the House relies upon His Majesty for preserving “his undoubted right to Gibraltar and Minorca." This resolution was communicated to the Commons in a conference; in that House also, Lord Malpas obtained the production of the King's letter, and a similar proposal to that of the Lords in opposition was made, but with similar defeat. The minority, however, mustered no less than 111, a larger number than they usually could at that period.* The agitation of the public mind on this question, and the rising clamour against Spanish depredations, rendered it more than ever necessary to come to some conclusion * Parliamentary History, vol. viii. pp. 548. and 695. |