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third undertook that in case of any attack on one of the contracting parties, the others should furnish a certain quota in troops, or the value in ships or money; and, in case of need, should agree concerning further succours. These were nearly all the apparent stipulations; but their real drift was, moreover, to counter-balance the treaty of Vienna - compel the Emperor to relinquish the Ostend Company, - and withstand any attempts that might be made in behalf of the Pretender.

Such was the celebrated treaty of Hanover, against which the Opposition so often thundered during the administration of Walpole. “ Thus Hanover rode tri“umphant on the shoulders of England,” writes Chesterfield. “It was a treaty, the tendency of which is dis“ covered in the name,” cries Chatham. But their judge ment loses much of its weight, when we find it built on the assumption that there was, in fact, no secret agreement at Vienna. The proofs of that agreement, depending mainly on private and confidential disclosures, could not, at the time, be made known; and party spirit was eager to deny an injury which it would not resent. But we — who can scarcely be unconvinced that there was such an agreement - - who observe that the two Courts were rapidly marching to its execution, and that Spain had just taken the first public step by a peremptory demand of Gibraltar from the British Governmentwe doubt that it was necessary to provide against this alarming combination, and that a counter-alliance was likely to prove, as it did prove, the best means of averting the danger, and preserving peace to England and to Europe?

Nor can it truly be said, that the treaty of Hanover was framed to promote Hanoverian objects. I do not deny, that the interests of Hanover had, in many instances, been unduly cherished, and had given rise to some of the difficulties out of which the treaty sprung. It was the acquisition of Bremen and Verden from Denmark which produced the seizure of Sleswick and the resentment of Russia, while the Emperor was no less offended at this spirit of aggrandisement, and at the refusal of George to pay the large fines required for investitures. Had it not been for Hanover, there might





have been no confederacy at Vienna. But that confederacy once formed, and once pointed against England, from whatever cause, it was necessary for England to withstand it; and the treaty of the 3rd of September was, in fact, only for the defence of England and of English objects, Gibraltar, the Ostend Company, and the attempts of the Pretender, -in all which Hanover had not the least concern. So certain is this, that the King's German Ministers were unanimous against it, complaining that the King was exposing his foreign states to the vengeance of the head of the Empire for the sake of English trade. The King himself opposed the treaty on this ground, and it was with great difficulty that his consent was extorted by Townshend. And thus, while the Opposition at home was clamorous against the treaty as too Hanoverian, the Germans, with more reason, denounced it as too English.

The treaty of Hanover was, I think, the only Ministerial measure from 1721 to 1742, in which Walpole did not take the principal lead. A statesman so jealous of power, was not a little displeased to find this important transaction almost solely conducted by a colleague. He was determined, according to his own phrase, that the firm should be Walpole and Townshend, not Townshend and Walpole. To this period may probably be ascribed his first animosity against his brother Minister ; perhaps even the fixed intention to remove him at a fitting opportunity. He complained that Townshend had been “ too

precipitate ;" meaning, no doubt, that there would have been sufficient time to receive his advice and directions, -and surely his talents deserved it. All his remarks on this subject display his superior sagacity. He fully approved of the main principles of the Treaty, but he remonstrated against the large sums required to gain Sweden; he would not lay an embargo on the Russian ships of war; he thought it a grievous omission not to have secured Portugal in the event of another war with Spain. Still more must he have disapproved a wild scheme which Townshend had formed and communicated to his brother Horace; to conquer the Austrian Netherlands, and divide them between England, Holland, and


France.* Walpole was far too wise a statesman to allow the French, under any pretext, a footing in the Netherlands. He knew, as was emphatically said many years afterwards by an American Minister in London, that “if “ever France should acquire the dominion of Flanders, “having at the same time a good constitution, the consequence

of this island is gone.”+ In December, the King began his journey to England; and landed at Rye after a most violent tempest, which exposed him to considerable danger. The engagements he had lately concluded produced the principal, indeed the only important, debates of the ensuing Session; their policy was severely arraigned by Pulteney, Shippen, and Lord Lechmere; but ably defended by Townshend and the two Walpoles, and supported by large majorities in both Houses. The funds also, which, on the apprehension of war, had fallen 12 or 14 per cent. I, gradually recovered from their depression.

* Lord Townshend to Horace Walpole, August 27. 1725.

† Gouverneur Morris's Letters to President Washington, August 30. 1790.

See Mr. Barnard's Speech, Feb. 9. 1726. (Parl. Hist. vol. vii. p. 502.)


WHILE such engagements were concluded at Hanover, and confirmed in London, the little Court of the Pretender was full of expectation and scheming. “I have had for

some time reason to hope," writes James to one of his Scottish adherents, “ that the Emperor will soon espouse “my restoration in a very particular manner. You will " allow it is no easy matter to persuade a foreign prince “ of the facilities he would find in such an attempt. “Therefore I proposed to the Emperor, to send a Minister “privately to England, to take information there of the

good disposition of my subjects, and I have reason to “ believe that he will send one soon. A secret mission of this kind would, however, have been so liable to suspicion and discovery, that the inquiry was relinquished, or rather left to be the private object of a public embassy. But James, on his part, sent over one of his most trusty followers, Allan Cameron, to visit the Highlands, and prepare them for a rising. This agent found there a curious combination of real and caution ; for example, among the Gordons it was already arranged, that the Duke should stay at home in the next insurrection and secure the estate, while the Earl of Aboyne, as next man of the family, should head the clan.f The principles of the Highlanders were still unchanged, and their spirit unbroken. In vain had the Act for the Encouragement of Loyalty in Scotland, brought in by Stanhope in 1715, and commonly called the Clan Act, endeavoured to dissolve their bond of feudal union, by providing, that whenever a vassal took arms in any rebellion, his property was to devolve upon his liege lord if he remained quiet; and on the other hand, that a loyal vassabwas to receive the freehold of his lands from a rebellious lord. In vain, also,

* To Mr. Lockhart, Feb. 2. 1726. Lockhart Papers.
† Mr. Lockhart to James, July 7. 1726.

had there passed in the very last Session, an Act for disarming the Highlanders. There was indeed a simulated surrender of arms to General Wade; but in fact none but old rusty firelocks, and other unserviceable weapons, were yielded by the disaffected clans, while the few welldisposed gave all, so that, in 1745, the latter were found defenceless, and the first prepared.* General Wade, who had been sent into Scotland with very full powers, seems to have been a judicious and conciliatory man, insomuch that he became personally popular, even whilst faithfully obeying most distasteful orders. He employed himself more usefully in making military roads across the Highlands, but these (such is the capriciousness of fame!) are perhaps less remembered for the solid advantage, than for the silly panegyric, they produced.

From the North, Allan Cameron proceeded to Edinburgh, to confer with the Duke of Hamilton, Mr. Lockhart, and the other managers or “trustees” of James in the south of Scotland ; for it is very remarkable how slight and casual were then the communications between the Highlands and Lowlands, and how little the Chiefs in one quarter knew what was passing in the other. Though attainted, Cameron remained for some time at Edinburgh, and ventured to frequent the most public taverns, observing only a new and convivial plan for his security. “ All “his caution," writes Lockhart, “ consisted in outsitting “all other companies at the same tavern, so that he was “safe going home!” Cameron was assured, that James's party had not fallen off in numbers or in zeal, and that the people at large were ripe for another attempt. But it was added, that this attempt could never promise success unless made with a foreign force ; that such a force ought to land in England, and the nearer London the better; and that nothing should, or need be expected from Scotland, except a diversion, to prevent the troops

* See an article ascribed to Sir Walter Scott, Quart. Rev. No. xxviii. p. 322, &c. + I allude to the well-known couplet :

“ Had you but seen these roads, before they were made,

• You'd have lifted up your eyes, and blessed General Wade!” I To Lord Inverness, June 9. 1726.

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