The CHAIRMAN: I desire on the part of the meeting to offer thanks to Lient. Soley for the paper he has just read.

It seems to me that we would make more progress in this matter were we to draw more marked distinctions between Tactics, Grand tacties, and Logistics, and teach them with this distinction in view. The simple tactics, the part to be learned by the man, should be taught not as an end, as it usually is, but as a preparation for drill. It should be boiled down to its simplest form, taught thoroughly once and for all. Then we can proceed to the real leading drills, which are important matters for the officer. Here the man merely puts in practice what he has learned; thus giving point to his knowledge and adding interest and, what is more important, experience.

I think if five or six imaginary operations could be worked out in minute detail, selecting for the scene Hampton roads, Newport, and one or two other places where the ships could assemble for landing drills, prepared like a theatrical play, illustrated with large scale colored maps (8 inches to the mile) it would be of enormous benefit. It would be simply necessary to issue an order for operation No. — and make the details for the several roles fill out the cast, so to speak. All the experience of real war would be obtained except in the element of danger. One or two should be for the night. I believe the true reason of the confusion frequently met with in landing blue jackets is a slovenliness in primary instruction, a slovenliness of which we officers ourselves are not wholly guiltless, as evidenced in the teaching of such movements as two's right about, movements utterly unauthorized in the tactics. Company drill is really extremely simple; but it is amazing how few blue jackets know even how to halt. The manual of arms is another matter and is really of small importance. Shooting and maneuvering are the two chief things required.

I do not exactly see the objection to the trumpet. It can readily be learned in a month and is extremely useful in handling squadrons of boats as well as howitzers and skirmishers.

Lieut. Com'r. CHADWICK-I noticed, in a visit which I paid on board the Bellerophon, at Barbadoes, some two years since, kits at hand ready for landing. These were made up of the usual articles of clothing carried by landing parties, and were neatly packed in a canvas cover which could be strapped on as a knapsack. They were made up of course from the men's own clothing. The kits were kept overhead in the men's quarters. Thus nothing but the blanket needed to be added, and they were ready at once. To show that such a thing is necessary, at times, I shall cite the case of the sudden sending off at night of 200 men, from the receiving ship at Norfolk, to Washington, during the riots of 1877, where great confusion ensued from the getting out of clothing etc., many men going without any change whatever. Leggings should be made a part of the uniform, and obligatory.

I am thoroughly in accord with all the ideas expressed by Lieut. Soley, and especially deprecate, with him, the adherence by so many to the idea that the knowledge by the sailor of the use of the musket and of infantry tactics is useless. I regard it as necessary in a very high degree, and think that any seaman is a better man and a better sailor even for this added knowledge. It has been my observation that the men who have shown most proficiency in such things on board ship have at the same time been our best men in seamanship duties. The sphere of a sailor's duties is not so large but that it may contain the knowledge of how to shoot with a small gun as well as with a big one.

Lieut. HANFORD. I would like to ask the lecturer how the paymaster is to transport the provisions etc. and where the men are to get their haversacks and canteens?

Lieut STOCKTON. The lecturer gives canteens and haversacks as part of the equipment of the men of the landing party, and with these water and rations for forty eight hours can be carried by each individual. In point of fact there are no canteens or haversacks among the stores of the ship for

the men, that is for the blue jacket. There is no doubt that by a liberal expenditure of canvas, haversacks can be made, but,it is a question whether, with the limited supply of tin ware on board, canteens can be improvised for the whole landing force. It would take a long time to make these articles with the resources of a single ship.

Personally I quite agree with the author of the paper just read in regard to the waste of time in the manual of arms and in the endeavor to get the manipulation of the rifles and the movements generally mechanically perfect; besides being a waste of time, it stifles the individuality of the sailor: and sacrifices celerity and freedom of movements to an unnecessary unity in detail. A writer lately pronounced the uniformity of detail in handling the guns and the mechanically correct manœuvres in marching, wheeling, and alignment as the coxcombry of the profession, and I think it should be relegated to the militia and to avenue parades. In time of actual war this vanishes into thin air and is not of the business of war. I do not wish to say that, given a body of men, to act as infantry, they should be kept in a chaotic state; but the movements taught should be restricted to simply the necessary ones, to those that will conform, as much as possible, to the characteristics that should be found in sailors,

The skirmish drill is well adapted to seamen and should be taught the men more frequently than is now the custom. now the custom. I hope Lieut. Soley's proposed formation of skirmishers will be thoroughly tested and criticised by military experts.

Master LYETH. In reply to Lieut. Hanford's inquiry as to the immediate wants of sailors on landing, especially in hot climates, for water, I would state that I took part in several landing parties for exercise conducted by Lieut. Soley, the summer of 1877, in Smyrna; the weather was very warm and a sufficient supply was with some difficulty kept up by the provision men of each company carrying water to their companies in mess kettles.

Lieut. J. W. MILLER. The organization of the Naval Brigade which the lecturer has given us to-night I have seen tested practically, both at Annapolis and by two ships of the fleet of which Mr. Soley was flag lieutenant. Although the exercises which have been conducted were necessarily on a peace basis, and the operations on shore bloodless, still all possible contingencies of actual warfare were provided for, and the majority of the details elaborated in the paper just read, were carried out in the most conscientious manner. One point upon which the lecturer dwells deserves the most earnest consideration, and that is the necessity of frequent naval brigade drills on shore. The vessels of our squadrons are so often separated that such drills are rare. Every effort should be made to bring the ships together. Granted that a few vessels may be assembled at some future date, every watch officer in the service should begin to prepare his division for a combined drill, and begin too at the A B C of tactics. Mr. Soley rightly says that a great deal of the so called "infantry" taught on board ship is a waste of time. When I first had a division my ambition was to make the men proficient in the manual, and at least three months were thrown away in drilling "by the numbers". Moreover, like most young graduates, I had the tendency to give too much time to explanation, and too little to execution. The short routine exercises should not be used up with talk. A man-of-wars-man learns much more readily by a simple repetition of an order than from long descriptions to which he is not listening; while the lazy landsmen are nothing loath to let the officer use his voice, while they stand at an "order" or comfortable “right-shoulder." Explanatory exercises should never, and never can, be combined with quick, spirited drills.

The next and most important point of all is to teach the men to load and fire properly. This is rarely acccomplished in a satisfactory manner on board ship. The quarterly allowance of small arm ammunition is usually expended at a target swung from the fore-yard arm; the men thus get in the habit of firing high and the range is too short. There is no reason why

Wingate's aiming drill, with the assistance of sand bags, should not be employed at first, to be followed by the armory target practice used with so much success by the militia. The Lowell cartridge company is now manufacturing a strong reloading shell, to contain eight grains of powder and a bullet, which will carry two hundred yards. A large folding target of boiler plate could be used in connection with this cartridge: the men to fire from aft; the target to be placed on the forecastle; the folds to form side screens, and a protection for the deck.

The proficiency of the divisions and companies is of the last importance and it behooves the watch officer to attend to all the minutiae, without which the larger operations on shore will prove failures.

I entirely agree with the lecturer that blank cartridges are not enough used on shore drills. All of us know the great difference that exists at great-gun drill between the actual general quarters with and without powder. Every detail may be seemingly perfect in the latter: yet when the men have to handle real charges for the first time, noise and confusion are often the result. Such confusion is tenfold greater when we pass from the ordinary battalion parades to the action of the skirmish line-even with blank cartridges. In case of a battle, the brigade which has been accustomed to the use of powder will undoubtedly stand fire better, while the linkmen and aides will have had much experience in passing the word from the outer line, and carrying orders quickly and quietly. Those gentlemen who have been to the "farm drills" at the Naval Academy, willˇappreciate the force of the foregoing remarks.

In conclusion, I would like to ask the lecturer whether, in his opinion, the skids formerly provided for landing howitzers, and still in use by some ships, are as serviceable as the single shifting spars coming into service, My experience with the latter leads me to think them far superior to the cumbersome skids advocated by so many officers.

Lieut. SOLEY: It is a matter of gratification to me to find that the ideas which I have put forward have been so well received. I am sure that all thinking men must see, sooner or later, that every thing must be eliminated from our drills that is not necessary as a preparation for war, and at the same time that nothing must be omitted which would tend to that end. My experience has taught me that the only way to have a successful drill is to take plenty of time in preparing the details; the more thoroughly the details are prepared the more will all concerned be ready for actual service, and in our squadrons we want to get as ready as possible in the shortest possible time. A great deal might be done on board the receiving ships, where our newly enlisted men are trained, by having an organized landing party; individual officers may work here and there, and work hard, but they have to encounter, on one hand, prejudice, which is disheartening, and, on the other, apathy, which is ten fold more aggravating. In such cases arguments avail nothing. If arguments did any good they might be taken beyond our own naval history, and shown how almost every navy in the world in the last ten years has used its naval brigade more than any other part of its naval force. In the Franco-Prussian war a whole division was landed from the French fleet and sent, under a Vice Admiral, to garrison the forts around Paris. In the Ashantee and Zulu campaigns the English landed their men and they were valuable coöperators. with the army. When the English fleet went into the sea of Marmora, they immediately made preparations to land men to hold the lines of Bulair. Does any one think that this could have been done without complete preparation?

After the preparation of drill should come the preparation of equipment. Mr. Hanford has asked where we would get the canteens and haversacks with which the men are to be supplied. Of course, we have none furnished to our ships, and if we had to improvise them from the ship's stores a man would be at his wit's end: haversacks might be made, while the canteens

would give more trouble. I think that if any one of us were going on an expedition he would not hesitate to buy them if he could, but I think that enough of each should be supplied for the landing party of each ship. With regard to the transport of provisions some means must be improvised which will depend upon circumstances: in some cases the native population may be impressed into the service; in civilized countries means of carriage will be easily found; but it is proposed that each man shall carry enough for two days: more is not likely to be required.

With regard to the use of the trumpet I do not think it is very useful except for very simple signals, such as forward, halt, charge, commence or cease firing, and the like. For extended movements aids and wig wag signals are the best.

I think that the skids which are furnished for the launches are worse than useless, for they are only lumber in the boat, and weight which does no good. We are not likely to have in a boat any gun which is too heavy to be handled by a shifting spar. The tactical movements which a sailor needs to know are few in number: the officer needs to know the principles of tactics, and he has plenty of opportunities to learn them if he chooses: and most officers will have sufficient pride in their profession to learn them if they will only reflect that they are more likely to be called upon to fight on shore than on the sea.

PROFESSIONAL NOTES.

These Articles have not been read before the Institute, but are inserted by direction of the Executive Committee.

DETAILS CONCERNING THE CAPTURE OF THE HUASCAR. QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE OFFICERS OF THE U. S. S. PENSACOLA, AND ANSWERED BY A LIEUTENANT OF THE CHILIAN NAVY WHO SERVED ON BOARD THE ALMIRANTE COCHRANE IN HER FIGHT WITH THe Huascar off Angamos OCTOBER 8, 1879.

QUESTION 1. What What is your opinion of the way the Huascar was fought? first as to the handling of the ship, and second as to the serving and pointing of the guns?

ANSWER. I consider that the Huascar, during action, was very poorly handled; from beginning to end she did nothing but try to escape, notwithstanding that those on board of her saw that our ship was steaming nearly a knot more than she. Captain La Torre steered straight for her, in order not only to shorten the distance but to bring her to the condition you mention in the second question. In my opinion, and in that of our captain, she ought to have preferred steering west, and finally given us her ram, but never her stern. The same shot which killed Captain Grau disabled part of the rudder chains leading to the fighting wheel; from that moment recourse was had to relieving tackles aft, and it is worth noticing that no officer appears to have been attending to these. No executive officer was killed or wounded outside of the fighting turret; no communication was established through voice tubes, telegraphs, et cetera, to after part of the ship: steering was carried on by word of command only-the worst possible thing in action, the words babor (port) and estribor (starboard) being so similar that a mistake is very easy.

The serving of the Huascar's guns, judging by the amount of firing, was not bad-especially during the first half hour. As regards pointing, I can only say it was wretched-in fact could not have been worse.