contend that there is no evidence of more than one. Now it generally happens that a negative proposition admits not of proof; and certainly, in all cases, the burden of proof ought to rest upon those who make the positive assertion. It is indubitably the business of those who maintain the reality of a being, capable of counteracting the decrees of the Supreme Jehovah, to demonstrate his reality; we are not to contend with a shadow, or attempt to knock down a phantom. It is indubitably the business of those who maintain that the Supreme Mind is divided into three distinct persons, to demonstrate the existence and the absolute divinity of these persons; nor is it till after such a demonstration that the fact can be believed.* However, on the present question it will be found that many solid arguments may be adduced even to prove a nega

tive.

2nd. No plea of necessity can be urged for

* I trust this expression will not be misunderstood as others have been. To avoid the possibility, however, I wish distinctly to state, That if it be proved to be revealed by God, that is demonstration.

more than one Supreme All-perfect Mind. It is an universal rule to admit of no more causes than are necessary for the production of the effect. In the works of art, as, for instance, a highly-finished painting, or a proudly-magnificent edifice, do we look for more than one artist, one architect? Or are we not at once satisfied that one mind was competent to the design? Apply the same test to the works of nature. One great operating cause we find to be absolutely necessary. But are we struck with the necessity of more? Have we any plea from reason for the supposition that one must direct, a second execute, and a third influence? Have we the slightest ground to suppose that the All-controuling mind must be divided into separate persons to accomplish its object? As a question of previous reasoning the supposition is absurd.

3rd. The supposition that there are more persons than one possessing coequal, co-eternal powers and perfections, deprives that one of his self-existence. Self-existence implies absolute independence. I would ask then, whether it be

possible to conceive of two, much less of three, absolutely independent beings? Once admit the idea of the slightest dependance of one being upon another, and his self-existence is destroyed.

will answer,

4th. The supposition of two or more persons of co-equal and co-eternal powers and perfections destroys the Omnipotence of God. What is Omnipotence? You answer, the power of doing every thing that does not imply a contradiction. Consequently a power of controul over all other beings. If there be a single other being not under his controul, his Omnipotence ceases. And surely none will contend, that the being who is, in the slightest degree, under the controul of another, is himself Omnipotent! And I would put it to the common sense of the most common mind, whether he can attach one grain of rationality to the assertion, that three distinct persons, each of them Omnipotent, can be amalgamated into One Omnipotent.

5th. The ascription of equal perfections to other beings is a derogation of the glory of the One Supreme. In meditat

We

ing upon the glorious attributes of God, the mind is not satisfied, does not conceive itself to have reached the highest possible pitch of grandeur and majesty, until it has ascribed to him not only absolute but exclusive perfection. delight in contemplating the highest archangel as infinitely inferior to the incomprehensible Jehovah. Nor can we for a moment admit the idea of other beings equalling his perfections, without a sensible diminution of his glory. Admit the possibility of a rivalship of perfections, and you can set no bounds to its extent. If one or two can equal, why not more? Where will you fix the limit? The mind revolts at the thought. It seems to burst the barrier between the creature and the great Creator.

6th. The division of the One God into three persons destroys the Spirituality of his nature. God is a Spirit. Our most sublime conception of him is as the Allpervading Mind, every where present, dwelling in the soul, the superintendent of universal nature. I appeal to you, whether the division of this Spirit into

three persons does not at once annihilate the Spirituality? Can the two ideas be entertained at the same time? Are they at all compatible with each other? Are they not perfectly contradictory?

7th. The supposition of a Trinity in Unity is exposed to the following dilemma. The three persons must be either of the same nature or of a different one. Are they precisely and in every respect of the same nature? Then, I ask, what possible advantage can be gained by the division into persons? For, in that case, whatever is done by one of the persons is done by the others also, and it was the Father and the Holy Ghost, equally with the Son, who descended from heaven, became a child, was crucified, dead and buried, and again ascended into heaven. In this case also, I ask, What is the object of worship? You will assuredly say, the essence, the nature, the deity. Then do you act consistently, whenever you pray to the Son or to the Holy Ghost? Are you not then praying to the Person? Surely, if you acted consistently, your object of worship should be the same as ours, One alone.