Congress was to defray expenses for the common defence or general welfare out of a common treasury; but there was no independent treasury; the taxes were to be laid and levied by the legislatures of the several states. Moreover, the quotas of the states were to be assigned in proportion to the value of all real estate within each state, and that value each state was to estimate for itself. Congress, which had no direct power to levy any money whatever, could not even assign to the states their quotas till every one of the thirteen should have completed its valuation. The states might tax imports as much as they pleased; congress could not tax them at all. It could declare war, but had not power to bring a single citizen into the field. The states of America had formed not a union but a confederation, which acted not on individuals but only on each separate sovereignty; room for amendment seemed to be provided for; but an amendment could not take place without the simultaneous consent of every member of the league. With every day, men would grow more attached to their separate states; for many of these had the best governments in the world, while the confederation was one of the worst, or was rather no government at all. Washington was the first to perceive the defects of the confederation, and the first to urge its reform. On the day before it was adopted he had explained to a young member of the Virginia legislature "the necessity of a controlling power to regulate and direct all matters of general concern. The great business of war," he said, "never can be well conducted, if it can be conducted at all, while the powers of congress are only recommendatory. Our independence, our respectability and consequence in Europe, our greatness as a nation hereafter, depend upon vesting congress with competent powers. That body, after hearing the views of the several states fairly discussed, must dictate, and not merely recommend." The position of the commander-in-chief required of him unceasing caution. Intrusted with the conduct of the war, no one could see so clearly the absolute necessity of clothing the confederation with coercive powers over its members; but the vigorous recommendation of the change, proceeding from the head of the army that in the last resort would be the instrument of coercion, would have increased and apparently justified congress in its jealousy of the camp. While, therefore, he wished to support his opinion by all the influence which he could wield, he sought to do it so circumspectly as to awaken no fear of military dictation or a baneful employment of force. The office of preparing a code of laws for Virginia, and adapting them to her new relations, had been definitively confided to Pendleton, Wythe, and Jefferson. No sooner had a groundwork for national reform been laid by the acceptance of the confederation, than Washington addressed to these three greatest civilians of his native commonwealth the most earnest arguments and entreaties that the manner of coercing a refractory or delinquent state might be clearly laid down, and the defects of the articles of confederation be seasonably considered and remedied. "Danger," he added, "may spring from delay; good, from a timely application of a remedy. The present temper of the states is friendly to the establishment of a lasting union; the moment should be improved: if suffered to pass away, it may never return; and, after gloriously and successfully contending against the usurpations of Britain, we may fall a prey to our own follies and disputes." He was more particularly impelled to express his opinions with freedom, because, in December 1779, the legislature of Virginia seemed to have censured the idea of enforcing obedience to requisitions. "It would give me concern," he added, "should it be thought of me that I am desirous of enlarging the powers of congress unnecessarily, as I declare to God my only aim is the general good. A knowledge that this power was lodged in congress might be the means to prevent its ever being exercised, and the more readily induce obedience; indeed, if congress was unquestionably possessed of the power, nothing should induce the display of it but obstinate disobedience and the urgency of the general welfare." Of this paper a copy was taken by Joseph Jones of King George, to whom Washington had already expressed himself "in plain language." This copy Jones confided to Madison, his colleague in congress, leaving him to draw his own inference with regard to its author. The confederation was but a month and a half old when a committee of congress presented a report drafted by Madison, exactly in conformity to this advice of Washington, and, as I believe, in consequence of it, proposing by "an amendment to the articles of confederation to give to the United States full authority to employ their force, as well by sea as by land, to compel any delinquent state to fulfil its federal engagements;" and the reason for the measure as assigned in the preamble was "to cement and invigorate the federal union, that it might be established on the most immutable basis." In this manner the idea of granting to the United States power to coerce a delinquent or refractory state entered the hall of congress, strange and as yet unwelcome and dreaded, yet never to die. The delicacy and importance of the subject inspired Madison, the author of the report, with the wish to obtain from Jefferson, now governor of Virginia, and one of those to whom Washington had addressed his paper of advice and entreaty, a judgment on the measure, before it should undergo the final decision of congress. He therefore, on the sixteenth of April, represented to Jefferson the arming of congress with coercive powers as a necessity, arising from the shameful deficiency of some of the states most capable of yielding their apportioned supplies, and the military exactions to which others, already exhausted by the enemy and their own troops, were in consequence subjected. "The expediency," he added, "of making the proposed application to the states will depend on the probability of their complying with it. If they should refuse, congress will be in a worse situation than at present; for as the confederation now stands, and according to the nature even of alliances much less intimate, there is an implied right of coercion against the delinquent party, and the exercise of it by congress whenever a palpable necessity occurs will probably be acquiesced in." The instrument of coercion which he preferred was a navy. No answer of Jefferson to these inquiries has been found; his opinions, as declared at a later period of the confederacy, coincide with those of Madison, who from that time strove without rest to establish an efficient system of government for the states in union. In May he continued to discuss with Pendleton by letters the proper methods of investing congress with new resources; but no reflecting and far-seeing observer of its relative strength dared hope that its members would be able to remodel the confederacy. While the American people met obstructions on every side as they slowly sounded their way to an efficient union, Washington on, the first day of May 1781, made a note, that instead of magazines they had but a scanty pittance of provisions, scattered here and there in the different states, and poorly provided arsenals which the workmen were leaving. The articles of field equipage were not ready, nor funds to defray the expenses of regular transportation. Scarce any one of the states had as yet sent an eighth part of its quota into the field; and there was no prospect of a glorious offensive campaign, unless their generous ally should help them with money and with a fleet strong enough to secure the superiority at sea. |