being increased from ninety-four to one hundred and fiftynine. The larger counties were divided; and the number of members adjusted with reference to the importance of the constituencies.

Another evil was the restricted and unequal franchise. This too was corrected. All narrow rights of election were set aside in boroughs; and a 107. household franchise was established. The freemen of corporate towns were the only class of electors whose rights were reserved; but residence within the borough was attached as a condition to their right of voting. Those freemen, however, who had been created since March 1831, were excepted from the electoral privilege. Crowds had received their freedom, in order to vote against the reform candidates at the general election: they had served their purpose, and were now disfranchised. Birth or servitude were henceforth to be the sole claims to the freedom of any city, which should confer a vote.

The county constituency was enlarged by the addition of copyholders and leaseholders, for terms of years, and of tenants-at-will paying a rent of 50l. a year. The latter class had been added in the Commons, on the motion of the Marquess of Chandos, in opposition to the government. The object of this addition was to strengthen the interests of the landlords, which it undoubtedly effected; but as it extended the franchise to a considerable class of persons, it was at least consistent with the liberal design of the reform act.

Another evil of the representative system had been the excessive expenses at elections. This too was sought to be mitigated by the registration of electors, the division of counties and boroughs into convenient polling districts, and the reduction of the days of polling.

It was a measure, at once bold, comprehensive, moderate, and constitutional. Popular; but not democratic: - it extended liberty, without hazarding revolution. Two years before, Parliament had refused to enfranchise a single unrepresented town; and now this wide redistribution of the

The Reform Act, Scotland.

franchise had been accomplished! That it was theoretically complete, and left nothing for future statesmen to effect, its authors never affirmed; but it was a masterly settlement of a perilous question. Its defects will be noticed hereafter, in recounting the efforts which have since been made to correct them; but whatever they were, -no law since the Bill of Rights, is to be compared with it in importance. Worthy of the struggles it occasioned, it conferred immortal honor on the statesmen who had the wisdom to conceive it—and the courage to command its success. The defects of the Scotch representation, being even more flagrant and indefensible than those of England, were not likely to be omitted from Lord Grey's general scheme of reform. On the 9th March, 1831, a bill was brought in to amend the representation of Scotland; but the discussions on the English bill, and the sudden dissolution of Parliament, interrupted its further progress. The same lot awaited it, in the short session of 1831; but in 1832, its success was assured in the general triumph of the cause. The entire representation was remodelled. Forty-five members had been assigned to Scotland at the Union this number was now increased to fifty-three, of whom thirty were allotted to counties, and twenty-three to cities and burghs. The county franchise was extended to all owners of property of 10l. a year, and to certain classes of leaseholders; and the burgh franchise to all 107. householders.

The Reform

1832.

The representation of Ireland had many of the defects of the English system. Several rotten and nominaAct, Ireland, tion boroughs, however, had already been disfranchised on the union with England; and disfranchisement, therefore, did not form any part of the Irish Reform Act. But the right of election was taken away from the corporations, and vested in 107. householders; and large additions were made to the county constituency. The number

12 & 3 Will. IV. c. 65.

of members in Ireland, which the Act of Union had settled at one hundred, was now increased to one hundred and five.1

Irish fran

chise, 1850.

This measure was the least successful of the three great reform acts of 1832. Complaints were immedi- Further exately made of the restricted franchise which it had tension of the created; and the number of electors registered, proved much less than had been anticipated. After repeated discussions, a measure was passed in 1850, by which the borough franchise was extended to householders rated at 87.; and further additions were made to the county franchise.2

The representation of the country had now been reconstructed on a wider basis. Large classes had been Political re

Reform Acts.

admitted to the franchise; and the House of Com- sults of the mons represented more freely the interests and political sentiments of the people. The reformed Parliament, accordingly, has been more liberal and progressive in its policy than the Parliaments of old; more vigorous and active; more susceptible to the influence of public opinion; and more secure in the confidence of the people. But in its constitution, grave defects still remained to be considered.

Act.

Prominent among the evils of the electoral system which have been noticed, was that of bribery at elections. Bribery since For the correction of this evil, the reform acts the Reform made no direct provision. Having increased the number of electors, the legislature trusted to their independence and public spirit in the exercise of the franchise; and to the existing laws against bribery. But bribery is the scandal of free institutions in a rich country; and it was too soon evident, that as more votes had been created, more votes were to be sold. It was not in nomination boroughs, or in boroughs sold in gross, that bribery had flourished: but it had been the vice of places where a small body of electors, exercising the same privilege as proprietors, sold the seats

1 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 88. Hansard's Deb., 3d Ser., iii. 862; Ibid. ix. 595; Ibid. xiii. 119.

2 13 & 14 Vict. c. 69.

which by their individual votes they had the power of conferring.

The reform act had suppressed the very boroughs which had been free from bribery: it had preserved boroughs, and classes of voters, familiarized with corrupt practices; and had created new boroughs, exposed to the same temptations. Its tendency, therefore, unless corrected by moral influences, was to increase rather than diminish corruption, in the smaller boroughs. And this scandal,— which had first arisen out of the growing wealth of the country, now encouraged by accumulations of property, more vast than in any previous period in our history. If the riches of the nabobs had once proved a source of electoral corruption,

--

was

what temptations have since been offered to voters, by the giant fortunes of our own age? Cotton, coal, and iron,— the steam-engine, and the railway, have called into existence thousands of men, more wealthy than the merchantprinces of the olden time. The riches of Australia alone, may now vie with the ancient wealth of the Indies. Men enriched from these sources have generally been active and public spirited, engaged in enterprises which parliamentary influence could promote; ambitious of distinction, — and entitled to appeal to the interests and sympathies of electors. Such candidates as these, if they have failed to command votes by their public claims, have had the means of buying them; and their notorious wealth has excited the cupidity of electors. This great addition to the opulent classes of society, has multiplied the means of bribery; and the extension of the franchise has enlarged the field over which it has been spread. Nor has the operation of these causes been sufficiently counteracted by such an enlargement of borough constituencies, as would have placed them beyond the reach of undue solicitation.

So far the moral and social evils of bribery may have been encouraged; but its political results have been less material. Formerly a large proportion of the members of

the House of Commons owed their seats to corruption, in one form or another: now no more than an insignificant fraction of the entire body are so tainted. Once the counterpoise of free representation was wanting: now it prevails over the baser elements of the constitution. Nor does the political conduct of members chosen by the aid of bribery, appear to be gravely affected by the original vice of their election. Eighty years ago, their votes would have been secured by the king, or his ministers: now they belong indiscriminately to all parties. Too rich to seek office and emolument, even were such prizes attainable, and rarely aspiring to honors, they are not found corruptly supporting the government of the day; but range themselves on either side, according to their political views, and fairly enter upon the duties of public life.

Sudbury and

disfranchised.

St.

The exposure of corrupt practices since 1832, has been discreditably frequent; but the worst examples have been presented by boroughs of evil reputa- St. Albans tion, which the reform act had spared. Sudbury had long been foremost in open and unblushing corruption; 1 which being continued after the reform act, was conclusively punished by the disfranchisement of the borough.2 Albans, not less corrupt, was a few years later, wholly disfranchised. Corrupt practices were exposed at Warwick, at Stafford, and at Ipswich. In corporate towns, freemen had been the class of voters most tainted by bribery; and their electoral rights having been respected by the reform act, they continued to abuse them. At Yarmouth their demoralization was so general, that they were disfranchised, as a body, by act of parliament. But bribery was by no means confined to the freemen. The 107. householders created by the reform act, were too often found unworthy of their new franchise. Misled by bad examples, and gen

5

1 See supra, p. 271. 27 & 8 Vict. c. 53.

8 15 & 16 Vict. c. 9.

Misled by bad examples,

4 Rep. of Committee, 1833, No. 295.

5 Ibid. No. 537.

6 Ibid. 1835, No. 286.

7 11 & 12 Vict. c. 24.