is a marked distinction among the objects thus included. Things very diverse from each other may be comprehended under one general name. The whole created universe, with its numberless worlds, and its endlessly diversified orders of beings, is, in a sense, but one thing, that is, but one universe. Edwards himself observes, that "the whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz., His infinite knowledge, His infinite virtue or holiness, and His infinite joy or happiness ;" and that "His external glory consists in the communication of these." But he represents the knowledge, holiness, and happiness of the creature as not distinct from the knowledge, holiness, and happiness of the Creator; because the excellence of the creature is communicated from the Creator. If this be admitted as a valid reason, will it not lead us to pantheism; to the conclusion, that the Creator and his creatures are not distinct beings? The existence and faculties of the one have been communicated from the other. Are we to infer from this, that human existence, and the human faculties, are not distinct from the divine existence, and the divine attributes? If they are distinct, are not the acts of these beings, and the exercise of these faculties, their knowledge, their holiness, and their happiness, distinct from the knowledge, the holiness, and the happiness of God? It is true, that they are inseparably connected; and in all beings perfectly holy, there is an entire harmony of feeling, of design, and of action. But are not God and the creature distinct objects of thought, of knowledge, and of benevolent regard?

President Edwards repeatedly speaks of the knowledge, the holiness and the happiness of creatures as being effects of the Creator's agency. But does this prove that they are not distinct from Himself? Is the effect never distinct from its cause? Is the material world one with God, because He is its author? Even where effects are of the same nature as their cause, they may be as really distinct from it, as any one thing is distinct from any other which it resembles. Because man was made in the image of God, does it follow that they are not separate beings? Every thing which man or angels know, God also knows. But does this imply, that the creature's knowledge is not distinct from that of the Creator? Holiness in men is of the same nature with God's holiness. But can we infer from this, that men have

no holiness which is properly their own? The joy of a creature who is perfectly holy, may be the same in kind, as the joy of his Maker; and the character of each may be a ground of rejoicing to the other. But does it follow that there is no distinction between them?

According to Edwards, the thing signified by the phrase the glory of God, as an ultimate end of His works, is the emanation of His internal glory, the excellent brightness and fulness of the Divinity diffused, overflowing, or in one word, existing ad extra. The effect produced by God's exercising His perfections, is His fulness communicated; and the producing this effect is the communication of His fulness. These expressions seem to imply, that every excellence in the creature has flowed out from the Creator in the same manner as a stream of water proceeds from its fountain. Though this comparison may be a happy illustration, yet we are not to consider the resemblance as perfect in every point of view. The stream of water consists of that which was previously in the fountain, but which is now no longer there. The fountain is so far diminished, unless replenished from some other source. But the communications which are made from the Creator of the universe withdraw nothing from His infinite fulness. The holiness of creatures consists of acts of their minds. Are these acts the acts of God? Have they flowed out from Him to the creature. Admitting that He is their primary cause, the original source from which they proceed, are they nothing distinct from Him? Are all effects nothing else than a portion of the cause from which they proceed? When Christians rejoice in the immeasurable blessedness of God, is there no distinction between their joy and His ?

"The glory of God," says Edwards, "is fitly compared to an effulgence or emanation of light from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly represented in scripture." This is indeed a beautiful figure. But can we infer from it, that the parallelism is in all respects complete, between the material sun and the infinite source of spiritual light and joy; that the holiness and happiness of creatures have come out from the Creator, in the same manner as the solar beams have radiated from the visible sun?

We are brought, then, to the conclusion, that while God has a supreme regard to His own infinite excellence and

blessedness, He has also a real regard for the welfare of His moral kingdom, for its own sake. He values it for what it is in its own nature, and not merely on account of its relation to Himself. The happiness of His creatures, and His joy in contemplating it, though evidently distinct, are inseparably connected. If He had no regard for their prosperity in itself considered, what delight could He take in promoting it? But if He seeks their highest good for its own sake, how can He fail to rejoice at its attainment? He thus becomes an example of impartial benevolence, for the imitation of His creatures. He says to His people, "Ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy.' "Love your enemies," says Christ to His disciples, "bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you that ye may be the children of Father which is in heaven." The same ultimate obyour jects of pursuit are proposed to us, which He makes the end of all His works; the glory of His name, and the highest good of His kingdom. These we are bound to seek on their own account, and not merely for the sake of procuring benefits for ourselves.

ARTICLE II.

EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR TAPPAN'S REVIEW OF EDWARDS ON THE WILL.

By Rev. Benjamin N. Martin, New York City.

THE "Inquiry into the modern notions of the Freedom of the Will," here brought under review, has possessed a degree of influence over the opinions of succeeding generations, rarely conceded to any psychological work. The concurrent testimony of friends and foes to the distinguished ability of its Author, has stamped Edwards as the prince of modern metaphysicians, and given him an authority, which has made. his lightest sayings, to many minds, oracular. Scarcely could the philosophy of Aristotle have been more potent in its most flourishing days, than is the philosophy of Edwards at this day, over many a reflecting tnind in this nation.

Under these circumstances, the announcement that Prof. Tappan had commenced his work on the Will, with a direct and hardy attack upon the Colossus that did thus "bestride our narrow world," invested that work with an unusual interest, and secured for it a very general and attentive perusal. If the reviewer has failed to secure a conviction of the soundness of his argument, he has not failed to impress upon his readers a highly favorable sense of his own critical abilities; for we believe that all who have alluded to his work, have made most respectful mention of it. The calm and philosophic spirit in which he has prosecuted his undertaking, the patient, and even profound reflection which many passages of the Review exhibit, the simplicity of statement, and the logical accuracy of many of his reasonings, have all received, as they certainly deserve, very great praise; and we rejoice to add our testimony to that of others, who have honored him as an earnest, fearless, and able investigator of the truth. But, while we thus cheerfully concede to Prof. T. no ordinary merit, we are not prepared, either to coincide with him in his views of Edwards, or to adopt his own statements of philosophic truth. We propose to confine ourselves in the present article, to an examination of his Review, and to inquire how far he has succeeded in loosening the hold, which this strong man of a past age yet has upon the public

mind.

To whatever cause the fact may be attributed, it must, we think, be admitted as a fact, that, to form an accurate estimate of the great work of Edwards, is an exceedingly difficult thing. Notwithstanding the numerous efforts which have been made, no one, however he may have been dissatisfied with the "Inquiry," has yet been able fundamentally to overthrow it, or however he may coincide with its general tenor, satisfactorily to vindicate it. The opponents of Edwards acknowledge its merits, and his disciples admit that it has its defects; yet no attempt to discriminate between them, has been fortunate enough to meet with general approbation. His errors are like the specks we sometimes see in cloth; we know they do not belong to it, but they are interwoven with the very substance of the fabric so skilfully, that it is difficult to lay hold of them, and so closely, that it is still more difficult to extricate them.

It must be known to every one, who knows any thing of

the effect of the Inquiry on the convictions of the world, that no great work was ever the subject of more controversy in respect to its main design. By one party, Edwards has been esteemed the champion of human liberty; by another, his work is regarded (and our Reviewer seems to think with entire justice), as the text-book of fatalism. Now, whatever may be the respective merits of these claims, it would seem to require but a moderate degree of penetration to perceive, that there must be something in the work which gives plausibility to each of them. Neither party would have esteemed it so highly-neither would have appealed to it so confidently, without finding in it something which they deemed favorable to their views. These facts would indicate that any exposition of the Inquiry, in order to be successful, must include much cautious discrimination, not only between truth and error, but between the conflicting statements on the same subject, which these opposing parties adduce. There must be something of candid concession-the endeavor to ascertain the design, and to develop the system of Edwards, from statements, some of which are admitted to be inconsistent with either of them.

This view, we are persuaded, is the only one which promises a satisfactory settlement of this involved and protracted controversy. We e regret that the Reviewer has not adopted it; he has proved himself competent to have done it ample justice, and we should have looked for some valuable results from so able an advocacy of it. He maintains a very different opinion. He considers Edwards a thorough and consist ent fatalist-construes all his language in consonance with this idea-pronounces his theory a psychological "monster," and meets it at every point with decided opposition. He does not, we believe, concede to his opponents a single disputed passage, nor acknowledge that he finds in the Inquiry any thing inconsistent with his own views of it. He has proceeded as though fatalism were so obviously designed in it, that nothing more was necessary than to exhibit the statements which avow it, and then to attack and vanquish the theory. Had he but contended that some of the principles of the Inquiry involve the fatalism he condemns, had he endeavored to distinguish these from the acute and forcible reasonings which have made that work so celebrated, we should have deemed the aim a happy one, and wished it all