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Hatred, Dr. Hey enlarges with all the precision of a reasoning and thoughtful mind, and with all the animation of a kind and Christian heart. Had we not positive evidence that this volume was printed in 1801, we should have thought that our author had drawn the following masterly picture, from a character too well known in the present day. So striking is the accuracy of delineation, and so remarkable is the colouring of the features, that the portrait is almost prophetic.

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"If we ask the Man-hater why he hates Mankind; he answers, because they are so vicious; so selfish, mean, cruel; so false and faithless. He cannot tolerate such infamous proceedings as he beholds in the world; he is too warm a friend of virtue to be placid and indifferent; and he is above flattery; he is too frank, sincere, and too little of a coward even to dissemble; therefore he must be permitted to vent an honest indignation; he means in private society; as to public matters, though he will not flatter the great, he will keep himself aloof. He can see that public transactions are all oppression, corruption, and iniquity; and therefore he will undertake no office; he will not appear to countenance abuses which he cordially detests. Is he a writer? he runs into virulent satire; his pen expresses nothing but gloominess and malignity; sometimes it is envenomed with the most poisonous slander: it wounds, and there is no cure. If he is not a writer, he gratifies himself by embittering conversation with austerity and invective: he alarms the cheerful tranquillity, the social security of convivial enjoyment, by representing every character and every transaction not as unpleasing only, but as shocking and detestable, He holds them up to view on the most unfavourable side, and rails at them as if they were incapable of any more favourable representation. His pleasure consists in the indulgence of his rancour and abhorrence: offer him an idea or expression that is candid or pleasing; he loaths it, as nauseously sweet and cloying. His companions, when companions he admits, are those who are best qualified to join with him in drawing gloomy pictures of mankind; in making malignant jests and acrimonious strictures; with such entertainment he gluts himself, as the savage animal with his prey. A cheerful moderate companion is at best but insipid to him, generally odious. Such a one is called unfeeling, timeserving, and a traitor to the cause of virtue. If any thwart his views, or interfere with his rights, they are immediately put upon the footing of enemies: however innocent they may be no trial is held; they are calumniated with virulence, and hated with bitterness: chagrin and ill-humour, in various shapes, take possession of his mind; and leave no authority to calm dispassionate reason, no room for mild forbearance. Yet he pretends to reason; the form of argument is kept up; nay he would be thought a man of deep reflection; of such penetration as to see through all hypocritical pretences: the complacent mask which men wear, does not

impose upon him; no; he can strip it off; and discover beneath it the hidden features of moral deformity." P. 37.

After this masterly delineation of the selfish and conceited victim of wretched and malignant gloom, our author proceeds to consider the fallacies under which misanthropy is generally desirous of sheltering its deformity. In his detection of these miserable subterfuges, Dr. Hey is peculiarly happy. He first shews that the misanthrope deceives himself firstly, in founding his pretensions to superior virtue on conduct inconsistent with hunian happiness; and secondly, with respect to his since rity and his fortitude. So far from possessing this latter qualification, Dr. Hey clearly proves misanthropy to be the result of cowardice and the want of that resolution, which enables the soul to bear up against the storms of life," the rich man's contumely, the proud man's scorn." The mischiefs caused by the misanthropist are enumerated at length, and the remedies proposed are such as if administered by a judicious and persevering hand, might be attended with a beneficial result.

We now come to the passion or sentiment of Envy, which our Author defines to be "that uneasy sentiment, of which we are conscious, when we observe the success of those with whom we compare ourselves to be greater than our own." Jealousy is considered as a branch of envy, applicable to personal favour, esteem, or affection. The beneficial effect of envy are universally acknowledged under the name of emulation. The justice, the candour, and the piety of the following statement will be received with much admiration.

"The beneficial effects of envy must be seen in the same light with those of hatred; it is a remedy for evil, itself wholly free from evil. In order to make ourselves sensible of its value, we must consider how men probably would have acted, and what improvements they would have made, had they felt no uneasiness on seeing themselves surpassed. As far as we can judge from experience, the want of such a spring, or spur, or motive, would have occasioned a very great difference in human exertions, and therefore in human improvements. Men would certainly have had their Reason to prompt them to improve themselves and their condition; and a prospect of advantage; but it has been observed, that it is chiefly uneasiness which impells men to determine on any change. (Locke, Hum. Und. 2.21. 29.) Taking men as they are, our most natural conclusion is, that without some uneasiness they would have continued in a state of indolence and stagnation. The finer feelings would have lain dormant; that alacrity and animation, which we now perceive, would have remained unseen and unknown. It may not indeed be easy to ascertain the precise quantity of good which envy has occasioned in the world; because we do not know exactly what we should have been, and how we should

should have acted, without it; but every man's experience must have shewn him instances of beneficial exertions owing to it. And he who wished to justify the ways of God to man, must produce such instances, and dwell upon them. He must also observe, that in cases where men are impelled to do good and to improve themselves, by higher motives, this spur does not necessarily act; and that its action ceases when the want of it ceases. For men are sometimes induced to exert themselves in a beneficial manner by virtuous and religious considerations; though ordinarily, judging of men from experience, it is not to be expected, that they will exert themselves so beneficially without the spur of envy, as by its assistance. And moreover, any one, thinking of envy as the work of the Creator, is at liberty to remark, how much its pungency and its mischievous influence are capable of being moderated and softened to what degree it is capable of being purified from evil. We see many amiable examples of generous rivals and competi tors; though in common life envy takes its ordinary course, and by being felt by some and recognized by all, it excites an universal animation. The best state of any passion is that which was inintended by God." P. 57.

After having enumerated the rules by which this passion is to be controuled, our author alludes to the affecting story of Joseph, which clearly turns upon the feeling of envy in his brethren, and has paraphrased at considerable length and with great feeling and beauty, the arguments of Reuben, who alone was the advocate of his brother; forming thus a recapitulation of the means which he recommends for its regulation and controul.

Our author now proceeds to his third principal head, Malice: which he considers as the pleasure which we receive from the failure of our rival or competitor-from a further stage of which arises the desire of accomplishing his ruin. In his description of the nature and the object of this tremendious passion our Author is vigorous, powerful, and just; but when he proceeds to the good effects to be expected, we must confess that we admire his ingenuity more than we coincide with his reasoning. The whole of the following paragraph appears too full of subtilty and refinement to produce conviction.

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Having now considered the Nature of Malice, and made our remarks a ground for introducing some passages of Holy Scripture, we proceed to examine its effects, that is, the good and evil annexed to the operations of that sentiment by the all-wise and allbountiful Author of Nature; or permitted to be derived from it by the free actions of man. Much of what has been already advanced is applicable to Malice, both respecting malevolent sentiments in general, and Envy in particular, of which Malice is the counterpart. In Malice we see pleasure and pain, reward and punish

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ment, somewhat more plainly and distinctly than in envy, though both passions are founded on competition. There is an immediate pleasure in comparative success, and an immediate pain in comparative disappointment; both of which may be accounted good; for neither of them needs do any harm, and both may be made beneficial. Pleasure itself is good, when not attended with any bad consequences; taken independently of the good which may be made to follow from a right use of it: and the pain is a spur to industry and improvement; one which needs not be felt when a greater evil would not arise from the want of it. And surely every thing should be esteemed a good which it is in our power to make one. When we speak of reward and punishment, in the present case, we suppose the pleasure and pain to be seen beforehand, at a distance; and then they excite hope and fear: the hope of enjoying victory and triumph animates us to exert every faculty; and the fear of being conquered and mortified co-operates with it to the same end. As man was not likely to act so well without this principle as with it, we may say, that God gave it in his goodness; and the effects now mentioned as arising from it, when rightly used, cannot be otherwise than good. These, we say, are industry and exertion, and, according to the natural course of things, improvement.

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"But it should moreover be observed, that those who have the care of educating others, find themselves able to derive great benefit from this rejoicing in comparative success; as well as from mortification in a comparative failure. They can make the rejoicing, when seen beforehand, operate as a proposed reward; and the mortification as a threatened punishment. Discretion, no doubt, is requisite in administering all rewards and punishments, to prevent abuse and particular inconveniences; but supposing these to be administered discreetly, nothing can be more efficacious. It may here be useful to observe, that education is capable of a very extensive sense; it may include communicating useful knowledge of any sort, and at any time, and in any manner: also forming any kind of good habits, of body or mind, in another.It may be well understood to comprehend the improvement of the Apprentice by his master; and not improperly that which the member of civil society receives under the protection of the Laws, and from the modes of conduct which they point out. Not to omit the edification which religious Societies receive from their Instructors. Such are the good effects of that sentiment which in systems of Morals is called Malice: they may seem to come into a small compass; but they keep arising incessantly; and they are very powerful.” P. 85.

The reader will here observe, that in order to make out any case at all, Dr. Hey is forced to confine the idea of Malice to the feeling of pleasure at the failure of our rival; which, we must confess, appears to us a feeling radically bad, and productive of

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no one good consequence. The pleasure which we receive from the failure of an enemy who is either plotting our destruction, or engaged in a course of action injurious to ourselves and others, we may allow, under due regulations, to be good: but the pleasure which arises from the fall of a virtuous competitor, is decidedly bad. It is the misapplication of a good feeling, namely, the pleasure which we receive from contemplating our success. This sentiment is placed by a good Providence in our bosoms for the best and wisest purposes; as the testimony of a good conscience, as a reward for our honest exertions and our painful and laborious struggles. But when this feeling of triumph declines from its proper object, ourselves, and extends itself towards a good and honourable rival, surely it is then to be ranked under sentiments ill regulated and misapplied. The conclusion, however, of this head is admirable, and well worthy the reader's earpest attention.

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We now arrive at the last principal source of the malevolent sentiments, Resentment: or that feeling which is excited in the mind when we receive an actual injury. Though all resentment implies a general desire of inflicting evil in return for evil, or in other words, of punishing the offender, yet our author draws a clear and judicious distinction between resentment and revenge: the latter of which he considers as a feeling centered in self; and considering the injury received, as merely personal. When a man now therefore executes revenge, he is gratified by the evil which the offender suffers, merely because it is evil, and without any regard to the good consequences which may follow, either from the justice of the retribution, the amendment of the individual, or the terror of the example.

Anger is considered by Dr. Hey, though sometimes synonymous with Resentment, to be rather the sudden emotion, while the latter is applicable to the more calm and deliberate feeling. Peevishness is well defined to be a habit of turning every incident in ordinary life into neglect, affront, injury; and of treating the persons deemed guilty, with a feeble, but never ceasing, resentment and unkindness. Indignation is the action of the same passion of resentment upon a mind of strong and ardent moral feelings, which is not so much agitated and offended by what immediately affects itself, as by what appears to be destructive of the general happiness of mankind.

We shall now present our readers with the author's view of the beneficial effect of this sentiment upon mankind.

"Of such as are useful it may be said, in general, that they are to be considered as appointed by our all-wise Creator, being suited to our present condition: Resentment does even its good work

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