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mind and confused intellect, yet busy, officious, curious, impertinent; deficient in wisdom, yet full of low artifice and hidder, duplicity. Ali these qualities heightened by an ill-contrived exterior, and expressed in an iliberal countenance. Think what you feel on the eight of a person who has been frequently the occasion of making you yourself in particular dissatisfied; or appear unfortunate or despicable. Whether by his unmerited and ill-applied prosperity, or his insolence in boasting of it, or by his baseness in attoining it, or in any other way. Think what has beea the effect when you have been eager to indulge your finer feelings; to expand yourself, as it were; to communicate your love of truth or virtue; or your relish for some liberal art; to expatiate on whatever has struck you as lovely, noble, ingenious; as likely to enlarge your sphere of beneficence; and ail these efforts have been checked by want of sympathetic spirit; have been blighted by the chilling coldness of your companion. Or think, lastly, what has been the state of your mind when all the expectations were disappointed, which you had formed on the character, age, profession of those with whom you have conversed. When from men in years you have expected sound sense and unembarrassed argument, the result of practice and experience; or moderation and serene cheerfulness, with settled habits of easy virtue, the effects having nearly finished their earthly labours, and of looking forward to a better world:—And you have been struck with the prevalence of some animal propensity, some cunning craftiness, eager ambition, sordid avarice, or perhaps vain affectation of youthful vivacity and ligentiousness. Or when from a robust form and habit of body you have expected fortitude and magnanimity;
and have been surprised and disgusted with childish cowardly ap
prehensions, and effeminate terrors.
“A due attention to our conceptions and feelings in such circumstances as these would make our idea of hatred much less vague than it appears to be at present.” P. G.
After a long disquisition upon its nature, and an examination into the scriptural usage of the term, Jr. Hey proceeds to consider the beneficial purposes for which it was insplanted in our breasts.
“Hatred, like other malevolent sentiments, when considered as a good, or as the work of our Creator, must be classed with those remedies for evils, (for it is impossible but that evils will come) which are not in themselves perfectly free from evil. Poisons which are antidotes to poisons, medicines or operations which cause bodily pain in order to diminish bodily pain upon the whole, are of this class: And indeed so are all punishments, which are painful methods of preventing evils; of preventing hurtful attacks on person and property, And so is war, since that must be . estimated as good which lessens evil; all, these are good, so long as evil is lessened by them.” P, 18.
“Nor must it be thought trifling or unimportant to found the utility of hatred upon its tendency to civilize mankind, and polish human nature; It is as much the design of Providence that Man should be improved and refined, as that he should subsist, or continue his species. Were not this the case, numberless provisions of Providence would be wholly thrown away. When we say that odious qualities probably tend to injure health, it should at the same time be understood, that every disorder of our bodily frame affects the mind, and therefore hurts or impedes our finer faculties and perceptions, to an extent beyond any limits which we can assign. And these are parts of man, as much as his bodily members. In this sense it is true, that “Man shall not live by bread alone.” Indeed the lowest classes amongst us are allowed to consider many accommodations as necessaries of life, to which an uncivilized human being is an utter stranger. “Now if things which ought to be odious, or which would be odious to the best regulated mind, are really of the nature of noxious weeds, or hurtful luxuriances, it is easy to see, that it is much better for mankind to have their growth checked by means of a sentinent, than by mere reason and experience. A sentiment acts instantaneously, whereas the deductions of reason and experience are slow. Sentiment can repel any attack upon the finer parts of our Nature before they are thoroughly understood, and so lead us to study and esteem them ; whereas if reason and experience alone inform us when we should restrain what would corrupt our nobler enjoyments, we must wait till our taste for virtue, and the fine arts has been reduced to a regular theory: a • thing not very near now, but which would be at a much greater distance than it now is, if we never had any gride but what was purely intellectual. Not that hatred is a mere blind instinct: although it acts, or makes us act, instantaneously, it is subject to the correction of reason: its operations are examined, judged, regulated by our superior facuities; and after regulation it acquires the prudence, as it were, of caim judgment, at the same time that it retains the quickness, versatility, and energy of sentiment.” P.20. “The good effects of Hatred spring up, both in the character of him who feels the passion, and of him who is the object of it. If certain qualities, actions, appearances are hateful to you, you yourself will of course avoid them; and that person in whom you hate them, is naturally induced to avoid them by the pain which your hatred inflicts. , in this nanner must the good effects of hatred, as it becomes better managed, increase and multiply.” P. 21. Its bad effects are too weii known to be presented to our readers; it will ire officient to say that they are represented with great fidelity, and that the rules which are given for the discipline and management of this sentiment are such as cannot fail if applied, to reduce it under the laws of perfect justice and the controul of Christian benevolence. - Upon a subject intinuately connected with the sentiment of - * . . . Hatred K- 5
Hatred, Dr. Hey enlarges with all the precision of a reasoning
“If we ask the Man-hater why he hates Mankind; he answers, because they are so vicious; so selfish, mean, cruel; so false and * He cannot tolerate such infamous proceedings as he
jeholds in the world; he is too warm a friend of virtue to be
placid and indifferent; and he is above flattery; he is too frank,
e must be permitted to vent an honest indignation; he means in
invective: he alarms the cheerful tranquillity, the social security
of convivial enjoyment, by representing every character and every
impose upon him; ne; he can strip it off; and discover beneath it the hidden features of moral deformity.” P. 37.
After this masterly delineation of the selfish and conceited victim of wretched and malignant gloom, our author proceeds to consider the fallacies under which misanthropy is generally desirous of sheltering its deformity. In his detection of these miserable subterfuges, Dr. Hey is peculiarly happy. He first shews that the misanthrope deceives himself firstly, in founding his pretensions to superior virtue on conduct inconsistent with human happiness; and seeondly, with respect to his sincerity and his fortitude. So far from possessing this latter qualification, Dr. Hey clearly proves misanthropy to be the result of cowardice and the want of that resolution, which enables the soul to bear up against the storms of life, “the rich man's contumely, the proud man's scorn.” The mischiefs caused by the misanthropist are enumerated at length, and the remedies proposed are such as if administered by a judicious and persevering hand, might be attended with a beneficial result. .
We now come to the passion or sentiment of Envy, which our Author defines to be “that uneasy sentiment, of which we are conscious, when we observe the success of those with whom we compare ourselves to be greater than our own.” Jealousy is considered as a branch of envy, applicable to personal favour, esteem, or affection. The beneficial effect of envy are universally acknowledged under the name of emulation. The justice, the candour, and the piety of the following statement will be received with much admiration.
“The beneficial effects of envy must be seen in the same light with those of hatred; it is a remedy for evil, itself wholly free from evil. In order to make ourselves sensible of its value, we must consider how men probably would have acted, and what improvements they would have made, had they felt no uneasiness on seeing themselves surpassed. As far as we can judge from experience, the want of such a spring, or spur, or motive, would have occasioned a very great difference in human exertions, and therefore in human improvements. Men would certainly have had their Reason to prompt them to improve themselves and their comdition; and a prospect of advantage; but it has been observed, that it is chiefly uneasiness which impells men to determine on any change. (Locke, Hum. Und. 2.21. 29.) Taking men as they are, our most natural conclusion is, that without some uneasiness they would have continued in a state of indolence and stagnation. The finer feelings would have lain dormant; that alacrity and animation, which we now perceive, would have remained unseen and unknown. It may not indeed be easy to ascertain the precise quantity of good which envy has occasioned in the world; because we do not know exactly what we should have been, and how we should should have acted, without it; but every man’s experience must have shewn him instances of beneficial exertions owing to it. And he who wished to justify the ways of God to man, must produce such instances, and dwell upon them. He must also observe, that in cases where men are impelled to do good and to improve themselves, by higher motives, this spur does not necessarily act; and that its action ceases when the want of it ceases. For men are sometimes induced to exert themselves in a beneficial manner by virtuous and religious considerations; though ordinarily, judging of men from experience, it is not to be expected, that they will exert themselves so beneficially without the spur of envy, as by its assistance. And moreover, any one, thinking of envy as the work. of the Creator, is at liberty to remark, how much its pungency and its mischievous influence are capable of being moderated and softened : to what degree it is capable of being purified from evil. We see many amiable examples of generous rivals and competitors; though in common life envy takes its ordinary course, and by being felt by some and recognized by all, it excites an universal
animation. The best state of any passion is that which was inintended by God.” P. 57.
After having enumerated the rules by which this passion is to be controuled, our author alludes to the affecting story of Joseph, which clearly turns upon the feeling of envy in his brethren, and has paraphrased at considerable length and with great feeling and beauty, the arguments of Reuben, who alone was the advocate of his brother; forming thus a recapitulation of the means which he recommends for its regulation and controul. - - Our author now proceeds to his third principal head, Malice: which he considers as the pleasure which we receive from the failure of our rival or competitor—from a further stage of which arises the desire of accomplishing his ruin. In his description of the nature and the object of this tremendious passion our Author is vigorous, powerful, and just; but when he proceeds to the good effects to be expected, we must confess that we admire his ingenuity more than we coincide with his reasoning. The whole of the following paragraph appears too full of subtilty and refinement to produce conviction.
“Having now considered the Nature of Malice, and made our remarks a ground for introducing some passages of Holy Scripture, we proceed to examine its effects, that is, the good and evil annexed to the operations of that sentiment by the all-wise and allbountiful Author of Nature; or permitted to be derived from it by the free actions of man. Much of what has been already advanced is applicable to Malice, both respecting malevolent sentiments in general, and Envy in particular, of which Malice is the counterpart. In Malice we see pleasure and pain, reward and punish
- - ment,