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ledge common to all mankind. I own, indeed, that in different perfons it prevails in different degrees

fupported by invincible force of argument, by two very able writers in the science of man, Dr. Reid in his Inquiry into the buman mind, and Dr. Beattie in his Essay on the immutability of truth. I beg leave to remark in this place, that, though for distinction's fake, I use the term common fenfe in a more limited fignification than either of the authors lait mentioned, there appears to be no real difference in our fentiments of the thing itfelf. I am not ignorant that this doctrine has been lately attacked by Dr. Priestley in a most extraordinary manner, a manner which no man who has any regard to the name either of Englishman, or of philofopher, will ever defire to fee imitated, in this or any other country. I have read the performance, but have not been able to discover the author's fentiments in relation to the principal point in difpute. He fays exprefsly, [Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry, &c. p. 119.] "Had these writers," Meffieurs Reid, Beattie, and Ofwald, “ affumed, as the elements "of their common sense, certain truths which are so plain, that no man could doubt of them, (without entering into the 66 ground of our affent to them) their conduct would have been "liable to very little objection.' And is not this the very thing which these writers have done? What he means to fignify by the parenthesis, "(without entering into the ground of "our affent to them)" it is not easy to guess. By a ground of affent to any propofition, is commonly understood, a reafon or argument in fupport of it. Now, by his own hypothefis, there are truths fo plain, that no man can doubt of them. If so, what ground of affent beyond their own plainnefs ought we to feck; what befides this can we ever hope to find, or what better reafon needs be given for denominating fuch truths, the dictates of common fenfe? If something plainer could be found to serve as evidence of any of them; then this plainer truth would be admitted as the first principle, and the other would be confidered as deduced by reafoning. But notwith/tanding

46

the

degrees of ftrength; but no human creature hath been found originally and totally deftitute of it,

who

the mistake in the inftance, the general doctrine of primary truths would remain unhurt. It feems, however, that though their conduct would have been liable to very little, it would have been liable to fome objection. "All that could have been "faid would have been, that, without any neceflity, they had "made an innovation in the received use of a term." I have a better opinion of thefe gentlemen than to imagine, that if the thing which they contend for, be admitted, they will enter into a dispute with any person about the name; though, in my judgment, even as to this, it is not they but he who is the innovator. He proceeds, "For no perfon ever denied, "that there are felf-evident truths, and that thefe must be af. "fumed, as the foundation of all our reasoning. I never met "with any perfon, who did not acknowledge this, or heard of "any argumentative treatife that did not go upon the fuppofi"tion of it." Now, if this be the cafe, I would gladly know, what is the great point he controverts. Is it, whether fuch felf-evident truths fhall be denominated principles of common fenfe, or be diftinguished by fome other appellation? Was it worth any man's while to write an octavo of near 400 pages for the difcuffion of fuch a queftion as this? And if, as he affures us, they have faid more than is neceffary, in proof of a truth which he himself thinks indifputable, was it no more than neceffary in Dr. Priestley, to compofe fo large a volume in order to convince the world, that too much had been faid already on the fubject? I do not enter into the examination of his objections, to fome of the particular principles produced as primary truths. An attempt of this kind would be foreign to my purpose; befides that the authors he has attacked, are better qualified for defending their own doctrine, and, no doubt, will do it, if they think there is occafion. I fhall only fubjoin two remarks on this book. The first is, that the author, through

the

who is not accounted a monster in his kind; for fuch, doubtlefs, are all idiots and changelings.

the whole, confounds two things totally diftinct, certain affociations of ideas, and certain judgments implying belief, which, though in fome, are not in all, cafes; and therefore not neceffarily connected with affociation. And if fo, merely to ac count for the affociation, is in no cafe to account for the belief with which it is attended. Nay, admitting his plea, [page 86] that by the principle of affociation, not only the ideas, but the concomitant belief may be accounted for, even this does not invalidate the doctrine he impugns. For, let it be observed, that it is one thing to affign a caufe which, from the mechas nifm of our nature, has given rife to a particular tenet of belief, and another thing to produce a reafon by which the underftanding has been convinced. Now, unless this be done as to the principles in queftion, they must be confidered as primary truths in refpect of the understanding, which never deduced them from other truths, and which is under a neceffity in all her moral reafonings, of founding upon them. In fact, to give any other account of our conviction of them, is to confirm, instead of confuting the doctrine, that in all argumentation they must be regarded as primary truths, or truths which reason -never inferred through any medium, from other truths previoufly perceived. My fecond remark is, that though this examiner has, from Dr. Reid, given us a catalogue of first principles, which he deems unworthy of the honourable place af figned them, he has no where thought proper to give us a lift of thofe felf-evident truths which, by his own account, and in his own exprefs words, "must be affumed as the foundation of "all our reafoning." How much light might have been thrown upon the fubject by the contraft? Perhaps we should have been enabled, on the comparison, to difcover fome distinctive characters in his genuine axioms, which would have preferved us from the danger of confounding them with their fpurious ones.

Nothing

lings. By madness, a disease which makes terrible havoc on the faculties of the mind, it may be in a great measure, but is never entirely loft.

Ír is purely hence that we derive our affurance of fuch truths as thefe: Whatever has a beginning has a caufe. When there is in the effect, a manifest adjustment of the several parts to a ' certain end, there is intelligence in the cause. 'The courfe of nature will be the fame to-mor

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row, that it is to-day; or, the future will refemble the paft. There is fuch a thing as body; or, there are material fubftances independent of the mind's conceptions. There are other intelligent beings in the univerfe befide me. The clear representations of my memory in regard to paft events, are indubitably true.' Thefe, and a great many more of the fame kind, it is impoffible for any man by reafoning to evince, as might eafily be fhewn, were this a proper place

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Nothing is more evident than that, in whatever regards matter of fact, the mathematical axioms will not answer. These are purely fitted for evolving the abstract relations of quantity. This he in effect owns himself [page 39]. It would have been obliging then, and would have greatly contributed to fhorten the controverfy, if he had given us, at leaft, a fpecimen of thofe felf-evident principles, which, in his eftimation, are the non plus ultra of moral reasoning.

VOL. I.

I

for

for the difcuffion. And it is equally impoffible, without a full conviction of them, to advance a fingle step in the acquifition of knowledge, espe cially in all that regards mankind, life, and conduct.

I AM fenfible, that fome of these, to men not accustomed to inquiries of this kind, will appear at firft not to be primary principles, but conclufions from other principles; and fome of them will be thought to coincide with the other kinds of intuition above mentioned. Thus the first, Whatever hath a beginning hath a caufe,' may be thought to ftand on the fame footing with mathematical axioms. I acknowledge, that in point of evidence they are equal, and it is alike impoffible in either cafe, for a rational creature to with-hold his affent. Nevertheless, there is a difference in kind. All the axioms in mathematics are but the enunciations of certain properties in our abstract notions, diftinctly perceived by the mind, but have no relation to any thing without themfelves, and can never be made the foundation of any conclufion concerning actual existence: whereas, in the axiom laft fpecified, from the existence of one thing we intuitively conclude the existence of ano her,

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