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of them, which would render them unfit for fup-porting a general conclufion:

PART IV. The fuperiority of fcientific evidence

re-examined.

AFTER the enumeration made in the first part of this fection, of the principal differences between scientific evidence and moral, I fignified my intention of refuming the subject afterwards, as far at least as might be neceffary to fhew, that the prerogatives of demonftration are not fo confiderable, as on a curfory view one is apt to imagine. It will be proper now to execute this intention. I could not attempt it fooner, as the right apprchenfion of what is to be advanced, will depend on a juft conception of thofe things which have lately been explained. In the comparison referred to, I contrafted the two forts of evidence, as they are in themselves, without confidering the influence which the neceffary application of our faculties in ufing both, has, and ought to have, on the effect. The obfervations then made in that abftracted view of the fubject, appear to be well founded. But that view, I acknowledge, doth not comprehend the whole. with which we are concerned.

VOL. I.

L 6

IT

It was observed of memory, that as it instantly fucceeds fenfation, it is the repository of all the ftores from which our experience is collected, and that without an implicit faith in the clear reprefentations of that faculty, we could not advance a step in the acquifition of experimental knowledge. Yet we know that memory is not infallible; nor can we pretend, that in any cafe there is not a phyfical poffibility of her making a falfe report. Here, it may be faid, is an irremediable imbecillity in the very foundation of moral reasoning. But is it lefs fo in demonftrative reafoning? This point deferves a careful examination.

Ir was remarked concerning the latter, that it is a proof confifting of an uninterrupted feries of axioms. The truth of each is intuitively perceived as we proceed. But this process is of neceffity gradual, and thefe axioms are all brought in fucceffion. It must then be folely by the aid of memory, that they are capable of producing conviction in the mind. Nor by this do I mean to affirm, that we can remember the preceding steps, with their connexions, fo as to have them all prefent to our view at one inftant; for then we should, in that inftant, perceive the whole

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of them, which would render them unfit for fupporting a general conclufion.

PART IV. The fuperiority of scientific evidence re-examined.

AFTER the enumeration made in the first part of this fection, of the principal differences between fcientific evidence and moral, I fignified my intention of refuming the fubject afterwards, as far at leaft as might be neceffary to fhew, that the prerogatives of demonftration are not fo confiderable, as on a curfory view one is apt to imagine. It will be proper now to execute this intention. I could not attempt it fooner, as the right apprehenfion of what is to be advanced, will depend on a juft conception of those things which have lately been explained. In the comparison referred to, I contrafted the two forts of evidence, as they are in themselves, without confidering the influence which the neceffary application of our faculties in ufing both, has, and ought to have, on the effect. The obfervations then made in that abftracted view of the fubject, appear to be well founded. But that view, I acknowledge, doth not comprehend the whole with which we are concerned.

IT

It was observed of memory, that as it instantly fucceeds fenfation, it is the repofitory of all the ftores from which our experience is collected, and that without an implicit faith in the clear reprefentations of that faculty, we could not advance a step in the acquifition of experimental knowledge. Yet we know that memory is not infallible; nor can we pretend, that in any cafe there is not a physical probability of her making a falfe report. Here, it may be said, is an irremediable imbecillity in the very foundation of moral reasoning. But is it lefs fo in demonftrative reafoning? This point deferves a careful examination.

It was remarked concerning the latter, that it is a proof confifting of an uninterrupted series of axioms. The truth of each is intuitively perceived as we proceed. But this process is of neceffity gradual, and thefe axioms are all brought in fucceffion. It must then be folely by the aid of memory, that they are capable of producing conviction in the mind. Nor by this do I mean to affirm, that we can remember the preceding fteps, with their connexions, fo as to have them all present to our view at one inftant; for then we should, in that inftant, perceive the whole

whole intuitively. Our remembrance, on the contrary, amounts to no more than this, that the perception of the truth of the axiom to which we are advanced in the proof, is accompanied with a strong impreffion on the memory, of the fatisfaction that the mind received from the justnefs and regularity of what preceded. And in this we are under a neceffity of acquiescing; for the understanding is no more capable of contemplating and perceiving at once, the truth of all the propofitions in the feries, than the tongue is capable of uttering them at once. Before we make great progrefs in geometry, we come to demonftrations, wherein there is a reference to preceding demonftrations; and in these perhaps to others that preceded them. The bare reflection, that as to thefe we once were fatisfied, is accounted by every learner, and teacher too, as fufficient. And if it were not fo, no advancement at all could be made in this fcience. Yet, here again, the whole evidence is reduced to the teftimony of memory. It may be faid that, along with the remembrance now mentioned, there is often in the mind, a confcious power of recollecting the several steps, whenever it pleases; but the power of recollecting them feverally and fucceffively, and the actual inftantaneous recollec

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