ample in Difamis, as in the technical dialect, the third mood of the third figure is denominated : Some men are rapacious ; All men are rational animals; Therefore fome rational animals are rapacious. Who does not perceive that rational animals is but a periphrafis for men? It may be proper to fubjoin one example at leaft in negative fyllogifms. The fubfequent is one in Celarent, the fecond mood of the first figure: Nothing violent is lasting; But tyranny is violent; Therefore tyranny is not lafting. Here a thing violent ferves for the genus of which tyranny is a fpecies; and nothing can be clearer than that it requires much less experience to difcover, whether shortness of duration be juftly attributed to tyranny the species, than whether it be juftly predicated of every violent thing. The application of what was faid on the first example to that now given, is fo obvious, that it would be lofing time to attempt further to illuftrate it. LOGICIANS have been at pains to discriminate the regular and confequential combinations of the the three terms, as they are called, from the irre gular and inconfequent. A combination of the latter kind, if the defect be in the form, is called a paralogifm; if in the fenfe, a sophism; though sometimes these two appellations are confounded, Of the latter, one kind is denominated petitio principii, which is commonly rendered in English a begging of the question, and is defined, the proving of a thing by itself, whether expreffed in the fame or in different words; or, which amounts to the fame thing, affuming in the proof the very opinion or principle proposed to be proved. It is furprifing that this should ever have been by thofe artifts ftyled a fophifm, fince it is in fact fo effential to the art, that there is always fome radical defect in a fyllogifm, which is not chargeable with this. The truth of what I now affirm, will appear to any one, on the flighteft review of what has been evinced in the preceding part of this chapter. THE fourth and laft obfervation I fhall make on this topic, is, that the proper province of the fyllogiftical science, is rather the adjustment of our language, in expreffing ourselves on fubjects previously known, than the acquifition of knowledge in things themfelves. According to M. du 66 66 65 66 66 du Marfais," Reasoning confists in deducing, inferring, or drawing a judgment from other judgments already known; or rather, in shewing that the judgment in queftion has been already formed implicitly, infomuch that the only point is to develop it, and show its identity with fome anterior judgment." Now I affirm that the former part of this definition fuits all deductive reasoning, whether scientifical or moral, in which the principle deduced is diftinct from, however closely related to, the principles from which the deduction is made. The latter part of the definition, which begins with the words or rather, does not anfwer as an explication of the former, as the author feems to have intended; but exactly hits the character of fyllogiftic reafoning, and indeed of all forts of controverfy merely verbal. If you regard only the thing fignified, the argument conveys no inftruction, nor does it forward us in the knowledge of things a fingle ftep. But if you regard principally the figns, it may ferve to cor Le raifonnement confifte à déduire, à inférer, à tirer un jugement d'autres jugemens déja connus; ou plutôt à faire voir que le jugement dont il s'agit, a déja été porté d'une manière implicite; de forte qu'il n'est plus queftion que de le déveloper, et d'en faire voir l'identité avec quelque jugement anterieur. Logique, Art 7. re&t rect mifapplications of them, through inadvertency or otherwise. IN evincing the truth of this doctrine,-I shall begin with a fimple illuftration from what may happen to any one in studying a foreign tongue. I learn from an Italian and French dictionary, that the Italian word pecora correfponds to the French word brebis, and from a French and English dictionary, that the French brebis corresponds to the English Sheep. Hence I form this argument, Pecora is the fame with brebis, Therefore pecora is the fame with sheep.. 6 This, though not in mood and figure, is evidently conclufive. Nay more, if the words pecora, brebis, and Sheep, under the notion of figns, be regarded as the terms, it has three diftinct terms, and contains a direct and fcientifical deduction from this axiom, Things coincident ' with the fame thing, are coincident with one another.' On the other hand, let the things fignified be folely regarded, and there is but one term in the whole, namely the fpecies of quadruped, denoted by the three names above mentioned. Nor is there, in this view of the matter, another another judgment in all the three propofitions, but this identical one, A fheep is a sheep.' NOR let it be imagined, that the only right application can be in the acquifition of ftrange languages. Every tongue whatever gives scope for it, inafmuch as in every tongue the speaker labours under great inconveniences, especially on abftract queftions, both from the paucity, obfcurity, and ambiguity of the words, on the one hand; and from his own mifapprehenfions, and imperfect acquaintance with them, on the other. As a man may, therefore, by an artful and fophiftical ufe of them, be brought to admit, in certain terms, what he would deny in others, this difputatious difcipline may, under proper management, by fetting in a ftronger light the inconfiftences occafioned by fuch improprieties, be rendered inftrumental in correcting them. It was remarked above, that fuch propofitions as thefe, Twelve are a dozen,' Twenty are a fcore,' unless confidered as explications of the words dozen and score, are quite infignificant. This limitation, however, it was neceffary to add; for thofe pofitions which are identical when confidered purely as relating to + Chap. V. Sect. I. Part I. N VOL. I. the |