the things fignificd, are nowife identical when regarded purely as explanatory of the names. Suppose that through the imperfection of a man's knowledge in the language, aided by another's sophistry, and perhaps his own inattention, he is brought to admit of the one term, what he would refufe of the other, fuch an argument as this might be employed,

Twelve, you allow, are equal to the fifth part of fixty;
Now a dozen are equal to twelve;

Therefore a dozen are equal to the fifth part of fixty.

I mark the cafe rather ftrongly, for the sake of illustration; for I am fenfible, that in what regards things fo definite as all names of number are, it is impoffible for any who is not quite ignorant of the tongue, to be mifled. But the intelligent reader will eafily conceive, that in abstruse and metaphyfical fubjects, wherein the terms are often both extenfive and indefinite in their fignification, and fometimes even equivocal, the most acute and wary may be intangled in them.

IN further confirmation of my fourth remark, I fhall produce an example in Cameftres, the fecond mood of the fecond figure:

All

When the antagonist calls an angel an animal, it muft proceed from one or other of thefe two causes, either from an error in regard to the nature of the angelic order, or from a miftake as to the import of the English word animal. If the firft be, the cafe; namely, fome erroneous opinion about angels, as that they are embodied fpirits, generated and corruptible like ourselves; it is evident that the forementioned fyllogifm labours under the common defect of all fyllogifms. It affumes the very point in queftion. But if the difference between the difputants be, as it frequently happens, merely verbal, and the opponent ufes the word animal, as another name for living creature, and as exactly correfponding to the Greek term*, arguments of this fort may be of fervice for fetting the impropriety of fuch a mifapplication of the English name in a clearer light. For let it be observed, that though Nature hath strongly marked the principal differences to be found in different orders of beings, a procedure which hath suggested to men the manner of claffing things into genera and spe

cies, this does not hold equally in every cafe. Hence it is, that the general terms in different languages do not always exactly correfpond. Some nations, from particular circumstances, are more affected by one property in objects, others by another. This leads to a different diftribution of things under their feveral names. Now, though it is not of importance that the words in one tongue exactly correfpond to those in another, it is of importance that in the fame tongue uniformity in this refpect be, as much as poffible, obferved. Errors in regard to the figns, tend not only to retard the progrefs of knowledge, but to introduce errors in regard to the things fignified. Now by fuggefting the different attributes comprised in the definition of the tern, as fo many mediums in the proof, an appeal is made to the adverfary's practice in the language. In this way fuch mediums may be prefented, as will fatisfy a candid adversary, that the application he makes of the term in question, is not conformable to the ufage of the tongue.

On the other hand it is certain, that in matters of an abstract and complex nature, where the terms are comprehenfive, indefinite, not in frequent ufe, and confequently not well afcer

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tained,

tained, men may argue together eternally, without making the smallest impreffion on each other, not fenfible all the while, that there is not at bottom any difference between them, except as to the import of words and phrases. I do not fay, however, that this is a confequence peculiar to this manner of debating, though perhaps oftener refulting from it, on account of its many nice distinctions, unmeaning fubtleties, and mazy windings, than from any other manner. For it must be owned, that the fyllogiftic art has at least as often been employed for impofing fallacies on the understanding, as for detecting those impofed. And though verbal controversy seems to be its natural province, it is neither the only method adapted to fuch difcuffions, nor the most expeditious.

To conclude then, what fhall we denominate the artificial fyftem, or organ of truth, as it has been called, of which we have been treating? Shall we style it, the art of reasoning? So honourable an appellation it by no means merits, fince, as hath been shewn, it is ill adapted to scientific matters, and for that reafon never employed by the mathematician; and is utterly incapable of affifting us in our researches into nature. Shall

we then pronounce it the science of logomachy, or in plain English, the art of fighting with words, and about words? And in this wordy warfare, fhall we fay that the rules of fyllogizing are the tactics This would certainly hit the matter more nearly; but I know not how it happens, that to call any thing logomachy or altercation, would be confidered as giving bad names; and when a good ufe may be made of an invention, it feems unreasonable to fix an odious name upon it, which ought only to discriminate the abuse. I shall therefore only title it, the scholastic art of disputation*. It is the schoolmen's fcience of defence.

WHEN all erudition confifted more in an acquaintance with words, and an addrefs in ufing them, than in the knowledge of things, dexterity in this exercitation conferred as much luftre on the scholar, as agility in the tilts and tournaments added glory to the knight. In proportion

It answers to that branch of logic which Lord Verulam ftyles Do&rina de elenchis hermenia; concerning which he af firms, "Dedimus ei nomen ex ufu, quia verus ejus ufus est plané redargutio, et cautio circa ufum verborum. Quinimo partem "illam de prædicamentis, fi recté inftituatur, circa cautiones. "de non confundendis aut tranfponendis definitionum et divisi. onum terminis, præcipuum ufum fortiri exiftimamus, et huc "etiam referri malumus." De Aug. Sci. L. v. c. 4.

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