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as the attention of mankind has been drawn off to the ftudy of Nature, the honours of this contentious art have faded, and it is now almoft forgotten. There is no reason to with its revival, as eloquence feems to have been very little benefited by it, and philosophy ftill lefs.

NAY, there is but too good reafon to affirm, that there are two evils at least which it has gendered. These are, first, an itch of difputing on every fubject, however uncontrovertible; the other, a fort of philofophic pride, which will not permit us to think, that we believe any thing, even a felf-evident principle, without a previous reafon or argument. In order to gratify this paffion, we invariably recur to words, and are at immenfe pains to lofe ourselves in clouds of our own raifing. We imagine we are advancing and making wonderful progrefs, while the mift of words in which we have involved our intellects, hinders us from difcerning that we are moving in a circle all the time*.

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How ridiculous are the efforts which fome very learned and judicious men have made, in order to evince that whatever be. gins to exift must have a caufe. One argues, There must have ⚫ been a caufe to determine the time and place,' as though it were more evident that the accidents could not be determined without a caufe, than that the existence of the thing could not

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be fo determined. Another infifts very curiously, that if a thing
had no cause, it must have been the cause of itself; a third, with
equal confiflency, that nothing muft have been the caufe. Thus, by
always affuming the abfolute neceffity of a caufe, they demonftrate the
abfolute neceffity of a caufe. For a full illuftration of the futility of
fuch pretended reasonings, fee the Treatife of Human Nature,
B. I. Part iii. Se&t. 3. I do not think they have fucceeded bet-
ter who have attempted to affign a reafon for the faith we have
in this principle, that the future will resemble the past. A late
author imagines, that he folves the difficulty at once, by saying,
that what is now time past, was once future; and that though
• no man has had experience of what is future, every man has had
experience of what was future.' Would it then be more per-
fpicuous to ftate the question thus, How come we to believe
• that what is future, not what was future, will resemble the
'paft?" Of the firft he fays exprefsly, that no man has had ex-
perience, though almost in the fame breath he tells us, not very
confiftently, The answer is fufficient, have we not always
⚫ found it to be fo?' an answer which appears to me not more
illogical than ungrammatical. But admitting with him, that
to confider time as past or future (though no distinction can be
more precife) is only puzzling the queftion; let us inquire whe-
ther a reason can be affigned, for judging that the unknown
time will resemble the known. Suppofe our whole time divided
into equal portions. Call thefe portions A, B, C, D, E, F, G.
Of these the three firft have been experienced, the remaining
four are not. The three firft I found to resemble one another,
but how muft I argue with regard to the reft? Shall I say, B
was like A, therefore D will be like C; or, if you think it
ftrengthens the argument, fhall 1 fay, C refembled A and B,
therefore D will resemble A, B, and C. I would gladly know
what fort of reafoning, fcientifical or moral, this could be deno.
minated; or what is the medium by which the conclufion is
made out? Suppose, further, I get acquainted with D, formerly
unknown, and find that it actually refembles A, B, and C, how
can this furnish me with any knowledge of E, F, and G, things
totally diftinct? The refemblance I have discovered in D to A,

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B,

B, and C, can never be extended to any thing that is not D, nor any part of D, namely to E, F, and G; unless you assume this as the medium, that the unknown will resemble the known; or, which is equivalent, that the future will resemble the past. So far is this principle, therefore, from being deduced from particular experiences, that it is fundamental to all particular deductions from experience, in which we could not advance a fingle step without it. We are often misled in cafes of this narure, by a vague and popular use of words, not attending to the nicer differences in their import in different fituations. If one were to ask me, 'Have you then no reason to believe that the ⚫ future will resemble the paft?' I fhould certainly anfwer, 'I And if the question

' have the greatest reason to believe it.' had been concerning a geometrical axiom, I should have returned the fame answer. By reason we often mean, not an argument, or medium of proving, but a ground in human nature on which a particular judgment is founded. Nay further, as no progress in reasoning can be made where there is no foundation, (and first principles are here the fole foundation) I should readily admit, that the man who does not believe fuch propofitions, if it were poffible to find fuch a man, is perfectly irrational, and confequently not to be argued with.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the confideration which the Speaker ought to have of the Hearers, as Men in general.

HETORIC, as was obferved already, not

only confiders the fubject, but alfo the hearers and the speaker *. The hearers must be confidered in a twofold view, as men in general, and as fuch men in particular.

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As men in general, it must be allowed there are certain principles in our nature, which, when properly addreffed and managed, give no inconfiderable aid to reason in promoting belief. Nor is it just to conclude from this conceffion, as some have haftily done, that oratory may be defined, The art of deception.' The ufe of fuch helps will be found, on a ftricter examination, to be in moft cafes quite legitimate, and even neceffary, if we would give reafon herself that influence which is certainly her due. In order to evince the truth confidered by itfelf, conclufive arguments alone are requifite; but in order to convince me by these arguments, it is moreover requifite that they be understood, that they • Chap. IV.

be

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be attended to, that they be remembered by me; and in order to perfuade me by them, to any particular action or conduct, it is further requifite, that by interefting me in the fubject, they may, as it were, be felt. It is not therefore the understanding alone that is here concerned. If the orator would prove fuccefsful, it is neceffary that he engage in his fervice all thefe different powers of the mind, the imagination, the memory, and the paffions. Thefe are not the fupplanters of reafon, or even rivals in her fway; they are her handmaids, by whofe ministry fhe is enabled to usher truth into the heart, and procure it there a favourable reception. As handmaids they are liable to be feduced by fophifiry in the garb of reason, and fometimes are made ignorantly to lend their aid in the introduction of falsehood. But their fervice is not on this account to be difpenfed with; there is even a neceffity of employing it founded in our nature. Our eyes and hands and feet will give us the fame affiftance in doing mifchief as in doing good; but it would not therefore be better for the world, that all mankind were blind and lame. Arms are not to be laid afide by honeft men, because carried by affaffins and ruffians; they are to be used the rather for this very reafon. Nor

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