are those mental powers of which eloquence fo much avails herself, like the art of war or other human arts, perfectly indifferent to good and evil, and only beneficial as they are rightly employed. On the contrary, they are by nature, as will perhaps appear afterwards, more friendly to truth than to falfehood, and more eafily retained in the cause of virtue, than in that of vice*. • "Notandum eft enim, affectus ipfos ad bonum apparens "femper ferri, atque hac ex parte aliquid habere cum ratione "commune: verum illud intereft; quod affectus intuentur præ"cipue bonum in præfentia; ratio profpiciens in longum, etiam “futurum, et in fumma. Ideoque cùm quæ in præfentia ob"verfentur, impleant phantafiam fortius, fuccumbit plerumque "ratio et fubjugatur. Sed poftquam eloquentiâ et fuafionum "vi effectum fit, ut futura et remota conftituantur et confpici"antur tanquam præfentia, tum demum abeunte in partes ra ❝tionis phantafiâ, ratio fit fuperior. Concludamus igitur, non "deberi magis vitio verti Rhetorica, quod deteriorem partem "cohoneftare fciat; quam Dialectica, quod fophifmata concinཔ་ nare doceat. Quis enim nefcit, contrariorum eandem ratio"nem effe, licet usu opponantur ?" De Aug. Sci. L. vi. c. 3. Τα υποκειμενα πραγματα εχ όμοιως εχει, αλλ' αιι τ' αληθη και τα βελτιω δ' ότι μεγα τη φύσει ευσυλλογισότερα καὶ πιθανωτερα, ὡς άπλως ειπείν.— και βλαψειεν αν ὁ χρωμενος αδίκως τη τοιαυτη δυναμει των λογων, τέτο τε κοινον ἐσι καλα παντων τῶν αγαθών, πλην αρετης, και μάλιςα κατα τῶν χρησιμωταίων, όσον ισχυς, έμειας, πλυτέ, σρατηγίας τοιύτοις γαρ αν τις ωφελήσειε τα μεγιςα, χρωμενο δικαιως και βλαψειεν αδίκως. Arift. Rhet. L. i. c. I. SECT SECTION I. Men confidered as endowed with Understanding. BUT to defcend to particulars; the first thing to be studied by the speaker is, that his arguments may be understood. If they be unintelligible, the cause must be either in the fenfe or in the expreffion. It lies in the fenfe, if the mediums of proof be fuch as the hearers are unacquainted with; that is, if the ideas introduced be either without the sphere of their knowledge, or too abstract for their apprehenfion and habits of thinking. It lies in the fenfe likewife, if the train of reasoning (though no unufual ideas should be introduced) be longer, or more complex, or more intricate, than they are accuftomed to. But as the fitnefs of the arguments in these respects, depends on the capacity, education, and attainments of the hearers, which in different orders of men are different, this properly belongs to the confideration which the fpeaker ought to have of his audience, not as men in general, but as fuch men in particular. The obfcurity which arifeth from the expreffion will come in courfe to be confidered in the fequel. SECT Men confidered as endowed with Imagination. THE fecond thing requifite is that they be attended to; for this purpose the imagination must be engaged. Attention is prerequifite to every effect of speaking, and without fome gratification in hearing, there will be no attention, at leaft of any continuance. Thofe qualities in ideas which principally gratify the fancy, are vivacity, beauty, fublimity, novelty. Nothing contributes more to vivacity than ftriking re femblances in the imagery, which convey, fides, an additional pleasure of their own. be BUT there is still a further end to be ferved by pleafing the imagination, than that of awakening and preferving the attention, however important this purpose alone ought to be accounted. I will not say with a late fubtile metaphysician*, that "Belief confifteth in the liveliness of our ideas." That this doctrine is erroneous, it would be quite foreign to my purpose to attempt here to evince†. Thus much however is indubitable, that belief The author of, A Treatife of Human Nature, in 3 vols. + If one is defirous to see a refutation of this principle, let him confult Reid's Inquiry, Ch. ii. Sect. 5. com commonly enlivens our ideas and that lively ideas have a ftronger influence than faint ideas to induce belief. But fo far are thefe two fróm being coincident, that even.this.connexion.be tween them, though common, is not neceffary. Vivacity of ideas is not always accompanied with faith, nor is faith always able to produce vivacity. The ideas raised in my mind by the Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles, or the Lear of Shakespeare, are incomparably more lively than thofe excited by a cold but faithful hiftoriographer. Yet I may give full credit to the languid narrative of the latter, though I believe not a fingle fentence in thofe tragedies. If a proof were afked of the greater vivacity in the one cafe than in the other (which, by the way, muft be finally determined by consciousnefs), let thefe effects ferve for arguments. The ideas of the poet give greater pleasure, command closer attention, operate more ftrongly on the paffions, and are longer remembered. If these be not fufficient evidences of greater vivacity, I own I have no apprehenfion of the meaning which that author affixes to the term. The connexion, however, that generally fubfifteth between vivacity and belief will appear lefs marvellous, if we reflect that there is not fo great a difference between argument gument and illuftration, as is usually imagined. The fame ingenious writer fays, concerning moral reasoning, that it is but a kind of comparifon. The truth of this affertion any one will eafily be convinced of, who confiders the preceding obfervations on that subject. WHERE then lies the difference between addreffing the judgment, and addreffing the fancy? and what hath given rife to the diftinction between ratiocination and imagery? The following obfervations will ferve for an answer to this query. It is evident, that though the mind receives a confiderable pleasure from the discovery of resemblance, no pleasure is received when the refemblance is of fuch a nature as is familiar to every body. Such are those resemblances which refult from the specific and generic qualities of ordinary objects. What gives the principal delight to the imagination, is the exhibition of a frong likeness, which efcapes the notice of the generality of people. The fimilitude of man to man, eagle to eagle, fea to fea, or in brief, of one individual to another individual of the fame fpecies, affects not the fancy in the leaft. What poet would ever think of comparing a combat between two of his heroes to a combat between other |