mind by its experience of a fimilar contiguity and fucceffion of the impreffions from which they are copied. This therefore is the refult of resemblance and vicinity united. Order in place is likewife a mode of vicinity, where this laft tie is ftrengthened by the regularity and fimplicity of figure; which qualities arise folely from the refemblance of the correfponding parts of the figure, or the parts fimilarly fituated. Regular figures, besides the advantages which they derive from fimplicity and uniformity, have this alfo, that they are more familiar to the mind than irregular figures, and are therefore more eafily conceived. Hence the influence which order in place hath upon the memory. If any perfon queftions this influence, let him but reflect, how much eafier it is to remember a confiderable number of perfons, whom one hath feen ranged on benches or chairs, round a hall, than the fame number feen ftanding promifcuously in a crowd; and how natural it is for affifting the memory in recollecting the perfons, to recur to the order wherein they were placed.

As to order in time, which in compofition is properly ftyled Method, it confifteth principally in connecting the parts in fuch a manner as to

give vicinity to things in the difcourfe, which have an affinity; that is, refemblance, caufality, or other relation in nature; and thus making their customary affociation and refemblance, as in the former cafe, co-operate with their con- . tiguity in duration, or immediate fucceffion in the delivery. The utility of method for aiding the memory, all the world knows. But befides this, there are fome parts of the difcourfe, as well as figures of fpeech, peculiarly adapted to this end. Such are the divifion of the fubject, the rhetorical repetitions of every kind, the different modes of tranfition and recapitulation.

SECTION IV.

Men confidered as endowed with Paffions.

To conclude; when perfuafion is the end, paffion alfo must be engaged. If it is fancy which bestows brilliancy on our ideas, if it is memory which gives them ftability, paffion doth more, it animates them. Hence they derive fpirit and energy. To fay, that it is poffible to perfuade without fpeaking to the paffions, is but at beft a kind of fpecious nonfenfe. The cooleft reafoner always in perfuading, addreffeth himfelf to the paffions fome way or other. This he

0 4

cannot

་

!

cannot avoid doing, if he speak to the purpose, To make me believe, it is enough to fhew me that things are fo; to make me act, it is neceffary to fhew that the action will answer fome end, That can never be an end to me which gratifies no paffion or affection in my nature. You affure me, It is for my honour.' Now you folicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You fay, It is • for my intereft.' Now you befpeak my felflove. It is for the public good.' Now you It will relieve the mifer

rouse my patriotism.

able.'

Now

Now you touch my pity. So far therefore it is from being an unfair method of perfuafion to move the paffions, that there is no perfuafion without moving them.

BUT if fo much depend on paffion, where is the fcope for argument? Before I answer this queftion, let it be obferved, that, in order to perfuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite fome defire or paffion in the hearers; the fecond is, to fatisfy their judgment, that there is a connexion between the action to which he would perfuade them, and the gratification of the defire or paffion which he excites. This is

the

the analysis of perfuafion. The former is effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object; the latter, unlefs fo evidènt of itfelf as to fuperfede the neceffity, by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the na ture of the fubject admits. In the one lies the pathetic, in the other the argumentative. These incorporated together (as was observed in the First Chapter) conftitute that vehemence of contention to which the greateft exploits of eloquence ought doubtlefs to be afcribed. Here then is the principal fcope for argument, but not the only scope, as will appear in the fequel. When the firft end alone is attained, the pathetic without the rational, the paffions are indeed roufed from a difagreeable languor by the help of the imagination, and the mind is thrown into a ftate, which, though accompanied with fome painful emotions, rarely fails, upon the whole, to affect it with pleasure. But, if the hearers are judicious, no practical effect is produced. They cannot by fuch declamation be influenced to a particular action, because not convinced that that action will conduce to the gratifying of the paffion raised. Your eloquence hath fired my ambition, and makes me burn with public zeal. The confequence is, there is nothing which at pre

fent

fent I would not attempt for the fake of fame, and the intereft of my country. You advife me to fuch a conduct; but you have not fhown me how that can contribute to gratify Either paffion. Satisfy me in this, and I am inftantly at your command. Indeed, when the hearers are rude and ignorant, nothing more is neceffary in the fpeaker than to inflame their paffions. They will not require that the connexion between the conduct he urges and theend propofed, be evinced to them. His word will fatisfy. And therefore bold affirmations are made to fupply the place of reafons. Hence it is that the rabble are ever the prey of quacks and impudent pretenders of every denomination.

On the contrary, when the other end alone is attained, the rational without the pathetic, the fpeaker is as far from his purpose as before. You have proved beyond contradiction, that acting thus is the fure way to procure fuch an object. I perceive that your reafoning is conclufive: but I am not affected by it. Why? I have no paffion for the object. I am indifferent whether I procure it or not. You have demonftrated, that such a step will mortify my enemy. I believe it; but I have no refentment, and will not trouble

myfelf