myself to give pain to another. Your arguments evince that it would gratify my vanity. But I prefer my ease. Thus paffion is the mover to action, reafon is the guide. Good is the object of the will, truth is the object of the understanding*.

IT

Several caufes have contributed to involve this fubject in confufion. One is the ambiguity and imperfection of language. Motives are often called arguments, and both motives and arguments are promifcuoufly ftyled reafons. Another is, the idle difputes that have arifen among philofophers, concerning the nature of good, both phyfical and moral. "Truth and good

are one," fays the author of the Pleasures of Imagination, an author whofe poetical merit will not be queftioned by pe:fons of tafte. The expreffion might have been paffed in the poet, whofe right to the ufe of catachrefis, one of the many privileges come prehended under the name poetic licence, prefcription hath fully established. But by philofophifing on this paffage in his notes, he warrants us to canvass his reasoning, for no fuch privilege hath as yet been conceded to philofophers. Indeed, in attempting to illuftrate, he has, I think, confuted it, or, to fpeak more properly, fhown it to have no meaning. He mentions two opinions concerning the connexion of truth and beauty, which is one fpecies of good. "Some philofophers, fays he, affert an "independent and invariable law in Nature, in confequence of "which all rational beings must alike perceive beauty in some cer"tain proportions, and deformity in the contrary." Now, though I do not conceive what is meant either by an independent law, or by contrary proportions, this, if it proves any thing, proves as clearly that deformity and truth are one, as that beauty and truth are one; for those contrary proportions are furely as much proportions, or, if you will, as true' proportions, as fome certain proportions are. Accordingly, if, in the conclusion deduced, you put the word deformity inftead of beauty, and the word beauty

It may be thought that when the motive is the equity, the generofity, or the intrinfic me

rit

beauty instead of deformity, the fenfe will be equally complete. "Others," he adds, "there are, who believe beauty to be "merely a relative and arbitrary thing; and that it is not im"poffible, in a phyfical sense, that two beings of equal capa"cities for truth, fhould perceive, one of them beauty, and the other deformity, in the fame relations. And upon this fup"pofition, by that truth which is always connected with beau"ty, nothing more can be meant than the conformity of any "object to thofe proportions, upon which, after careful exami"nation, the beauty of that species is found to depend." This opinion, if I am able to comprehend it, differs only in one point from the preceding. It fuppofes the standard or law of beauty, not invariable and univerfal. It is liable to the fame objection, and that rather more glaringly; for if the fame relations must be always equally true relations, deformity is as really one with truth, as beauty is, fince the very fame relations can exhibit both appearances. In fhort, no hypothefis hitherto invented hath shown that by means of the difcurfive faculty, without the aid of any other mental power, we could ever obtain a notion of either the beautiful or the good; and till this be shown, nothing is shown to the purpose. The author aforefaid, far from attempting this, proceeds on the fuppofition, that we first perceive beauty, he fays not how, and then having by a careful examination, discovered the proportions which gave rise to the perception, denominate them true; fo that all thofe elaborate difquifitions with which we are amufed, amount only to a few infignificaut identical propofitions very improperly expreffed. For out of a vast profusion of learned phrase, this is all the information we can pick, that Beauty is truly beauty,' and that Good is--truly good.'"Moral good," fays a cele brated writer," confifteth in fitness." From this account any person would at first readily conclude, that morals, according to him, are not concerned in the ends which we pursue, but

folely

rit of the action recommended, argument may be employed to evince the reasonableness of the

folely in the choice of means for attaining our ends; that if this choice be judicious, the conduct is moral; if injudicious, the contrary. But this truly pious author is far from admitting fuch an interpretation of his words. Fitness in his fenfe hath no relation to a further end. It is an abfolute fitness, a fitness in itfelf. We are obliged to ask, What then is that fitness, which you call abfolute? for the application of the word in every other cafe invariably implying the proper direction of means to an end, far from affording light to the meaning it has here, tends directly to mislead us. The only anfwer, as far as I can learn, that hath ever been given to this question, is neither more nor lefs than this, That alone is abfolutely fit which is morally "good: fo that in faying moral good confifteth in fitness, no more is meant than that it confifteth in moral good. Another moralift appears, who hath made a most wonderful discovery. It is, that there is not a vice in the world but lying, and that acting virtuously in any fituation, is but one way or other of telling truth. When this curious theory comes to be explained, we find the practical lie refults folely from acting contrary to what thofe moral fentiments dictate, which, instead of deducing, he every where presupposeth to be known and acknowledged by us. Thus he reafons perpetually in a circle, and without advancing a fingle ftep beyond it, makes the fame things both causes and effects reciprocally. Conduct appears to be false for no other reason, but because it is immoral, and immoral for no other reafon but because it is falfe. Such philofophy would not have been unworthy thofe profound ontologists, who have blest the world with the difcovery that One being is but one being,' that A being is truly a being,' and that Every being has all the properties that it has,' and who, to the unfpeakable increase of useful knowledge, have denominated these the general attributes of being, and diftinguished them by the titles, unity, truth, and goodness. This, if it be any thing, is the very fublimate of fcience.

end,

end, as well as the fitnefs of the means. But this way of fpeaking fuits better the popular dialect, than the philofophical. The term reasonableness, when used in this manner, means nothing but the goodnefs, the amiableness, or moral excellency. If therefore the hearer hath no love of juftice, no benevolence, no regard to right, although he were endowed with the perfpicacity of a cherub, your harangue could never have any influence on his mind. The reafon is, when you speak of the fitness of the means, you address yourself only to the head; when you speak of the goodness of the end, you address yourself to the heart, of which we supposed him destitute. "Are we then to class the virtues among the paffions? By no means. But without entering into a difcuffion of the difference, which would be foreign to our purpose, let it fuffice to obferve, that they have this in common with paffion. They neceffarily imply an habitual propenfity to a certain fpecies of conduct, an habitual averfion to the contrary; a veneration for fuch a character, an abhorrence of fuch another. They are therefore, though not paffions, fo closely related to them, that they are properly confidered as motives to action, being equally capable of giving an impulfe to the will. The difference is a-kin to that, if not

the fame,which rhetoricians obferve between pathos and ethos, paffion and difpofition*. Accordingly, what is addreffed folely to the moral powers of the mind, is not fo properly denominated the pathetic, as the fentimental. The term, I own, is rather modern, but is nevertheless convenient, as it fills a vacant room, and doth not, like moft of our newfangled words, juftle out older and worthier occupants, to the no fmall detriment of the language. It occupies, fo to speak, the middle place between the pathetic and that which is addreffed to the imagination, and partakes of both, adding to the warmth of the former, the grace and attractions of the latter.

Now the principal queftions on this fubject, are these two: How is a paffion or difpofition that is favourable to the defign of the orator, to be excited in the hearers? How is an unfavourable paffion or difpofition to be calmed? As to the firft, it was faid already in general, that paffion must be awakened by communicating lively ideas of the object. The reafon will be obvious from the following remarks: A paffion

This feems to have been the fenfe which Quintilian had of the difference between wados and 90s, when he gave amor for an example of the first, and charitas of the fecond. The word 9 is also sometimes used for moral fentiment.

is