Sivut kuvina
PDF
ePub

is moft ftrongly excited by fenfation. The fight of danger, immediate or near, inftantly rouseth fear; the feeling of an injury, and the presence of the injurer, in a moment kindle anger. Next to the influence of fenfe, is that of memory, the effect of which upon paffion, if the fact be recent and remembered diftinctly and circumftantially, is almoft equal. Next to the influence of memory, is that of imagination; by which is here folely meant, the faculty of apprehending what is neither perceived by the fenfes, nor remembered. Now, as it is this power of which the orator must chiefly avail himfelf, it is proper to inquire what thofe circumftances are, which will make the ideas he fummons up in the imaginations of his hearers, refemble, in luftre and fteadinefs, thofe of fenfation and remembrance. For the fame circumftances will infallibly make them resemble alfo in their effects; that is, in the influence they will have upon the paffions and affections of the heart.

[ocr errors]

SEC

SECTION V.

The circumftances that are chiefly inftrumental in operating on the paffions.

THESE are perhaps all reducible to the feven following, probability, plaufibility, importance, proximity of time, connexion of place, relation of the actors or fufferers to the hearers or speaker, intereft of the hearers or speaker in the confequences T.

PART I. Probability.

THE first is probability, which is now confidered only as an expedient for enlivening paffion. Here again there is commonly scope for argument. Probability results from evidence, and

+ I am not quite pofitive as to the accuracy of this enumeration, and shall therefore freely permit my learned and ingenious friend Dr. Reid, to annex the et cætera, he proposes in such cases, in ørder to fupply all defects. See Sketches of the History of Man. B. iii. Sk. 1. Appendix, c. ii, sect̃. 2.

In the judiciary orations of the ancients, this was the principal fcope for argument. That to condemn the guilty, and to acquit the innocent, would gratify their indignation against the injurious, and their love of right was too manifeft to require a proof. The fact, that there was guilt in the prifoner, or that there was innocence, did require it. It was otherwife in deliberative orations, as the conduct recommended was more remotely connected with the emotions raised.

VOL. I.

P

begets

begets belief. Belief invigorates our ideas. Relief raised to the higheft becomes certainty. Certainty flows either from the force of the evidence, real or apparent, that is produced; or without any evidence produced by the speaker, from the previous notoriety of the fact. If the fact be notorious, it will not only be fuperfluous in the fpeaker to attempt to prove it, but it will be pernicious to his defign. The reafon is plain. By proving he fuppofeth it questionable, and by fuppofing actually renders it fo to his audience: he brings them from viewing it in the ftronger light of certainty, to view it in the weaker light of probability in lieu of fun-fhine he gives them. twilight. Of the different means and kinds of probation I have spoken already.

PART II. Plaufibility.

THE fecond circumftance is plausibility, a thing totally distinct from the former, as having an effect upon the mind quite independent of faith or probability. It arifeth chiefly from the confiftency of the narration, from its being what is commonly called natural and feafible. This the French critics have aptly enough denominated in their language vraisemblance, the English critics more improperly in theirs probability.

In order to avoid the manifeft ambiguity there is in this application of the word, it had been better to retain the word verifimilitude, now almoft obfolete. That there is a relation between thofe two qualities muft, notwithstanding, be admitted. This, however, is an additional reason for affigning them different names. An homonymous term, whofe differing fignifications have no affinity to one another, is fcarce ever liable to be misunderstood.

BUT as to the nature and extent of this relation, let it be observed, that the want of plaufibility implies an internal improbability, which it will require the ftronger external evidence to furmount. Nevertheless, the implaufibility may be furmounted by fuch evidence, and we may be fully ascertained of what is in itself exceedingly implaufible. Implaufibility is, in a certain degree, pofitive evidence against a narrative; whereas plaufibility implies no pofitive evidence for it. We know that fiction may be as plaufible as truth. A narration may be poffeffed of this quality in the highest degree, which we not only regard as improbable, but know to be false. Probability is a light darted on the object, from the proofs, which for this reafon are pertinently enough

P 2

enough ftyled evidence. Plaufibility is a native luftre iffuing directly from the object. The former is the aim of the hiftorian, the latter of the poet. That every one may be fatisfied, that the fecond is generally not inferior to the first, in its influence on the mind, we need but appeal to the effects of tragedy, of epic, and even of romance, which in its principal characters, participates of the nature of poefy, though written in profe.

Ir deferves, however, to be remarked, that though plaufibility alone hath often greater efficacy in roufing the paffions, than probability, or even certainty; yet, in any fpecies of compofition wherein truth, or at leaft probability is expected, the mind quickly naufeates the most plaufible tale, which is unfupported by proper arguments. For this reafon it is the bufinefs of the orator, as much as his fubject will permit, to avail himself of both qualities. There is one cafe, and but one, in which plaufibility itself may be difpenfed with; that is, when the fact is fo inconteftible, that it is impoffible to entertain a doubt of it; for when implaufibility is incapable of impairing belief, it hath fometimes, efpecially in forenfic caufes, even a good effect. By presenting

6

« EdellinenJatka »