THE performance which, of all thofe I happen to be acquainted with, feems to have advanced farthest in this way, is the Elements of Criticism. But the fubject of the learned and ingenious author of that work, is rather too multifarious to admit so narrow a scrutiny as would be neceffary for a perfect knowledge of the feveral parts. Every thing that is an object of tafte, fculpture, painting, mufic, architecture, and gardening, as well as poetry and eloquence, come within his plan. On the other hand, though his fubject be more multiform, it is in refpect of its connexion with the mind lefs extenfive than that here propofed. All thofe particular arts are examined only on that fide, wherein there is found a pretty confiderable coincidence with one another; namely as objects of tafte, which, by exciting fentiments of grandeur, beauty, novelty, and the like, are calculated to delight the imagination. In this view, eloquence comes no farther under confideration, than as a fine art, and adapted, like the others above mentioned, to pleafe the fancy, and to move the paffions. But to treat it alfo as an useful art, and clofely connected with 3

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the understanding and the will, would have led to a difcuffion foreign to his purpose.

I AM aware, that, from the deduction given above, it may be urged, that the fact as here reprefented, feems to fubvert the principle formerly laid down, and that as practice in the art has given the firft fcope for criticifin, the former cannot justly be confidered as deriving light and direction from the latter; that, on the contrary, the latter ought to be regarded. as merely affording a fort of intellectual entertainment to fpeculative men. It may be faid, that this fcience, however entertaining, as it muft derive all its light and information from the actual examples in the art, can never in return be fubfervient to the art, from which alone it has received whatever it has to beftow. This objection, however fpecious, will not bear a near examination. For let it be obferved, that though in all the arts the first rough draughts, or imperfect attempts, that are made, precede every thing that can be termed criticism, they do not precede every thing that can be termed knowledge, which every human creature that is not an idiot, is every day, from

his birth, acquiring, by experience and obfervation. This knowledge muft of neceffity precede even thofe rudeft and earliest effays; and if in the imperfect and indigefted ftate in which knowledge must always be found in the mind that is rather felf-taught than totally untaught, it deserves not to be dignified with the title of science, neither does the firft awkward attempt in practice merit to be honoured with the name of Art. As is the one, fuch is the other. It is enough for my purpose, that fomething must be known, before any thing in this way, with a view to an end, can be undertaken to be done.

Ar the fame time it is acknowledged, that as man is much more an active than a contemplative being, and as generally there is fome view to action, especially in uncultivated minds, in all their obfervations and inquiries, it cannot be doubted that, in compofition, the firft attempts would be in the art, and that afterwards from the comparison of different attempts with one another, and the confideration of the fuccefs with which they had been severally attended, would arife gradually the rules of criticism.

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ticifm. Nor can it, on the other hand, be pleaded with any appearance of truth, that observations derived from the productions of an art, can be of no fervice for the improvement of that art, and confequently of no benefit to future artists. On the contrary, it is thus that every art, liberal or mechanical, elegant or ufeful, except thofe founded in pure mathematics, advances toward perfection. From observing fimilar but different attempts and experiments, and from comparing their effects, general remarks are made, which ferve as fo many rules for directing future practice; and from comparing fuch general remarks together, others ftill more general are deduced. A few individual inftances serve as a foundation to thofe obfervations, which, when once fufficiently established, extend their influence to inftances innumerable. It is in this way that, on experiments comparatively few, all the phyfiological sciences have been reared; it is in this way that thofe comprehenfive truths were firft difcovered, which have had fuch an unlimited influence on the most important arts, and given man so vast a dominion over the elements, and even the most refractory powers of nature. It is evident, there

fore, that the artift and the critic are recipro cally fubfervient, and the particular province of each is greatly improved by the affiftance of the other.

But it is not neceffary here to enter farther into this fubject; what I fhall have occafion afterwards to advance on the acquifition of experience, and the manner of ufing it, will be a fufficient illuftration.

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