préfenting us with fomething monftrous in its kind, it raises aftonifhment, and thereby heightens every paffion which the narrative is fitted to excite.

BUT to return to the explication of this quality. When I explained the nature of experience, I showed, that it confifteth of all the general truths collected from particular facts remembered; the mind forming to itself often infenfibly, and as it were mechanically, certain maxjins, from comparing, or rather affociating the fimilar circumftances of different incidents *. Hence it is, that when a number of ideas relating to any fact or event, are fucceffively introduced into my mind by a fpeaker; if the train he deduceth, coincide with the general current of my experience; if in nothing it thwart those conclufions and anticipations which are become habitual to me, my mind accompanies him with facility, glides along from one idea to another, and admits the whole with pleasure. If, on the contrary, the train he introduceth, run counter to the current of my experience; if in many things it fhock thofe conclufions and anticipations which are become habitual to me, my mind at

tends him with difficulty, fuffers a fort of violence in paffing from one idea to another, and rejects the whole with disdain :

For while upon fuch monftrous fcenes we gaze,

They shock our faith, our indignation raife +. FRANCIS. In the former cafe I pronounce the narrative natural and credible, in the latter I fay it is unnatural and incredible, if not impoffible; and, which is particularly expreffive of the different appearances in respect of connexion made by the ideas in my mind, the one tale I call coherent, the other incoherent. When therefore the orator can obtain no direct aid from the memory of his hearers, which is rarely to be obtained, he muft, for the fake of brightening, and strengthening, and, if I may be permitted to use fo bold a metaphor, cementing his ideas, bespeak the affiftance of experience. This, if properly employed, will prove a potent ally, by adding the grace of verifimilitude to the whole. It is therefore first of all requifite, that the circumstances of the narration, and the order in which they are exhibited, be what is commonly called natural, that is, congruous to general experience.

+ Quodcunque oftendis mihi fic, incredulus odi.

HOR. De Arte Poet.
WHERE

WHERE paffion is the end, it is not a fufficient reason for introducing any circumstance that it is natural, it must also be pertinent. It is pertinent, when either neceffary for giving a diftinct and confiftent apprehenfion of the object, at least for obviating fome objection that may be started, or doubt that may be entertained concerning it; or when fuch as in its particular tendency promotes the general aim. All circumstances however plaufible, which ferve merely for decoration, never fail to divert the attention, and fo become prejudicial to the propofed influence on paffion.

BUT I am aware, that from the explication I have given of this quality, it will be faid, that I have run into the error, if it be an error, which I intended to avoid, and have confounded it with probability, by deriving it folely from the fame origin, experience. In anfwer to this, let it be obferved, that in every plaufible tale, which is unfupported by external evidence, there will be found throughout the whole, when duly canvaffed, a mixture of poffibilities and probabilities, and that not in fuch a manner as to make one part or incident probable, another barely poffible, but fo blended as equally to affect the whole,

P 4

whole, and every member. Take the Iliad for an example, That a haughty, choleric, and vindictive hero, fuch as Achilles is reprefented to have been, should, upon the public affront and injury he received from Agamemnon, treat that general with indignity, and form a refolution of withdrawing his troops, remaining thenceforth an unconcerned fpectator of the calamities of his countrymen, our experience of the baleful influences of pride and anger, renders in fome degree probable; again, that one of fuch a character as Agamemnon, rapacious, jealous of his pre-eminence as commander in chief, who envied the fuperior merit of Achilles, and harboured refentment against him; that fuch a one, I fay, on fuch an occurrence as is related by the poet, fhould have given the provocation, will be acknowledged alfo to have fome probability. But that there were fuch perfonages, of fuch characters, in fuch circumftances, is merely poffible. Here there is a total want of evidence. Experience is filent. Properly indeed the cafe comes not within the verge of its jurifdiction. Its general conclufions may ferve in confutation, but can never ferve in proof of particular or hiftorical facts. Sufficient teftimony, and that only will answer here. The teftimony of the

poet

in

this cafe goes for nothing. His object we know is not truth but likelihood. Experience, however, advances nothing against thofe allegations of the poet, therefore we call them poffible; it can fay nothing for them, therefore we do not call them probable. The whole at most amounts to this, If fuch caufes exifted, fuch effects probably followed. But we have no evidence of the existence of the caufes; therefore we have no evidence of the existence of the effects. Confequently, all the probability implied in this quality, is a hypothetical probability, which is in effect none at all. It is an axiom among dialecticians, in relation to the fyllogiftic art, that the conclufion always follows the weaker of the premifes. To apply this to the prefent purpose, an application not illicit, though unufual; if one of the premifes, fuppofe the major, contain an affirmation that is barely poffible, the minor one that is probable, poffibility only can be deduced in the conclufion.

THESE two qualities therefore, probability and plaufibility, (if I may be indulged a little in the allegoric ftyle) I fhall call Sifter-graces, daughters of the fame father Experience, who is the progeny of Memory, the firft-born and heir of

Senfe.