that it is the bubble reputation (which, were it any thing, a dead man furely cannot enjoy) that the foldier is fo infatuated as to feek even in the cannon's mouth? Are not thefe, therefore, but the various ways of felf-deftroying, to which, according to their various tastes, men are prompted, by the fame univerfal principle of self-hatred?

IF you fhould infift on certain phenomena, which appear to be irreconcilable to my hypothefis, I think I am provided with an answer. You urge our readinefs to refent an affront or injury, real or imagined, which we receive, and which ought to gratify inftead of provoking us, on the fuppofition that we hate ourfelves. But may it not be retorted, that its being a gratification is that which excites our refentment, inafmuch as we are enemies to every kind of felfindulgence? If this answer will not fuffice, I have another which is excellent. It lies in the definition of the word revenge. Revenge, I pronounce, may be juftly deemed an example of unmixed felf-abhorrence and benignity, and may be refolved into that power of imagination, by which we apply the fufferings that we inflict on others to ourselves; we are faid to wreak our vengeance no longer than we

fancy ourselves to fuffer, and to be fatiated by reflecting, that the fufferings of others are not really ours; that we have been but indulging dream of felf-punishment, from which, when we awake and difcover the fiction, our anger inftantly fubfides, and we are meek as lambs.' Is this extravagant? Compare it, I pray you, with the preceding explication of compaffion; to which it is a perfect counterpart. Confider seriously, and you will find that it is not in the fmalleft degree more manifeft, that another and not ourselves is the object of our refentment when we are angry, than it is that another and not ourfelves is the object of our compaffion, when we are moved with pity. Both indeed have a felf-evidence in them, which, whilft our minds remain unsophisticated by the dogmatism of fyftem, extorts from us an unlimited affent.

SECTION II.

The Author's hypothefis on this fubject.

WHERE fo many have failed of fuccefs, it may be thought prefumptuous to attempt a decifion. But defpondency in regard to a queftion which feems to fall within the reach of our faculties, and is entirely fubjected to our observation and

1

experience, muft appear to the inquifitive and philofophic mind, a ftill greater fault than even

prefumption. The latter may occafion the introduction of a falfe theory, which must neceffarily come under the review and correction of fucceeding philofophers. And the detection of error proves often inftrumental to the discovery of truth. Whereas the former quafhes curiofity altogether, and influences one implicitly to abandon an inquiry as utterly undeterminable. I fhall therefore now offer a few obfervations concerning the paffions, which, if rightly apprehended and weighed, will, I hope, contribute to the folution of the prefent queftion,

My firft obfervation fhall be, that almost all the fimple paffions of which the mind is fufceptible, may be divided into two claffes; the pleafant, and the painful. It is at the fame time acknowledged, that the pleasures and the pains. created by the different paffions, differ confiderably from one another, both in kind and degree. Of the former clafs are love, joy, hope, pride, gratitude; of the latter, hatred, grief, fear, thame, anger. Let it be remarked, that by the name pride in the first class, (which I own admits a variety of acceptations) no more is meant here than

the feeling which we have on obtaining the me-
rited approbation of other men, in which fenfe
it ftands in direct oppofition to fhame in the fe-
cond clafs, or the feeling which we have when
confcious of incurring the deserved blame of
others. In like manner, gratitude, or the refent-
ment of favour, is opposed to anger, or the re-
fentment of injury. To the fecond class I might
have added defire and averfion, which give the
mind fome uneafiness or diffatisfaction with its
prefent ftate; but thefe are often the occafion of
pleafure, as they are the principal spurs to action,
and perhaps more than any other paffion, relieve
the mind from that languor, which, according
to the juft remark of Abbé du Bos, is perfectly
oppreffive. Befides, as they are perpetually ac-
companied with fome degree of either hope or
fear, generally with both, they are either plea-
fant or painful, as the one or the other prepon-

derates. For thefe reafons, they may be con-
fidered as in themselves of an indifferent or inter-
mediate kind.

THE fecond obfervation is, that there is an attraction or affociation among the paffions, as well as among the ideas of the mind. Rarely any paffion comes alone, To inyeftigate the laws of

this attraction, would be indeed a matter of curious inquiry, but it doth not fall within the limits of the prefent queftion. Almost all the other affections attract or excite defire or averfion of fome fort or other. The paffions which feem to have the leaft influence on thefe, are joy and grief; and of the two, joy, I believe, will be acknowledged, to have lefs of the attractive power than grief. Joy is the end of defire, and the completion of hope: therefore when attained, it not only excludes occafion for the others, but feems, for a while at leaft, to repel them, as what would give an impertinent interruption to the pleasure refulting from the contemplation of prefent felicity, with which the mind, under the influence of joy, is engroffed. Grief hath a like tendency. When the mind is overwhelmed by this gloomy paffion, it refifts the instigations of defire, as what would again, to no purpose, rouse its activity; it disdains hope, it even loathes it as a vain and delufive dream. The first fuggeftions of these paffions feem but as harbingers to the cutting recollection of former flattering profpects, once too fondly entertained, now utterly extinct, and fucceeded by an infupportable and irremediable disappointment, which every recollection ferves but to aggravate. Nay, how unaccountable