The reasoning here is fufficiently infinuated by the happy application of a few words, fuch as mechanic tools to the work of falvation; croffes, relics, beads, pictures, and other fuch trumpery, to fpiritual provifion. The juftnefs of the representation of their practice, together with the manifeft incongruity of the things, fupply us at once with the wit and the argument. There is in this poem a great deal of ridicule; but the author's quarry is the frantic exceffès of enthusiasm, and the bafe artifices of hypocrify; he very rarely, as in the above paffage, points to the idiot gew-gaws of fuperftition. I fhall only add one inftance from Pope, which has fomething peculiar in it,

Then fighing thus, " And am I'now threescore?

"Ah why, ye gods! should two and two make four ?”

This, though not in the narrative, but in the dramatic ftyle, is more witty than humorous. The abfurdity of the exclamation in the fecond line is too grofs to be natural to any but a madman, and therefore hath not humour. Nevertheless, its resemblance to the common complaint of old age contained in the first, of which it may be called the analyfis, renders it at once both an ingenious exhibition of fuch complaint

+ Dunciad.

in its real import, and an argument of its folly. But notwithstanding this example, it holds in general, that when any thing nonfenfical in principle is to be affailed by ridicule, the natural ally of reafon is wit; when any extravagance or impropriety in conduct, humour feldom fails to be of the confederacy. It may be further obferved, that the words banter and raillery are alfo ufed to fignify ridicule of a certain form, applied, indeed, more commonly to practices than to opinions, and oftener to the little peculiarities of individuals, than to the diftinguishing cuftoms or ufages of fects and parties. The only difference in meaning, as far as I have remarked, between the two terms, is that the first generally denotes a coarfer, the fecond a finer fort of ridicule; the former prevails moft among the lower claffes of the people, the latter only among perfons of breeding.

I SHALL conclude this chapter with obferving, that though the gayer and more familiar eloquence now explained, may often properly, as was remarked before, be admitted into public orations on fubjects of confequence, fuch, for inftance, as are delivered in the fenate or at the bar, and even fometimes, though more fparingly,

VOL. I.

G

fparingly, on the bench; it is feldom or never of fervice in thofe which come from the pulpit. It is true, that an air of ridicule in difproving or diffuading, by rendering opinions or practices contemptible, hath occafionally been attempted with approbation, by preachers of great name. I can only fay, that when this airy manner is employed, it requires to be managed with the greatest care and delicacy, that it may not degenerate into a strain but ill adapted to fo ferious an occupation. For the reverence of the place, the gravity of the function, the folemnity of worship, the severity of the precepts, and the importance of the motives of religion; above all, the awful prefence of God, with a sense of which, the mind, when occupied in religious exercifes, ought eminently to be impreffed; all these feem utterly incompatible with the levity of ridicule. They render jefting impertinence, and laughter madnefs. Therefore, any thing in preaching which might provoke this emotion, would juftly be deemed an unpardonable offence againft both piety and decorum.

In the two preceding chapters I have confidered the nature of oratory in general, its various forms, whether arifing from difference in

the

the object, understanding, imagination, passion, will; or in the subject, eminent and fevere, light and frivolous, with their refpective ends and characters. Under thefe are included all the primary and characteristical qualities of whatever can pertinently find a place either in writing or in difcourfe, or can truly be termed fine in the one, or eloquent in the other.

CHA P. III.

The doctrine of the preceding chapter defended. BEFORE I proceed to another topic, it

will perhaps be thought proper to inquire how far the theory now laid down and explained, coincides with the doctrines on this article to be found in the writings of philofophers and critics. Not that I think fuch inquiries and difcuffions, always neceffary; on the contrary, I imagine, they often tend but to embarrass the reader, by distracting his attention to a multiplicity of objects, and fo to darken and perplex a plain queftion. This is particularly the cafe on those points on which there hath been a variety of jarring fentiments. The fimpleft way and the most perfpicuous, and generally that which

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which beft promotes the difcovery of truth, is to give as distinct and methodical a delineation as poffible of one's own ideas, together with the grounds on which they are founded, and to leave it to the doubtful reader (who thinks it worth the trouble) to compare the theory with the fyftems of other writers, and then to judge for himself. I am not, however, fo tenacious of this method, as not to allow, that it may. fometimes, with advantage, be departed from. This holds especially when the fentiments of an author are opposed by inveterate prejudices in the reader, arifing from contrary opinions early imbibed, or from an exceffive deference to venerable names and ancient authorities.

SECTION E

Ariftotle's account of the ridiculous explained.

SOME, on a fuperficial view, may imagine, that the doctrine above expounded is oppofed by no lefs authority than that of Ariftotle. If it were, I should not think that equivalent to a demonstration of its falfity. But let us hear; Ariftotle hath obferved, that "the ridiculous implies fomething deformed, and confifts in those 6.6 fmaller

6.6

2