"fmaller faults, which are neither painful nor

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pernicious, but unbefeeming: thus a face ex"cites laughter wherein there is deformity and "diftortion without pain." For my part, nothing can appear more coincident than this, as far as it goes, with the principles which I have endeavoured to establish. The Stagyrite here fpeaks of ridicule, not of laughter in general, and not of every fort of ridicule, but folely of the ridiculous in manners, of which he hath in few words given a very appofite defcription. To take notice of any other laughable object, would have been foreign to his purpose. Laughter is not his theme, but comedy, and laughter only fo far as comedy is concerned with it. Now the concern of comedy reaches no farther than that kind of ridicule which, as I faid, relates to manners. The very words with which the above quotation is introduced, evince the truth of this. Comedy," fays he, " is, as "we remarked, an imitation of things that are "amifs; yet it does not level at every vice." He had remarked in the preceding chapter, that

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• The whole pallage runs thus, Η δε κωμωδια ετιν, ώσπες ενα πομεν, μίμησις φαυλότερων μεν, ο μεν οι καλα πασαν κακίαν, αλλά το αίσω χρω επι το γέλοιον μόριον το γας γελοίον εσιν ἁμαρτημα τι να αισχος ανώδυνον καὶ ω φθαρτικον" διον ευθυς το γελοιού πρόσωπον αισχρον τι καὶ διεΓραμμένο ανευ ἔδυνης, Poey, 5.

G 3

its

its means of correction are "not reproach, but "ridicule." Nor does the claufe in the end of the fentence, concerning a countenance which raifes laughter, in the leaft invalidate what I have now affirmed; for it is plain, that this is fuggefted in the way of fimilitude, to illuftrate what he had advanced, and not as a particular instance of the pofition he had laid down. For we can never fuppofe that he would have called distorted features "à certain fault or flip ‡," and ftill less that he would have fpecified this, as what might be corrected by the art of the comedian. As an inftance, therefore, it would have confuted his definition, and thewn that his account of the object of laughter must be erroneous, fince this emotion may be excited, as appears from the example produced by himself, where there is nothing faulty or vicious in any kind or degree. As an illuftration it was extremely pertinent. It fhewed that the ridiculous in manners (which was all that his definition regarded) was, as far as the different nature of the things would permit, analogous to the laughable in other fubjects, and that it fuppofed an incongruous combination, where there is

* Οι ψόγον αλλα το γελοιον δραματοποίησας. Η "Αμαρτημα τιο

nothing

nothing either calamitous or deftructive. But that in other objects unconnected with either character or conduct, with either the body or the foul, there might not be images or exhibitions prefented to the mind, which would naturally provoke laughter, the philofopher hath nowhere, as far as I know, fo much as infinuated.

SECTION II.

Hobbes's account of laughter examined.

FROM the founder of the peripatetic fchool, let us descend to the philofopher of Malmesbury, who hath defined laughter "a fudden glory, arif

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ing from a fudden conception of fome emi"nency in ourselves, by comparifon with the "infirmity of others, or with our own former"ly." This account is, I acknowledge, incompatible with that given in the preceding pages, and, in my judgment, refults entirely from a view of the fubject, which is in fome respect partial, and in fome refpect falfe. It is in fome refpect partial. When laughter is produced by ridicule, it is, doubtlefs, accompanied

1

•Human Nature, Chap. IX. 5 13. Cap. Xll. 4.7.)

G 4

with

with fome degree of contempt. Ridicule, as hath been obferved already, has a double operation, firft on the fancy, by prefenting to it fuch a group as conftitutes a laughable object; fecondly, on the paffion mentioned, by exhibiting abfurdity in human character, in principles or in conduct and contempt always implies a fenfe of fuperiority. No wonder then that one likes not to be ridiculed or laughed at. Now it is this union which is the great fource of this author's error, and of his attributing to one of the affociated principles, from an imperfect view of the fubject, what is purely the effect of the other,

FOR, that the emotion called laughter, doth not refult from the contempt, but folely from the perception of oddity with which the paffion is occafionally, not neceffarily, combined, is manifeft from the following confiderations. First, contempt may be raised in a very high degree, both fuddenly and unexpectedly, without producing the leaft tendency to laugh. Of this inftances have been given already from Bolingbroke and Swift, and innumerable others will occur to thofe who are converfant in the writings of thofe authors. Secondly, laughter may

be,

be, and is daily produced by the perception of incongruous affociation, when there is no contempt. And this fhews that Hobbes's view of the matter is falfe as well as partial. "Men," fays he," laugh at jefts, the wit whereof always con"fifteth in the elegant discovering and convey

ing to our minds, fome abfurdity of ano"ther." I maintain, that men alfo laugh at jefts, the wit whereof doth not confift in difcoyering any abfurdity of another; for all jefts do not come within his defcription. On a careful perufal of the foregoing fheets, the reader will find that there hath been several inftances of this kind produced already, in which it hath been obferved, that there is wit, but no ridicule. I fhall bring but one other inftance. Many have laughed at the queerness of the comparison in these lines, For rhime the rudder is of verses,

With which, like ships, they fteer their courfes +;

who never dreamt that there was any perfon or party, practice or opinion, derided in them. But as people are often very ingenious in their manner of defending a favourite hypothefis, if any admirer of the Hobbefian philosophy should pretend to discover fome clafs of men whom

Ibid.

+ Hudibras, Part I. Canto 1.

the