univerfal obfervations, is to appeal to the common fenfe of mankind. How admirably is the height of pride and arrogance touched in the character which Cæfar gives of Caffius!

He loves no plays

As thou doft, Antony; he hears no mufic,
Seldom he fmiles, and fmiles in fuch a fort,
As if he mock'd himself, and fcorn'd his fpirit,
That could be mov'd to fmile at any thing *.

I should not have been fo particular in the refutation of the English philofopher's system in regard to laughter, had I not confidered a careful difcuffion of this queftion, as one of the best means of developing fome of the radical principles of this inquiry.

CHA P. IV.

Of the relation which eloquence bears to logic and to grammar.

IN contemplating a human creature, the most

natural divifion of the fubject is the common divifion into foul and body, or into the living principle of perception and of action, and that fyftem of material organs, by which the other

receives information from without, and is enabled to exert its powers, both for its own benefit and for that of the fpecies. Analogous to this, there are two things in every discourse which principally claim our attention, the sense and the expreffion; or in other words, the thought, and the fymbol by which it is communicated. These may be faid to constitute the foul and the body of an oration, or indeed, of whatever is fignified to another by language. For, as in man, each of thefe conftituent parts hath its diftinctive attributes, and as the perfection of the latter confifteth in its fitness for ferving the purposes of the former, fo it is precifely with those two effential parts of every speech, the fense and the expreffion. Now it is by the fense that rhetoric holds of logic, and by the expreffion that fhe holds of grammar.

THE fole and ultimate end of logic, is the eviction of truth, one important end of elo quence, though, as appears from the first chapter, neither the fole, nor always the ultimate, is the conviction of the hearers. Pure logic re gards only the fubject, which is examined folely for the fake of information. Truth, as fuch, is the proper aim of the examiner. Eloquence

not

not only confiders the fubject, but also the speaker and the hearers, and both the fubject and the speaker for the fake of the hearers, or rather for the fake of the effect intended to be produced in them. Now to convince the hearers, is always either propofed by the orator as his end in addreffing them, or fuppofed to accompany the accomplishment of his end. Of the five forts of difcourfes above mentioned, there are only two wherein conviction is the avowed purpose. One is that addreffed to the underftanding, in which the fpeaker propofeth to prove fome pofition difbelieved or doubted by the hearers; the other is that which is calculated to influence the will, and perfuade to a certain conduct; for it is by convincing the judgment, that he propofeth to intereft the paffions, and fix the refolution. As to the three other kinds of difcourfes enumerated, which addrefs the understanding, the imagination, and the paffions, conviction, though not the end, ought ever to accompany the accomplishment of the end. It is never formally propofed as an end where there are not fuppofed to be previous doubts or errors to conquer. But when due attention is not paid to it, by a proper management of the subject, doubts, disbelief, and mistake will be raised by VOL. I.

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the difcourfe itself, where there were none before, and thefe will not fail to obftruct the fpeaker's end, whatever it be. In explanatory difcourfes, which are of all kinds the fimpleft, there is a certain precifion of manner which ought to pervade the whole, and which, though not in the form of argument, is not the lefs fatisfactory, fince it carries internal evidence along with it. In harangues pathetic or panegyrical, in order that the hearers may be moved or pleased, it is of great confequence to imprefs them with the belief of the reality of the fubject. Nay, even in those performances where truth, in regard to the individual facts related, is neither fought nor expected, as in fome forts of poetry, and in romance, truth ftill is an object to the mind, the general truths regarding character, manners, and incidents. When thefe are preferved, the piece may justly be denominated true, confidered as a picture of life; though falfe, confidered as a narrative of particular events. And even these untrue events must be counterfeits of truth, and bear its image; for in cafes wherein the propofed end can be rendered confiftent with unbelief, it cannot be rendered compatible with incredibility. Thus, in order to fatisfy the mind, in moft cafes, truth, and in every case, what

bears the femblance of truth, must be presented to it. This holds equally, whatever be the declared aim of the speaker. I need scarcely add, that to prove a particular point, is often occafionally neceffary in every fort of discourse, as a fubordinate end conducive to the advancement of the principal. If then it is the bufinefs of logic to evince the truth, to convince an auditory, which is the province of eloquence, is but a particular application of the logician's art. As logic therefore forges the arms which eloquence teacheth us to wield, we muft first have recourse to the former, that being made acquainted with the materials of which her weapons and armour are severally made, we may know their respective strength and temper, and when and how each is to be used.

Now, if it be by the fenfe or foul of the difcourse that rhetoric holds of logic, or the art of thinking and reasoning, it is by the expreffion or body of the discourse, that she holds of grammar, or the art of conveying our thoughts, in the words of a particular language. The obfervation of one analogy naturally fuggefts another. As the foul is of heavenly extraction, and the body of earthly, so the sense of the dif courfe

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