commissioners October 1. During recess between conferences with the Spanish negotiators, and before the subject of the Philippines was reached, they examined a number of persons more or less informed as to these islands, including General Merritt, commander of the American army at Manila, who was ordered to Paris to advise with the commissioners. The trend of the information received by them was that the natives were strongly opposed to the restoration of Spanish authority; that its rule had been most oppressive and cruel; that the natives were not capable of sustaining an independent government; and that if American authority was withdrawn the islands would fall into hopeless anarchy and misrule. This testimony as taken was cabled to Washington. On October 25, Mr. Day (late Secretary of State) informed the President that there existed differences of opinion among the commission as to the course to be pursued, and asked for further instructions. He himself doubted the wisdom of extending American sovereignty over the Philippines, but would acquiesce in the occupation of Luzon as a commercial base and a naval station. Senator Gray opposed the taking of any part of the territory. The other three commissioners favored a demand for the cession of the entire Philippine group.

Meanwhile the President had made a visit through the States of the central West, attended several peace jubilees, and returned to Washington impressed with the popular sentiment apparently favorable to the acquisition of all the Philippine Islands; and on October 26 Secretary Hay cabled the commission that the President

was convinced that, on political, commercial, and humanitarian grounds, the cession must be of the whole archipelago. He "is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose," but he believes "this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility."

Thus the third and last stage in the attitude of the government was reached, and a proposition was submitted to the Spanish commissioners for the cession of the Philippines, and the payment to Spain of twenty millions of dollars. The Spanish commissioners protested that the proposition was in violation of the peace protocol, but in order to avoid the horrors of war, they resigned themselves" to the painful strait of submitting to the law of the victor;" and the treaty of peace was signed which contained the cession of the entire Philippine group to the United States.1

Three reasons were advanced for requiring the cession of the Philippines, based upon political, commercial, and moral grounds.

It was claimed that the United States had reached a stage in its history where it should no longer confine its influences to the western hemisphere. Modern means of communication had annihilated distance, so that the United States was nearer to the Philippines than it was to California when that territory was acquired from

1 Peace Protocol, S. Doc. No. 62, Pt. i. 55th Cong. 3d Sess. 282; Instructions to Peace Commissioners, S. Doc. 148, 56th Cong. 2d Sess. 3; Negotiations, Docs. Nos. 62 and 148 (cited); Treaty of Peace, Doc. No. 62 (cited), 5.

Mexico. The Pacific Ocean had become the area of interest to the civilized world, and it was not only proper, but essential to the future prosperity of the United States to secure a commanding and controlling station on the Asiatic side of the Pacific.

The argument for a complete cession from a commercial standpoint was that the recent enormous increase in productiveness of American industries and in the export trade required an extension of markets; that it was impossible to enter into competition with European countries without following their methods in securing a base for commercial operations; and that, although the policy of the United States was "the open door," this could not be maintained without asserting American political power, especially in the part of the world where the greatest markets were situated.

The moral grounds for the possession of the Philippines were that the colonial administration of Spain had been conducted with great cruelty, injustice, and in disregard of personal rights; that it would be inhuman and morally wrong to permit Spain to retain her sovereignty; that the weakened power of that government would be unable to tranquillize the disordered and lawless conditions existing in the islands, to protect life and property, and to perform the obligations incident to government; and that it was for the interest of the people of the Philippines in particular, and mankind in general, to extend to the archipelago the principles of civil liberty, equality, and self-government, which form the basis of American institutions, and that to do so was a duty to the world which the United States could not

rightfully ignore. It is impossible to read the utterances of President McKinley during and following the negotiations, without being satisfied that these latter considerations exercised a controlling influence with him in determining the destiny of the islands.

There was a large party in the United States which combated all these reasons, and contended that the addition to the American domain of distant regions and races would lead to hurtful innovations in the system of government, to the oppression of an unwilling people, to a large increase in the standing army and the navy with heavy financial burdens, and to threatening for eign complications. But this opposition was no greater than had been manifested at the time of the addition to the American possessions of the Louisiana territory, Texas, California, and Hawaii. Since the beginning of its history, every step taken in the enlargement of the bounds of the Union had been popular with the masses of its citizens, had resulted in increased prosperity to the nation, and in benefit to the inhabitants of the annexed territory. Such, it was argued, would be the result as to the new possessions in the Orient.

Following soon after the acquisition of the Philippines, and while the government of the United States was actively engaged in restoring order and establishing a stable administration in its new possessions, the mutterings of a storm were heard in China which threatened to disorganize the government of that country, to paralyze its commerce, and to put in peril the lives and property of all foreign residents. In a few months the storm broke with a violence hitherto unknown

The civilized world

men,

in that land of riots and disorder. was horrified by the massacre of foreigners, women, and helpless children, the destruction of foreign-built railways and property, and finally by the news that one foreign minister had been murdered in a street of the capital, and that all the other diplomatic representatives were besieged in their legations and their lives threatened by a bloodthirsty mob which had overawed or was controlling the imperial government. In answer to the urgent call which came from the beleaguered diplomats and foreigners resident at Peking, Tientsin, and other places, the United States, witħin a brief space was able from its forces in the Philippines to land upon Chinese soil a division of its army, supported by a squadron of its navy, and to take an important and honorable part in the rescue of its citizens and in the pacification and reorganization of the empire.

The so-called "Boxer" movement, which was the occasion of these troubles, suddenly dominated several of the most populous provinces and the imperial capital, and for a time threatened to carry the whole nation with it, in its cry for the expulsion of all foreigners from the country. Such a widespread and powerful movement, which imposed upon the United States and the other civilized powers the task of readjusting the foreign and domestic relations of the great empire, demands careful consideration.

China has been described as honeycombed with secret societies. The I Ho Tuan, or "Boxers," variously translated the "Sacred Harmony Fist," "Fists