"Sol di là sù deriva; come fiume "Dove ogni ben con molto male è misto, Be patient, Nymph, and if deriv'd from Heav'n, Thither lift up thy Eyes; all Good or Ill Derives from thence, as Streams from Fountains flow, Or Plants fpring from their Roots: And tho' all Good Here upon Earth, is greatly mix'd with Ill; Yet there, where all is good, it turns to Good. This is what Mr. Pope call'd before: Heaven destroying the Effect of Vice. And fhould it be fo that all fhall at laft turn to Good and Happiness, then let human Actions, or all other Accidents be what they will, it must be allow'd, WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT. { He blames those who expect an immediate Reward for their Virtue, in Things which are by no Means worthy to be term'd fo, and much more thofe enjoying many good Things, are continually uneafy, and for grasping of more. But fometimes Virtue ftarves while Vice is fed. What then? Is the Reward of Virtue, Bread? That, Vice may merit; 'tis the Price of Toil: The Knave deferves it when he tills the Soil; The Knaves deferves it when he tempts the Main, Where Madness fights, for Tyrants, or for Gain. The good Man may be weak, be indolent, Nor is his Claim to Plenty, but Content. But granthim Riches, your Demand is o'er? [Pow'r? No-fhall the Good want Health, the Good want Add Add Health to Pow'r, and every earthly Thing: Such People asking as a Reward for Virtue what would most certainly deftroy it, he concludes therefore on the Whole, that, What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy, The Soul's calm Sunfhine, and the Heart felt Joy Is Virtue's Prize. The Poet (fays our Commentator) begins therefore [from 1. 174 to 195] with confidering Riches. 1. He examines firft, what there is of real Value in them, and fhews, they can give the good Man only that very Contentment he had before, or, at moft, but burthen him with a Truft to be difpens'd for the Benefit of others: For Riches, can they give but to the Just Since the good Man efteems all, befide what is fufficient to fupply him with the Conveniencies of Life, as entrusted to him by Providence, for the Supply of others Neceffaries. 'Tis true, he tells us elfewhere, that another Sort of good Men are of a different Opinion : The grave Sir Gilbert holds it for a Rule, God God cannot love (fays Blunt, with lifted Eyes) O Fool! to think God hates the worthy Mind, The Lover, and the Love, of Human-kind, Whofe Life is healthful, and whofe Confcience clear, Because he wants a thousand Pounds a Year! The Poet next examines the imaginary Value of Riches, as the Fountain of Honour. For his Adverfaries Objection ftands thus -As Honour is the genuine Claim of Virtue, and shame the just Retribution of Vice; and as Honour, in their Opinion, follows Riches, and Shame Poverty; therefore the good Man fhould be rich.-He tells them in this they are much mistaken : Honour and Shame from no Condition rife; What Power then has Fortune over the Man? None at all. For, as her Favours can confer neither Worth nor Wisdom; fo neither can her Displeasure cure him of any of his Follies. On his Garb indeed fhe has some little Influence; but his Heart ftill remains the fame : Fortune in Men has fome fmall Diff'rence made, Then, as to Nobility, by Creation or Birth, this too he fhews [from 1. 195 to 207] is, in itself, as devoid of all real Worth as the reft: Because, in the firft Cafe the Title is generally gain'd by no Merit at all; Stuck Stuck o'er with Titles, and hung round with Strings, That thou may'st be by Kings, or Whores of Kings. In the fecond, by the Merit of the first Founder of the Family, which will always, when reflected on, be rather the Subject of Mortification than Glory: Go! if your antient, but ignoble, Blood III. The Poet in the next Place [from 1. 206 to 227] unmasks the falfe Pretences of Greatness, whereby it is feen that the Hero and Politician (the two Characters which would monopolize that Quality) after all their Buftle, effect only this, if they want Virtue, that the one proves himself a Fool, and the other a Knave: And Virtue they but too generally want. The Art of Heroifm being understood to confift in Ravage and Defolation; and the Art of Politicks, in Circumvention. Now -Grant that those can conquer, these can cheat, 'Tis Phrase abfurd to call a Villain, Great: Who wickedly is wife, or madly brave, Is but the more a Fool, the more a Knave. It is not the Success therefore that constitutes true Greatness; but the End aimed at; and the Means which are employed: And if these be right, Glory will be the Reward, whatever be the Iffue: Who noble Ends by noble Means obtains, IV. With regard to Fame, that still more fantastick Bleffing, he shews (from 1. 226 to 249] that all all of it, befides what we hear ourfelves, is merely nothing; and that even of this finall Portion, no more of it gives the Poffeffor a real Satisfaction, than what is the Fruit of Virtue. All Fame is foreign, but of trus Defert, Plays round the Head, but comes not near the Heart. Thus he fhews, that Honour, Nobility, Greatness, Glory, fo far as they have any Thing real and fubftantial, that is, fo far as they contribute to the Happiness of the Poffeffor, are the fole Iffue of Virtue, and that neither Riches, Courts, Armies, nor the Populace, are capable of conferring them. •24 V. But laftly, the Poet proves [from 1. 248 to 259] that as there are no external Goods can make Man happy, fo neither is it in the Power of all internal. For, that even fuperior Parts bring no more real Happiness to the Poffeffor, than the reft, nay, put him into a worfe Condition; for that the Quicknefs of Apprehenfion, and Depth of Penetration do but sharpen the Miseries of Life: In Parts fuperior, what Advantage lies? &c. This to his Friend-nor does it at all contradict what he had faid to him concerning Happiness in the Be-. ginning of the Epiftle: For he is now proving that nothing external to Man, or what is not in his own Power, and of his own Acquirement, can make him happy here. The most plaufible Rival of Virtue is Knowledge. Yet even this, he fays, is fo far from giving any Degree of real Happiness, that it deprives Men |