THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

REV. J. BURNET,

FETTER LANE CHAPEL, OCTOBER 1, 1835 *.

"Prove all things."-1 THESSALONIANS, V. 21.

In the present age of the world it may perhaps be thought somewhat singular that the Christian Instruction Society should select for the consideration of those whom they invite to this meeting, such a subject as The Right to Private Judgment in Matters of Religion. It may be stated that no one can, or dare, prevent the exercise of this right, and that upon this account it may be altogether unnecessary to take any trouble or occupy any portion of our time in considering such a question.

Now I will remark, that so far is this from being the fact, namely, that there is no necessity for considering such a question, we should rather regard the period at which we have arrived, and the freedom of thinking by which it is distinguished, as reasons for settling upon fixed and definite ground our right to exercise this freedom of thought. It is very possible that, at an unexpected moment, we may be assailed by the cry that this freedom of thought is licentiousness. It is very possible that, at some unexpected moment, we may be informed that we have no right to exercise this independence of mind and of judgment. And perhaps the length of time through which we have taken it for granted that it is our right thus to exercise our individual judgment, may prevent us from being able to reply to the plea that may be raised against us, and may have prevented us from reverting to the foundation on which we have actually been exercising the right at issue.

Now to prevent this, while we enjoy, and are thankful that we do enjoy, the exercise of private judgment, not only in matters of religion, but in all matters, we should never forget frequently to recur to first principles, and to see clearly why we exercise this right, and ascertain that we have a divine authority for it. We are then ready against an evil day, for which at present we may not look; and we are then ready for circumstances which at present we may not anticipate; we are ready to contend earnestly for this very important and this very essential feature in the faith of the Gospel.

It is, then, for the purpose of thus directing your minds, that I have read the motto which I intend as a prefix to the observations I have to submit to you: but before entering upon the reasons I would adduce in support of the right of private judgment in matters of religion, I would first notice-(although

The first of a Course of Lectures by Ministers in connexion with the Christian Instruction Society.

this may not be a usual method, perhaps it may be found not at all an improper one)-I would first notice the objections that are taken against the exercise of this right.

It is said, first of all, If private judgment is to be exercised in matters of religion, then every individual will have his own religion, and we may expect to have as many religions as there are individuals making a profession of Christianity. If that be the fact, if we were, in asserting the exercise of private judgment as a right belonging to every individual, to run the hazard of multiplying religions, we answer at once, that this is only a consequence arising out of the right of private judgment from the depravity of human nature, and not arising out of the exercise of private judgment itself. It is very possible, nay, very certain, that if the imperfect children of men had all the liberty and privileges belonging to the angels in heaven, consequences very different from those which characterize the history of angels would arise out of the character of the children of men. But no one would say that these consequences were the necessary effects of the liberty which men would then enjoy. The angels are perfect in the liberty and privileges they enjoy, and no evil consequences result from the exercise of their liberty and their privileges: why, then, should it be supposed that evil consequences must necessarily be connected with privilege and liberty? The same liberty, however, and the same privileges would be found connected with, though not producing, evil consequences in the case of the children of men: and then, if these consequences arise not from the privileges in question, whence do they come? We answer at once, From the depravity of human nature. Deal with that depravity as abusing the right of private judgment, but assail not the right itself, as if it were the author of the evil of which you complain. If private judgment is so exercised by depraved and fallen man as to be abused, then let nothing but the depravity that is guilty of the abuse be arraigned for the consequences: and if that depravity is so arraigned we shall be the last to attempt its defence. But if, instead of assailing the depravity of man for abusing the right of private judgment, we assail the right itself and forbid its exercise, we are mistaking altogether the source whence the evil springs of which we complain, and we are not taking the method by which the evil may be prevented.

But again: let us suppose that the right of private judgment may be interdicted to the many, lest each may create in its exercise a religion of his own; in what way are we to prevent these evil consequences by interdicting the right? Shall we issue a decree clothed with all the formalities of authority; and shall we insist that that decree, by personal pains and penalties, shall be observed, and that private judgment shall be in no case exercised? Let me ask whether this is possible. Have we the minds of men in our hands? We can interdict, very true, the expression of private judgment, but the exercise of it in the minds of individuals we cannot interfere with. The slave, clad in the iron fetters with which his tyrant holds him in degrading bondage, has still, in the midst of that bondage, his private judgment: and with the mind, which is free whilst you bind his body, you cannot interfere; and the current of his thoughts will flow with the same freedom when you have pronounced your resolve that he shall think with you, as if you had permitted him to prove all things," according to the words of our text.

We say, then, in reply to the objection, that the evil results not from the

exercise of private judgment, but from the depravity of human nature; and we say, secondly, that you cannot prevent the exercise of private judgment if you would, although you may suppress the expression of its dictates.

But it may be said, If we can suppress the expression of its dictates, and we cannot pretend to any thing more, is this not a certain degree of good achieved, and do we not prevent evil? In what way, my friends? To prevent the expression of the dictates of private judgment, and to supersede them by some authorized teaching, supposes an infallible instructor. How do we know that the public judgment exercised by the ecclesiastical council, or exercised by any body whatever, may not be as pernicious in its results and its workings, as the private judgment of each individual? Yea, we know that this has been the case in the past ages of the Church: almost every heresy has been at one time or other protected and taught by public authority; and almost every orthodox sentiment has by the same public authority been put down. We have, therefore, no infallible teacher to which to apply: if we were to give up the exercise of our private judgment, we have no infallible guide that can direct us in order to ascertain what the will of God is in public authority, if we were to yield our personal reason.

It is impossible, then, to suppress, by any means whatever, the exercise of private judgment-equally impossible to substitute public authority for it, without involving in the possibility an infallible teacher, an infallible guide, which no one pretends to possess: and therefore, after all the objections that can be urged against the right of private judgment, we must abandon them all as untenable, and have recourse to the motto in the text " Prove all things."

Having noticed the leading objections that may be urged against the right of private judgment, let me direct your attention to some considerations that may be urged in support of that right.

And first of all I would say, that the right of private judgment in matters of religion (for it is here that we assert that right), appears to have been intended as the duty-not merely the privilege-of every individual to whom the word of God should come. Let us take for example the epistle of which our text forms a part, and let us see to whom this epistle was directed; and we shall then be able rightly to understand the meaning of the expression which I have chosen as the text. At the beginning of the epistle we find the Apostle setting out thus: "Paul, and Silvanus, and Timotheus, unto the church of the Thessalonians, which is in God the Father and in the Lord Jesus Christ." Now you will observe that this was not addressed to the clergy, but to the Church-the Church of the Thessalonians; not to any public functionary, but to the private members. Such is the address of the Apostle; and after the Apostle, and his brethren whom he unites with himself in the epistle before us, Silvanus and Timotheus-after the Apostle had thus addressed the private members of the Church, what does he tell them to do? Does he tell them to listen to the public functionaries, and to accept the law at their lips? Does he tell them to accept every thing from those who might administer the law amongst them, and to reject no part of their injunctions, how much soever those injunctions might be at war with their own judgments? No; but the Apostle, and Timotheus, and Silvanus, inspired and infallible teachers of the mind of God to the Church of Thessalonica, say, "Prove all things." Now

nothing could be more indicative of the right of the people, as recognized by Paul, and Timotheus, and Silvanus, to exercise their private judgment, than this very injunction. To all the church of Thessalonica, to the men and to the women of that church, without any discrimination of rank or talent, or information, he addresses the common injunction, "Prove all things." if any individual were to say, Nay, but the church at Thessalonica must defer to authority," we should at once say, Where is the ground of the deference? It occurs no where in the epistles; they are addressed without any exception, and without distinction in the epistle of the high pre-eminence of any authority; and they are all in common commanded (not recommended), they are all in common commanded to " prove all things." Nothing can be plainer, nothing

can be more obvious than this.

Now if we go further yet-although we might consider this to be conclusive, for there is actually a command to exercise the right of private judgment, not merely an assertion on its behalf-but if we were to go further than this, and look to the other epistles, we find those epistles in precisely the same style. The epistle to the Romans is directed, "To all that be in Rome, beloved of God, called to be saints." The first and the second epistles to the Corinthians are addressed in the same style: "To the church at Corinth." We find the epistle to the Galatians in the same .form: in short, all the epistles to the churches are in precisely the same form, except one, and that is the epistle to the church at Philippi, and we find that epistle opening thus: "To all the saints which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons :" but first of all, to the church. That is the only epistle in which the public functionaries are introduced at all in the superscription of the epistle, and there they are introduced only after the church has been placed before them. If, therefore, we find the epistles to all the churches thus addressed to the members of the churches generally and individually, and not to the public functionaries-except in the one case to which I have referred, in which they are placed behind, and the members of the church brought up to the most prominent position-if that be the case, is there not a proof then in all these epistles, that it was intended that every member should exercise his right of private judgment in the exposition and in the application of it?

Nay more, if we come to consider the epistles that were addressed to individuals that, for example, addressed to Timothy, and that addressed to Titus, and that "to the elect lady and her children," and that to "the beloved Gaius," do we find any thing in these epistles clothing these individuals with the authority of interpreting against the private judgment of those they taught the oracles of truth? Nay, they are commanded "in meekness to instruct those that oppose themselves;" not to dictate to them on the ground of authority. They are commanded to reprove and to rebuke. and to exhort, and to persuade; but they are no where commanded to exercise authority, if opposed, over the right of private judgment exercised by the individuals in question.

If, therefore, we find all the public epistles thus directed to the church generally, and not to the public functionaries, and if we find all the individual and private epistles directed to the parties on private business, like that of Philemon, or about the conduct which individuals should pursue in the church, like that of Timothy and Titus, while nothing on the subject of interference

with the right of private judgment is introduced, can we have a stronger argument for maintaining the sacredness of this right? I think not.

Now we have not only the fact, that the church at Thessalonica was addressed by the command, "prove all things," notwithstanding the truth that that epistle was addressed to all the members-we have not only the further fact, that all the other public epistles are of the same description, addressed to all the members of the churches-we have not only the third fact, that all the private epistles omit, and do not clothe the individual addressed with any authority against the right of private judgment, and do not contain any disparagement of the exercise of that right-but we have the additional fact, and it is a great and important one, that every one of us must give an account of himself unto God; and, consequently, this account implies the exercise of the right of private judgment. If we are to give an account of ourselves unto God; if we are to appear at the judgment-seat of Christ, and to give there an account of the deeds done in the body; if we must have our own destiny fixed on the judgments we have formed, and the practices which have followed on the judgments we have formed; would it not be the greatest absurdity in the government of God, for a moment to suppose that he intended that after all the account each of us should be compelled to give of himself, we should be at the same time compelled to pursue the dictates which another might deliver, in opposition to our own judgment upon the matter? Shall we give an account of the deeds and the practices to which we have been stimulated by those who would not allow us to think for ourselves? Shall we be called upon to answer at the bar of the Infinite Jehovah for that which another commands us to do, when we were convinced we ought not to do it, or for that which another commands us not to do, when we were convinced we ought to do it? Shall we give an account of ourselves unto God at the last, whilst we are permitted to take no account of ourselves? Shall we be in the keeping of others in every step of our progress on the earth, until at last we arrive at the presence of God, and then, and then only, shall we be independent of the jurisdiction, of the help, or of the censure of other men? Shall we carry mental slavery with us all the time that we are in our state of probation, and as soon as our eternity is to melt away beneath the sentence of the everlasting God, shall we then stand on our own foundation, and shall we never be permitted to do so till then? There is something in this so monstrous, there is something so inconsistent with the elevated views that we are taught to form of God, there is something in this so inconsistent with the equity and justice of his high administration, that we cannot for a moment entertain it. If God tells us, and we know he does, that every one of us must give an account of himself to God, he means to tell us, that every one of us is allowed to "prove all things" against the day of that account. If he tells us that every one of us is to give an account of himself unto God, he tells us, at the same time, that we are to employ our judgment in ascertaining how we are to walk before the day of that high final sentence. If, for example, the laws of the land were promulgated in the midst of us, and we were reminded that we must be accountable to the tribunal by which these laws are executed; but if we were informed, at the same time, that there are certain public functionaries appointed to tell us what in every case we are to do, but that when we are called to the tribunal of the land, these functionaries are not to be accountable for