country, which had so unchangeably resisted, withstood, and overcome, the utmost fury and indignation of France in her proudest days, was reserved the immortal honour of deciding this third Punic war-the fortune of their bitterest foes-the political life of Napoleon. The allied armies, in countless numbers, continued to press forward to the French frontiers. On the side of Italy and the Upper Rhine, they formed an immense barrier along the French borders. Still, however, several of their armies were not yet up in line, and it would still require some time before they could be so, particularly on the Upper Rhine, where the most formidable army of the allies intended to enter France, and where the grand head-quarters of the allied Sovereigns were established. Their plan was understood to be not to make any movement on the offensive, till their whole forces were in line from the straits of Dover to the shores of the Mediterranean. This done, and before the sword was unsheathed, a solemn appeal was intended to be made by them. to the French nation, calling upon them to return to a state of amity, by abandoning the man who had brought so many calamities and this fresh war upon Europe, and to remould the treaty of peace which they had violated. This offer unsuccessful, as they calculated it would be, their intention was to enter France at every point with an overwhelming force; and from every quarter to advance without delay upon Paris, which again in their power, they supposed would disorganize and scatter the Government and resources of Napoleon. Of this, Bonaparte was perfectly aware; and also deeply sensible how unable he was to oppose an effectual resistance, on every point, against the vast force advancing against him. He, therefore, determined to take them in detail, and before their plans were matured and completed. In furtherance of this object, the allied armies stationed in the Netherlands, under the command of Wellington and Blucher, engaged his earliest attention, as being those nearest the capital of his Empire. He, therefore, resolved to attack them first. In this resolution he seems to have had four great objects in view. The first was the gratification of French ambition, cupidity, and vanity, by the conquest of Belgium, so generally wished for in France. The movements. second was, if possible, to remove the danger of invasion to a point as far distant from his capital as possible. The third was of still greater importance, namely, if he succeeded in forcing back the armies here stationed, he would then have it in his power to menace the rear of the right wing of the grand allied army, which was to enter France by the Upper Rhine, thereby either retarding or endangering their forward If he succeeded in these important operations, it was of less consequence at what expense he did so. He conceived that he would thereby crush the voice of disaffection in France, and call forth once more around his conquering standards, the energy and unprincipled ambition of the nation. Last, and not least, as the surest road to ultimate success: by gaining the first point he was certain that he would succeed in removing the war from the French territories, and make other Countries, as formerly, support the expense; without which he was aware France would not long bend with perfect satisfaction to his sway. To accomplish this point, however, he must have totally destroyed the armies of Wellington and Blucher. Any partial victory obtained over them, though it might have compelled them to retreat, and thereby have given him the possession of a tract of country, would have been of no solid advantage, so long as their armies remained unbroken and united; because their loss would have been quickly supplied from the numerous re-enforcements pushing on to join them; and because the advance of the grand army across the Upper Rhine, where Bonaparte had confessedly no force equal to oppose them, would not only have laid his right wing open to their efforts, but his Capital also. This alone would have compelled him to relinquish any hold which he might have gained in the Netherlands; unless in his usual phrase, he had in reality annihilated the armies of Blucher and Wellington, when a small part of his force would have been sufficient to guard the quarter where they were, and the remainder of his force would thus have been disposable to watch the movements or attack the columns of the grand army. Such, no doubt, were his calculations. Still nothing but French vanity and arrogance could have led him to suppose, that he had any chance to ob fain this great object, but at an expence which on his part would have rendered even victorý but a temporary relief, if he could obtain it at all. He, however, thought otherwise. It was the only measure in which he had any chance of that success which could materially benefit his cause-the only measure which was likely to have a serious influence upon the plans of his adversaries-a beneficial influence on the recovery of his military character, and the re-establishment of his former power. Half measures were not the weapons with which he fought. All or nothing was his watch-word in every operation. No lesser matters occupied his thoughts. It animated him at this moment, it prompted every movement-directed every motion and guided him to cast every thing upon the issue of one terrible attempt. What he had in view he must also do quickly. The allied army in the Netherlands were at this moment, dispersed over the country, for the sake of procuring, more readily, the necessary supplies, for such vast bodies of men. About half, or rather more than the half, of the Prussian army, were upon the banks of the Rhine, a considerable distance from the remainder and from the frontiers. On his part he had it in his power, when acting on the offensive, to choose his point of attack, with greater security than the allies could; because he had a much more formidable chain of fortresses in his line to support his operations, and behind which he, no doubt, calculated that he would be able to retire, if he found he could not accomplish his object. A decisive victory over him, by the arms of Wellington and Blucher, was an occurrence which never once entered into his mind, or into the thoughts of his admirers. With the mighty force of 190,000 men, as is elsewhere more particularly mentioned, and not only formidable in point of numbers, but more so from the quality of the troops, he commenced his operations. These men were the flower of France, and of his military strength. They had their characters to regain-their glory to re-conquer-their fortunes to re-establish and their future repose to secure. Perjury and treason had lowered them in the eyes of honour and worth. These feelings combined, stung their souls, and goaded them to fury. The utmost exertions were to be expected, from both them and their leader. Their fate, their fortune, and their fame, they had altogether to re-create, and these were all irretrievably committed in this dreadful struggle. They marched to it with a resolution which the utmost strength of rage and despair could inspire. The infamous attempts of their profligate Government, to inflame their hearts with the deadliest animosity and resentment against the allies, and particularly against the Prussians, by publishing, falsehoods about the intended crueltics to be committed by the latter in France, had but too well succeeded. Their anger was thus goaded to madness; and they were prepared to act in a manner which was certain to drag down on their heads at last the most unrelenting vengeance. "It is particularly against the Prussians," said an article in the Moniteur, "that the French army manifests an implacable hatred, and we have some reason to fear that it will not be willing to make any prisoners of that nation." Why they should entertain this implacable hatred, it would be difficult to tell, but from the reason already mentioned. Their guilty consciences, no doubt, bade them remember the miseries and cruelties, which without any cause, they had inflicted without mercy on that gallant nation. Wherefore they feared those they had so cruelly injured; and because, if situated as the Prussians were, they would have acted to them as their Government had succeeded in persuading them the Prussian soldiers intended to do in France, they were resolved to shew them no mercy. The consequences, bitter and distressing as these might be, were incapable of meeting with consideration in their hardened hearts. On the 13th, Bonaparte having joined the army, the head quarters was established at Beaumont. The 1st corps, under D' Erlon, was at Soire on the Sambre; the 2d corps, under Reille at Ham-sur-Heure; the 4th corps, under Girard, at Philipville; the 3d, under Vandamme, on the right of Beaumont, the position of the 6th, under Lobau, is not stated. The advance of the Prussian army were on their front, occupying the banks of the Sambre, above Namur, in the neighbourhood of which the main body was assembled. On the extremity of their left was posted the Belgian, Dutch, and part of the Brunswick forces; and behind them, in cantonments towards Brus sels, and in that city, the British and Hanoverian troops were stationed. In marching to the frontiers, and while living in their own country, the French soldiers were guilty of the greatest excesses. They boldly told their own countrymen, things could not go on without them, and that they would do as they pleased. They plundered and robbed every thing that came in their way; and destroyed what they could not use. In these scandalous scenes, they were abetted by their Officers; who carelessly answered to complaints, that "the Soldiers must live." The Soldiers accordingly lived, and the Officers had abundance. Such, however, was always the conduct of every army under the command of Napoleon. By allowing them to do as they pleased, he made them enthusiasts in his favour. In this instance, wherever they marched they left desolation behind them. In an instant the crops on the richest fields disappeared, under the edge of the scythe; to be used as forage for the Cavalry and thatch for their canteens. The Guards, who were the most devoted servants of Napoleon, treated the rest of the army with the greatest arrogance and contempt, in consequence of which a deep enmity was produced betwixt them. The Cavalry and Infantry were also on bad terms, and it was only when in battle they were united-In the work of death they all cordially joined, and hence their leader hastened to lead them into it. On the 14th Bonaparte commenced offensive operations. This day was the anniversary of the battles of Marengo and Friedland, and therefore in all probability was chosen by him as a propitious moment to encourage his troops, and to commit his fortune to the decision of the sword. On this day, once inore, Napoleon calls and France obeys his call, พ. He, accordingly, addressed a proclamation, of that date, to his army, reminding them of these events, which twice before "decided the fate of Europe." "Then," said he, "as after Austerlitz, as after Wagram, we were too generous." Those Princes, continued he, whom we left on the throne, have violated their oaths, have coalesced among themselves, "to destroy the independence and most sacred rights of France. • Pope's Homer's Iliad. |