but few, if any, afterwards. Yet, in an official account published at Berlin, a considerable time after, from the 15th June to the 3d July, 11,000 are returned "missing;" and of this number there was 27 officers and 6424 rank and file belonging to the first corps, which was that which was most closely engaged on the 16th. This return will be more particularly attended to afterwards. But we shall take the number of killed and wounded only at 16,000, on the 15th and 16th, particularly as the enemy's account only mentions that number. It is true, he mentions this in an unusual manner. He says "that the flower of the Prussian army was destroyed in this battle, and that its loss could not be less than 15,000 men:" whether he includes prisoners in that number is difficult to determine. I conceive not. These, according to Soult's account, amounted to 8000 men; but many, if not all of these, were, no doubt, wounded. The French loss was, as usual, underrated; and by the same authority is set down at only "3000 killed and wounded."* Soult, in an official letter to the minister at war, also states this as the number. "Our loss," said he, "does not appear enormous; since, without screening it, I do not reckon it more than 3000 men." It is almost unnecessary to add, that this account cannot be correct; and when we come to sum up the strength and losses of the army, we will find that it was not. Fortunately we have other data to enable us to ascertain this loss. According to Lacroix, in the Chamber of Peers, July 1st, the loss of Girard's division, which was detached to assist Vandamme, was more than one half of this number, and it was only one twentieth of the force engaged. Besides, the two corps under Grouchy were, no doubt, the same strength as the rest; and this with the cavalry makes their strength on the 16th above 55,000 men. Allowing that he had 40,000 with him at Wavre, he must have lost more than 15,000, independent of the loss in Girard's division. It was this great loss which was the true cause of Bonaparte's inactivity after these bloody battles. Further, if they lost upwards of 6000 men at Quatre Bras, where so few, comparatively speaking, were engaged; their loss, upon a moderate calculation, must have * French official account of the battle of the 16th. been more than double the number at Ligny; and there can be little doubt that it was at least equal in killed and wounded to that of the Prussian army. These numbers united, and joined to those at Quatre Bras, will give a loss to both armies of 41 or 42,000 men killed and wounded. The French even attempt, in a subsequent dispatch, to make this affair as bloody as Borodino. "The cannonade," said they, "was like that at the battle of Moskwa. The loss is said to be 50,000 men."* Though this account is absurd, yet it is evident that the loss was dreadful; and certainly, on both sides, amounted to 41,000 men. Fearful as this destruction was, it is trifling to what followed. These were as yet but skirmishes, as it were, at the outposts of the armies. The repulse of the enemy at Quatre Bras was of the most essential service; and while it added the greater praise to the British troops, which effected the whole without the assistance of cavalry or artillery, against an enemy superbly provided with both; it prevented Ney, with the force under his command, from turning the right wing of the allied army, as his master had calculated upon. Had this taken place, at the same moment when the village of Ligny was finally wrested from Blucher, it might have been attended with the most disastrous consequences. "But fate," to use the words of Ney, "had ordered it otherwise." This Officer finds great fault with Bonaparte, for not attacking the British army first, in place of the Prussian. He forgets that he was in reality sent with a force which he believed, and which was calculated would have, even according to his own accounts, succeeded in defeating it completely; for "victory was not doubtful," when he found the first corps of the army withdrawn from his assistance. But wherefore was it so? Because the Prussians were too firm for Bonaparte. It was so late before he could spare this corps from the point where he was, that Ney could make no use of it, as the remainder of the British army had come up. Ney accuses the Emperor of causing the 1st corps to march backwards and forwards during the day without being of any service to either party. In this he only shews how severe and * Letter to the minister at war, Fleurus, June 17th.-Moniteur, June 20th. ↑ Ney's letter to Fouche, June 26th, 1815. how doubtful the combat was at every point, and how mucks the Emperor had it at heart to gain all his object. It is easy to find out faults after errors have been committed; but the truth is that both Ney and his master, before the battle, had the most perfect confidence that their force was quite sufficient to carry all their objects into execution, but which were frustrated by the bravery of their adversaries. The great object of Bonaparte, at this point, was to gain possession of the road to Brussels. In this he was disappointed. He was compelled to acknowledge that all that Ney could effect was to maintain his position at Frasne.* In short, Ney was driven with great loss from this important part of the allied position; and his failure at this point was, unquestionably, the primary cause of all those terrible disasters, which afterwards so rapidly overtook the cause of treason and ambition. Therefore was he angry. Of his anxious wish-of the anxious wish of his master and all France to "destroy" the British, there is no doubt. It had been their object during twenty-five dreadful years of crimes and misery. The constant aim of that Revolutionary Junta, was expressed in the fiend-like expectations of Fouche, who hoped the republic would, like a volcano, consume "those treacherous and ferocious Britons;" and the land which " produced these monsters be swallowed up by the surrounding seas:"+it was their constant aim from that period till this, when "the general opinion in France, and particularly in the army, was, that the Emperor would, in the first place, turn his attention solely to the destruction of the English army,' and for which circumstances were very, favourable-but fate has ordered it otherwise." The people of Britain are certainly little obliged to Ney and his master, for always directing their first attention solely to their destruction. But that is not so easily accomplished. Such were the results of the sanguinary combats of Ligny and Quatre Bras; where, according to Soult, the overthrow was terrible, and the effect theatrical. The Emperor had indeed at one point beaten, but not broken the line, so far as to compel the allies to choose other ground to reform it; but *French official account of the battle of the 16th. + Fouche's letter to Collot de Herbois, Toulon, Dec. 1793. from that he was not able to derive any material advantage; and certainly none such as he anticipated. This Although the army under Wellington had maintained their position at Quatre Bras, and were joined, or about to be joined, by the cavalry and the main body of the army; still, the retreat of Blucher with the Prussian army, rendered a corresponding movement, on the part of the British General, absolutely necessary. Accordingly, he retired from Quatre Bras early next morning, and took up his quarters at Genappe. Instead of following up this "signal victory," as the followers of Bonaparte chose to term it, and which the Emperor would no doubt have done if he could; he, according to Soult, “returned" to Fleurus at eleven o'clock at night; "as it was necessary to pass the night in attending to the wounded.”* at least argued their numbers. It was not till next day" that the Emperor mounted his horse to follow the success of the battle of Ligny."+ There were other reasons for the Emperor's conduct at this time, than those of attending to the wounded-other pressing reasons; or these would have got leave to. remain on the field of battle, without sustenance and without dressings, as thousands upon thousands of their fellows had, fared in other places. The reasons, which at this time forced humanity upon him, we know from good authority. He "dared” not pursue us, said Blucher. "We maintained our position also," said Wellington. "He made no effort to pursue Marshal Blucher. On the contrary, a patrole which I sent to Sombref, in the morning, found all quiet; and the enemy's videttes fell back as the patrole advanced. Neither did he attempt to molest our march to the rear, though made in the middle of the day." No; the serious business of the preceding day had taught him, that against such foes he must move with caution. Their firmness had rendered it necessary for him to remould his plans, to recruit and re-organize his strength -to be certain, that, in the next engagement, no corps of his army should march backwards and forwards, during a whole day, doing nothing; and perhaps, as at Leipsic, to stop till he got up from the rear a fresh supply of cannon balls and ainmunition to replace that which had been expended. The bravery • Soult's dispatch, June 17th, 1815. do. of the British troops had, in a particular manner, baffled his views; and till they were disposed of, he could neither turn a force against the Prussian army, sufficient to "crush" it, nor could he march to Brussels in safety. In the battle of the 16th, both sides fought with the utmost resolution; but the French soldiers with the bitterest animosity. The first and second corps, which were those that fought at Quatre Bras, had hoisted the black flag, and resolved to give no quarter to their enemies. According to Soult, the French troops fought with the utmost fury and enthusiasm. The columns which marched to battle, the wounded who returned from being dressed, never ceased to exclaim, "Long live the Emperor." This was well-it was brave—had their enthusiasm stopped where it ought. But it did not. The conduct of the French troops in these battles, but particularly against the Prussians, was ferocious and barbarous to the highest degree. Bravery and enthusiasm they may call it, if they please; but such acts belong not to that honourable class, when they put to death, without mercy, the enemy who could no longer injure or resist them. This was their conduct in the present instance. For what reason they were animated with such a deadly hatred against the Prussians, they best could explain. That people had, more than others, been injured, insulted, and oppressed by Frenchmen; and the guilty minds of the latter bade them, perhaps, dread the arm of those whom they had so cruelly wronged. Their government, to assist its own views, had endeavoured to instil into their minds that the Prussians were animated with passions more ungovernable, vindictive, and unjust, than their own; and which they intended to wreck on France without mercy. Their passions were thus kindled to fury against the Prussians, whom, as soldiers, their pride and selfconfidence had taught them to look upon with contempt. They, therefore, refused to give quarter. The battle thus became a massacre. This statement is not taken from the accounts published by the enemies of France, but we learn it from their own documents. We have already noticed the odious fabrications which prepared us to expect this conduct on the part of the French troops. Unfortunately, it was too well adapted to the feelings of the French soldier. Their bloody threats were put |