This important and terrible anathema of United Europe, reached Paris about the third or the fourth day after the King left it, and the second after Bonaparte entered it. It had a prodigious effect on the public mind. All endeavours to conceal it, made it the more eagerly sought after, and though, it was impossible to keep it a secret in Paris, yet by means of the. censorship over the public Press, it was not generally known over France. Without publishing the document itself, Bonaparte caused the Moniteur to insert some remarks upon an article, said to have been published by the allies; but it was not till two weeks afterwards, nor till the perverted intellects of the English opposition Press, and members, had given the French Government their cue, that they published the declaration with their usual sophistical notes and remarks accompanying it. But even these did not go the length their friends on this side the channel had done. They seem to have been able, to find out no encouragement to assassination in it, nay, they even admit the propriety of the declaration, so long, as the allies conceived that Bonaparte was only an adventurer; but main-, tained that his arrival at Paris, and resumption of the imperiat dignity, altered his situation so as to make a total different mode of behaviour, and line of conduct towards him, requisite on the part of the powers of Europe. They did not attempt to deny, that the powers of Europe, had a right to prevent the return of Bonaparte, providing, according to their ideas, that there was a party in France against him; but, as they maintained there was none, so they insisted that they had a right to make choice of him, if they wished it, without violating any treaty with the allies; who had expressly declared, that they did not wish to interfere with the internal concerns of France, or to force any form of Government upon her, contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants. This was the mode in which the conspirators reasoned; forgetting that the allies having an unquestioned and imperious right to proscribe the Government of Bonaparte, had done so, to which the French people had assented, and upon the faith of the observance of which, they had concluded with France in 1814, the favourable treaty which they had done. That which I have already mentioned,

was the feelings of the conspirators themselves, with regard to this famous document:-the following remarks from the Moniteur, wrote for the express purpose of answering what they as yet dared not publish, will be sufficient to shew this. " It is the wish of the powers, it is said, that the general peace should not be disturbed, and the nations of Europe, should not be again plunged into the disorders and misfortunes of Revolutions. That principle might induce them to declare against the Emperor Napoleon, on the first news of his landing, and when they could only regard him as a competitor for a throne, occupied by another, where success was uncertain-when they thought that a contest with balanced forces, might disturb the tranquillity, and bring back all the Revolutionary evils to France, and to Europe. The succours which these powers offer to the French nation, are, therefore, as inapplicable, as those offered to the King. There is no longer a King of France to accept the one; and the French nation will not have the other. The pretended assistance, would therefore, be an attack: those offers would be a declaration of war against the whole nation-a declaration, which would remind the nations of Europe, of the Crusade of 1792, and which would have the same result." *

Proceeding in this train of reasoning, they endeavoured to raise a clamour in Europe, by insinuating or rather stating, as usual, that the object of the allies, was merely to maintain Louis XVIII. on the throne of France, against the wishes of the nation, which was unanimous against him. "No where are there any symptoms of troubles or demonstrations of civil war. The subjects of those powers, fatigued by twenty years of war, will not be deceived on this subject. They will see that Europe is to be put in flames, for a single family-who, having already been once replaced, by deluges of blood, in its inheritance, could not maintain itself one year! It will be asked, whether all the people of Europe are to sacrifice their repose, their industry, their welfare, and their lives, constantly seeking to place a fugitive family in an asylum, whence it allows itself always to

* Moniteur, 3d April, 1815.

be repelled, and to replace it in a situation which it always abandons." * Here the French writer with that characteristic audacity and disregard, for truth, which the denationalizing jargon of the revolution had taught them, boldly asserts, that all the wars to the conquest of Paris in 1814, was waged by the nations of Europe, purely for the purpose of restoring Louis XVIII. and that their object was again the same. Europe well knew, the contest had been, and was yet to be, for a very different purpose; and that the whole had been forced upon her by French Revolutionary principles, ambition, and power. Not content with promulgating this barefaced falsehood, they affected to claim great merit, for their wish to observe the treaty of Paris, which they characterised as disgraceful to France. "The treaty of Paris," said they, "might excite, in the mind of the Emperor, as in the mind of every Frenchman, a sorrow which might have been the deeper, as a firm and courageous Government would doubtless have obtained less disadvantageous conditions. But that treaty exists. It is not the Emperor's work. It is not his glory that suffers by it. France wishes for peace; her limits are traced, the Emperor will not overpass them, unless he be thereto compelled, in consequence of their being penetrated. There is nothing to be changed in the relation of the Empire with other nations. The chief is different, but the relations are the same." If the Emperor could have made a more advantageous peace, why then, did he not stay and do it? All Europe, and every one, but an impudent Frenchman, could understand that it was not with Napoleon the treaty of Paris was made; and that the cause of its being so favourable, was the express conditions, that Bonaparte should leave France, and that the French nation should withdraw their allegiance from him. Unless that had been done, a treaty very different from that of Paris would have been exacted from France; and Europe would have taught her, that with Bonaparte at her head, the relations between them had always been, and must remain, upon a different footing. After adverting to the im

* Moniteur, April 38, 1815,

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possibility, in his view of the subject, of the allies ever forming another coalition, equal to that of 1813 and 1814, which they accomplished" by making the people believe, that they were interested in opposing the pretensions of France," the writer proceeds to shew, that France and the Emperor might safely be trusted. "France has no longer any pretensions, that may alarm them. The Emperor comes forth from his retreat to act on a new system abroad and at home. With respect to abroad, he renounces the idea of a great Empire, and at home he wishes a free Constitution. His promises are believed, and foreigners have nothing more to say on the subject. We respect their independence, let them respect ours. They have no right to violate it, and experience has well demonstrated, that when we are united they have not the power." *

Such was the idle reasoning, which the French nation brought forward to support their last flagrant violation of the treaties, concluded between them and the people of Europe; and such the daring assertions and assumptions, which they attempted to make and maintain, to aid their unrighteous cause. It was impossible that Europe could for one moment be so besotted as to listen to such arguments; and nothing but that consummate impudence, which modern Frenchmen possess beyond all other men, could have made them suppose that she would. No! Europe had been too often deceived by France and her Emperor, again to put any trust in the promises or the professions of either. In all these observations, however, upon the declarations of the allies, there is not the smallest hint of attributing assassination to them, or disputing their right to interfere against Bonaparte; but only attempting to say, he would, for the future, behave better than he had done. The hints and materials given and afforded to Bonaparte's supporters, in Paris, by his admirers in Britain, had not yet reached that city, or opened their understanding; but, as we go along, we will perceive that these were not lost upon them.

If the Sovereigns of Europe were so firmly resolved, and unanimous, upon the first whisper of the danger which approach

Moniteur, April 3d, 1815.

ed them, it was not likely that they would be less so, as that danger became more imminent. Accordingly, the rapid advance of Bonaparte, the defection of the troops, the apathy or the satisfaction of the people, and the joy with which he was received at Paris, but increased their spirit and doubled their exertions. Courier after courier was dispatched to hasten the march of the troops from every point. The Austrian troops continued to press forward to Italy, and towards the Rhine, The Bavarians, in great force, took the same direction. The Germans, along both banks of the Mayne, followed their route. The Prussians continued to increase in the country round Namer and Luxembourg, Blucher was directed to assume the command of this increasing force. Lower down the French frontiers, the troops of Holland, Hanover, Belgium, and Great Britain, daily augmenting by re-enforcements, were placed under the command of the Conqueror of Vittoria, who was recalled from Vienna to assume a more conspicuous and more important station. On the Italian and Spanish frontiers, things were equally active; and at the same time the British flag began to shew itself from her wooden walls, along the sea coasts of the French Empire. The boasted unanimity of the French people, in the reception of Bonaparte, which they gave out, and perhaps made themselves believe, would appal Europe, had a totally different effect. It, indeed, augmented the danger, but it also called forth commensurate means to meet and to crush it.

But to return to France, where we left the usurper again seated in the Thuilleries, amidst the plaudits of his good city of Paris. Napoleon le Grand animated the deepest dens of guilt in the Palais Royale, and the darkest haunts of ferocity in the Fauxbourg of St. Antoine. But before we begin to notice his conduct, after his resumption of the Imperial dignity, it may not be amiss to examine a little more minutely into the object. which he had in view, in returning to France, the plan of the conspirators to accelerate that return, and the conduct of the Marshals and leading men in France at this period. Let us examine these separately.

I have already taken a summary view of the internal situation of France, and the secret anger and deep discontent which