inquiry-between physical science and natural theology, as also between this and revealed religion; each in succession furnishing the necessary basis of evidence to the next; and again, the independence of each with respect to the succeeding, as essential to the order and force of the reasoning, whilst they yet maintain a close connection with, and reaction upon each other.

Thus, from the very nature of the case it will be apparent to what extent the present publication can have any claims to novelty in its topics. Among the various writers on kindred subjects I have met with none taking precisely the same line, or embracing exactly the same range of subject as that which is proposed to be pursued in the ensuing treatise. Yet almost every one of the different branches of my subject has been more or less discussed by some of the authors alluded to. In many cases my statements are, in fact, no more than an elementary exposition of a particular branch of the subject often treated before by others. Yet I conceive I have. best consulted perspicuity and brevity in laying down the principles, as if delivering what was new to the reader, without formally referring him to authors who have treated of it before.

It may perhaps be right to state, that a great part of the argument in the fourth scction runs nearly parallel with that of a discourse which I some time since published, intitled, Revelation and Science ; Oxford, 1833. Also the introductory portion of the first section is a reprint (with a few alterations,) of a paper which I contributed to some early numbers of the Magazine of Popular Science, vol. i. 1836.

In the details of examples adduced from different branches of physical science, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to avoid technicalities, or at least to explain the scientific terms referred to, in the most popular form of illustration of which they appeared susceptible. Indeed throughout in the exposition of the argument, it has all along been made an object to elucidate the principles in the most perspicuous manner which the nature of the subject would admit, and to carry on the discussion in such a form as would be suitable to the general reader.

One further remark must be added. In some of the late critical discussions on natural theology, great stress has been laid (as appears to me very unfairly,) on the omissions of certain writers. No author ought fairly to be subject to animadversion for not discussing what the peculiar line of argument he has selected does not lead him to discuss. I am therefore particularly desirous of stating that the present work has no pretensions whatever to include a complete or systematic treatise on natural theology. Its outline embraces only certain particular questions connected with that science; of a nature, indeed, preliminary and general in one part, and in another supplementary and discursive; but in neither instance having any claim to be regarded as treating every point belonging to the subject. In a word, I wish to be judged of, not by what I do not say, but by what I do.

INDUCTIVE SCIENCE

AND

SECONDARY CAUSES,

CONSIDERED AS THE EVIDENCE OF A FIRST CAUSE, AND THE FOUNDATION OF RELIGIOUS TRUTH.

I. THE EVIDENCE AND NATURE OF
PHYSICAL TRUTH.

II. THE APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL
TO DIVINE TRUTH.

INTRODUCTION.

THE study of natural theology cannot be pursued alone, and disjoined from other branches of inquiry. It has a close connexion with the study of physical science on the one hand, and with that of revelation on the other. Whether we dwell upon the nature of the evidences, or upon the truths established, this connexion is equally intimate. The stability of natural theology rests upon the demonstrations of physical truth: and upon the assurance of the great doctrines of natural theology must all proof, and even all notion, of a revelation be essentially founded. This intimate connexion and dependence, however, is by no means generally understood, often questioned, and not unfrequently even disparaged and denied.

In the discussion of the truths of natural theology much difficulty has arisen in some minds, and much misapprehension of the whole nature of the argument. The order and chain of proof, indeed, seems to require but little consideration to render it evident. Yet it is very generally misconceived. That prolific source of mistake, the ambiguity of terms, operates

B