traced up to their determinate laws, or in other words (agreeably to what has been above maintained), to their physical causes, then, and then alone, it is, that we can ascend to the idea of a regulating moral cause; and deduce the conclusion of superintending volition and designing intelligence.

In general then, the evidence and stamp of moral agency and intelligent influence, is found in the discovery of a uniform consistency in the results, in a regular arrangement of parts adapted to each other, and to the whole, such as to preclude at once the idea of caprice and chance, and that of blind unforeseeing fatality. And this may be distinguished into two kinds :-1st. Where a fixed end is discoverable, and we observe the direction of means to it, and changes taking place in furtherance of it. 2nd. Where, although no such end is discoverable, and no change takes place, yet we perceive things arranged in a certain invariable order and symmetry.

In the study of the actual laws, mechanism, and arrangement of the natural world, we have a magnificent field open before us, in which to pursue the inquiry, whether such indications of moral causation can be traced; and this inquiry is in fact, in its most essential point, already answered in the conclusions at which we arrive by inductive science, the universal order and invariable harmony pervading the material universe.

The application of the truths disclosed by the study of the laws of nature, and the dependence of

physical causes, is, indeed, not to be mistaken; and it may be truly said, that the sublime conclusions of natural theology, in their general and popular acceptation, are obvious on the most cursory survey of the natural world, and at once convincing, even to the most uninstructed apprehension. Unless miserably blinded by prejudice, or incapacitated by moral perversion, the most untaught mind instantly recognises the evidences of the Divine existence and attributes, and unhesitatingly regards the visible order and adaptations of the natural world, as no other than the created manifestations of the Divine perfections. Let us, however, observe that the special object of natural theology, as a science, is to analyse the precise steps by which these conclusions are attained, and examine the security of the ground on which they rest. The preceding portion of this inquiry has been directed in its proper way, towards this object, by scrutinizing the more general grounds on which all our ideas of the relation of effects to their causes depend; and it is to the more particular application of these views to the great argument of natural theology that we are now to proceed.

Nature of Final Causes.

AT the outset of this inquiry, we meet with an expression very commonly employed, but often with little attention to accuracy of meaning; the consideration of what are called "final causes," is referred

to as the main evidence afforded by the study of nature, for the existence and perfections of the Deity. Here then, as in other cases, it is to the meaning of the term that our attention must, in the first instance, be carefully directed. Now the application of the word "cause," when we speak of "final causes," is somewhat peculiar, and, in fact, such as very commonly to occasion mistake and difficulty. Yet the phrase has been perhaps too strongly sanctioned by custom to allow an expectation that it can be generally discarded, even though we should gain considerably in perspicuity, by adopting other expressions to convey the same meaning.

A few instances will serve to illustrate the use of the term:-The circulation of the blood is said to be the final cause of the valves in the blood vessels. It would not be considered correct language to call it the cause simply: though by another modification of the word, we might say that the valves are provided because of the circulation. We might easily illustrate the distinction by abundance of other examples, from all parts of the natural world.

The variation of the seasons is said to be the final cause of the obliquity of the earth's axis. The graminivorous or carnivorous constitution of animals, the final cause of the respective forms of their teeth and feet. The painting of the image, exactly on the retina, is the final cause for the lens of the eye having precisely that focal length, and the medium a corresponding refracting power. Whilst the form

ation of an image, free from colour (in perfect eyes), is the final cause of the lens and vitreous humour having their dispersive powers in a certain relation to each, by which, in theory, that condition will be secured*.

In all such instances we, in fact, use a very circuitous mode of expression in adopting the term "final cause." It was remarked before, that in ordinary language we often use the term "cause" to signify the reason, object, or motive, influencing some moral or intelligent agent. Now when we consider the end or design, in order to which, one thing is arranged in a certain adjustment to another:-when we observe things so adjusted to each other as to be able to trace manifest indications of such plan, then we say of two things so adjusted, that the one is the reason for the other; that the first arrangement was made with a view to the second, or that the second is the use, end, final reason, or lastly, final cause, of the other. We mean, then, a cause operating not in one arrangement upon the other, (as physical cause and effect,) to produce it, or even to regulate it, but in the motive or reason of the intelligent agent, who, we infer, contrived and designed the adjustment.

Thus the term "final causet" really implies no more than is implied by the term "design." In the

See Note D.

+ The etymology is illustrated by the expression of Crellius: "Res hujus universi omnes finis gratiá existere."-De Deo et ejus Attrib. c. iii.

first instance, we find, as mere matter of fact and observation in the order of nature, a recondite adaptation, or fitness, of all the parts of organized beings, and of all the functions of unorganized matter, to each other. We observe that every natural arrangement has its relations to other arrangements: that every physical effect has its dependencies, its uses, its purposes, in reference to others. We discover that in every such relation, (so universally and immutably preserved,) some particular end is, in fact, answered, some particular object secured. It is from the notice and conviction of this bare matter of fact, that we are led on to the further idea and belief of design and intention: that the end which we see answered was contemplated, that the object which we see attained was designed *.

There is, however, another sense in which the same term "final cause" has been used by some writers, which it is worth while to consider, more especially as the confusion thus introduced has led to serious misapprehension of their opinions.

In some cases we may trace the dependence of a phenomenon through a series of physical causes; und the last, highest, or ultimate, cause to which we can thus refer, has been sometimes called the " final cause." And where men have been unable or unwilling to investigate such proximate physical causes, they have been prone to refer at once, as an ultimate or "final" cause, to the will of the Deity; and to

* See Note E.