Sivut kuvina
PDF
ePub

and shall here run no risk of speaking as if we confounded the stones with the builder,—their mutually supporting force with the skill of the architect who adjusted them.

These considerations may enable us, then, to perceive the entire futility of those objections which are often urged against the study of secondary causes as being injurious to our due apprehension and acknowledgment of the first cause;-so far from it they, in fact, furnish the sole rational or natural means of leading us to that apprehension and acknowledgment; and, in the language of Newton, (understood agreeably to the distinctions before laid down,) though every true step made in this philosophy brings us not immediately to the knowledge of the first cause, yet it brings us nearer to it, and on that account is to be highly valued*."

66

Argument from Design to Intelligence.

We have thus far referred only, in a very general sense, to the notion we form of the great source of design and order in nature, or, in popular language, the First Cause, or Supreme Intelligence. In a more precise sense it may become a question, how far is this language and this inference borne out by any conclusions of our unaided reasoning powers?

From the regularity, permanence, and universality

* Opticks, Query 28, p. 345.

of physical causation, we conclude the existence of a moral causation; from the manifestations of order and purpose, we infer an ordaining and designing

mind.

That these are natural inferences and ideas almost unavoidably occurring to us, is perfectly true; but the very point of inquiry in natural theology is the ground of the inference and the analysis of the natural impression.

Now, it has been contended by some professed friends to religion, that beyond the bare fact of order and fitness we can really infer nothing by the mere powers of reason; and that the conclusion of an independent intelligent supreme existence, if it be anything more than a mere truism, is a vain presumption; that in one sense, it is mere tautology to say, that design implies a designer; or else, in another sense, idle to suppose that our finite reason can teach us anything of the purposes or nature of an Infinite Being*.

Now, the bare fact of order and arrangement is on all hands undisputed, though commonly most inadequately understood and appreciated.

The inference of design, intention, forethought, is something beyond the last mentioned truth, and not to be confounded with it. This implies intelligent agency, or moral causation. Hence again, we advance to the notion of distinct existence, or what is sometimes called personality; and thence proceed

Sce Irons On Final Causes, p. 116, &c.

to ascribe the other Divine attributes and perfections as centering in that independent Being.

Such probably would be the distribution of our thoughts as successively pursued, if we proceeded to any systematic analysis of our reasonings on the subject. It is not, perhaps, a species of examination to which many are inclined, even of those who take delight in the general contemplation of the truths with which they are impressed by the examination of the natural world.

Yet a careful consideration of the orderly series of simple elements into which we can analyze our conceptions, is of eminent use (even though we do not practically and habitually go through such a process every time we think on the subject). It enables us as well to assure ourselves of the validity of our own conceptions, as to detect the fallacies of sceptical objections.

Now here I conceive we shall have no need to enter upon any abstruse or difficult discussion. I believe it will suffice to elucidate the subject, if we simply look to the use of language. In analyzing the train of inferences or ideas referred to, the consideration of the origin and precise meaning of the terms we employ appears to me most vitally essential, and yet most commonly overlooked; while, from the neglect of it, most of the misapprehensions which prevail on the subject take their rise.

We observe the indications of mind displayed in the works produced by the moral causation of volun

tary agents and intelligent beings within the scope of our observation. We follow up an analogy

between these and the vast manifestations exhibited in the order of nature; and from this analogy we attempt, however inadequately, to express our limited and imperfect conceptions of the infinite and incomprehensible moral cause of the universal order and system of natural causes.

The same remark applies to the further inference of the distinct existence of the source of moral causation, our whole notion of which seems to depend on our idea of the relation of moral causation to mind, in the cases within our experience. The metaphysical notions which seem to be involved will, I believe, be found to resolve themselves into the same simple consideration of the use of terms applied by analogy from what we experience in ourselves and in beings about us. This I conceive will, on reflection, be found the clue which will safely guide us through at least a large portion of the intricacies of the subject. Considerations of this kind, however, are vitally necessary to the argument of natural theology; and this portion of the subject, involving what has been termed "the psychological argument," is beyond question most essential to an exact and philosophical discussion, though certainly not placed in a sufficiently prominent light, if regarded at all, by some of the most excellent and popular writers*.

See Note G.

The Divine Supremacy.

WE may here observe further, that if we retain the popular language, and speak of the first cause and secondary causes, we must, at all events, bear in mind that the term "first," is relative. We cannot extend our conclusions beyond our evidence. It is entirely from our investigation of "secondary," or physical causes, that we can recognise the sublime moral cause which ordered them all. It is thus manifest that we can properly attach no other idea to the term "first cause," than one which is simply relative to these "secondary causes." Natural theology cannot lead us to any higher inference. Nor is it any reproach to this science that it does not enable us to proceed beyond the limits of its own province; nor to answer the question sometimes propounded in this form of illustration: "The examination of a watch leads us to infer a watchmaker, but it cannot answer the further question, who made the watchmaker* ?" Yet this question has been made the subject of much misapprehension and objection, mainly, as appears to me, from want of reflection and caution in the use of words; or, perhaps after all, rather from some feeling of offence taken at the

For an acute and original statement of this point (which has called forth much animadversion,) the reader is referred to Mr. Combe's System of Phrenology, vol. ii., p. 592.

« EdellinenJatka »