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gradual evolution of the existing frame of the world out of previous orders of existence; we trace its mighty manifestations, stamped with the same unchanging attributes of immensity, through countless ages of duration, and through the boundless expanse of space; but it cannot be said that mere reason can therefore infer any other kind of exercise of this power.

Let it be distinctly borne in mind that the object of these remarks is solely that of caution as to the proper limits of the mere reasoning upon physical order, which is the strict province of the science of natural theology.

There is, however, another point of view in which this subject is often regarded, to which I must allude, though, as not strictly belonging to our present subject, it can be but cursorily noticed, however important in itself. The Deity is proposed as the object not merely of our belief, but of our practical adoration and love, in the imitation, limited and imperfect as it must be, of His moral perfections. Hence the vital practical importance of the most unimpeachable conception of those attributes, and of removing every thing like a limitation on their infinite moral excellence. With the object of maintaining this practical view, many excellent writers have gone into a variety of speculations, directly imposing limits on our ideas of some of the Divine perfections, lest they should be at variance with the infinite excellence of others. Thus it has been distinctly argued, in order to vindi

cate the Divine benevolence, that we must suppose the Deity unable to prevent evil; or, in other words, deny his omnipotence*.

Of such reasonings I will here say no more than this: they are maintained and highly approved as propounded by the very able writer just referred to, by parties of the most unquestionable piety and religious zeal. Those, therefore, who allow and admire these views, can have no right to object to other speculations, which, in like manner, tend to limit our conclusions as to the same attributes. "The truth is, the only rational conclusion which we can arrive at in the matter, is, that in the nature of things, no such attribute" (i. e. as omnipotence) "can exist." These are the words of Mr. Woodward.

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very much question whether expressions infinitely less bold from other quarters, would not be set down as absolute atheism, by the same religious party who admire Mr. Woodward. Such, however, is too often the inconsistency with which cavils are urged against the freedom of inquiry, which we must of necessity claim, in any profitable discussion of the truths of natural theology.

In like manner, writers of the Calvinistic school have anxiously insisted on the want of any proofs of the infinite benevolence of the Deity; thus fortifying their system against the most obvious and forcible

* See Essays and Sermons, &c., by the Rev. H. Woodward, London, 1836; especially Essay XV.

+ Essays, &c., p. 177.

objection drawn from the inconsistency with that attribute, in supposing a condemnation to eternal misery without moral criminality in the irresponsible victim of reprobation, or the possibility of effecting any ulterior good, when the punishment is endless. Yet such persons would be the first to exclaim against putting any limitation on our notions of the Divine power or wisdom, as impious and atheistical.

Limits of Natural Theology.

THE general question as to the extent to which the conclusions of natural theology strictly and legitimately reach, has been the subject of much difference of opinion. One class of reasoners have been prone to invest their inferences with a systematic completeness, which is but illusory: while the perception of this has afforded some colour to the opinion of others, who have as strenuously denied that mere reasoning on these subjects can teach any substantial or satisfactory truths.

And those who do not go these lengths have contended, that what we certainly learn from the admitted facts of order and adjustment in the material world, is in truth very little. That we can advance only to the inference of the mere existence of some powerful intelligent cause; that we can rise only to a vague apprehension of some superior power displayed in the adaptation of created things: but

that we can ascend no further as to any practical results that we learn nothing more than (as they term it) a "quiescent intelligence:" that we can deduce nothing as to active superintendence of the world and the affairs of men: that (in a word) natural theology teaches us nothing of a moral governor of accountable moral agents: nothing of our own nature or destinies: nothing of incorporeal existence, or a future state. For all information on these subjects, they contend we must refer exclusively to revelation.

These are undoubtedly questions not only most fairly and legitimately open to discussion, but of great moment and importance in a satisfactory analysis of the grounds of religious belief. Certainly great diversity of opinion has prevailed with respect to them: and, it must be allowed, may very reasonably prevail.

I will merely offer one remark as to the entire spirit and character of such inquiry. I conceive it is an equally mistaken view, to prosecute it as supposing it to involve the credit either of natural theology on the one hand, or revelation on the other. It neither at all affects the truth or value of natural theology, to admit that it may be deficient in some points, or that they may not properly belong to its province: nor is it any disparagement to the just estimate of our reasoning powers, to confess that they may find their limit when we arrive at certain parts of this vast subject.

On the other side, it does not appear to me at all essential to support the credit, or enhance the perfections of Divine revelation, to make out that it is the only source of information on topics of this nature: or to allow that reason may supply some first rudiments of religious knowledge, on which it is the province of revelation to shed a full and abundant illumination.

Natural Theology necessary as the Basis of Revelation. Opposite Views considered.

WHATEVER difference of opinion may prevail as to the extent to which the inferences of natural theology may reach, or the limits by which they must be circumscribed, all rational inquirers on these topics, I should conceive, would agree in admitting at least some first elements of belief in a Deity, however imperfect and insufficient, as established by natural reason. And it appears equally clear, that, not only any notion whatever of a revelation, but even any statement or proposition of further religious truths beyond the primary doctrines of the existence and perfections of the Deity, must, from the nature of the case, presuppose the truth of those primary doctrines, and be actually based upon the evidence of their truth.

If, again, we look to the establishment of the Evidences of revelation, we must consider the essential bearing which our notions of the Divine attri

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